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**Submission to the Scientific Inquiry
into
Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory**

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He chaired the Australian Coal Associations in 1987-88. From 1998-2000 he chaired the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading which developed the first emissions trading system design for Australia. From 1997 to 2001 he was CEO of the Australian Institute of Company Directors. Ian has a particular interest in the interaction of corporate governance, corporate responsibility and sustainability.

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Submission to the Scientific Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory

Preamble

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to the Scientific Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory (NT).

The Inquiry's Draft Final Report (DFT) is comprehensive at the level of conventional operating and risk management practice. However, in addressing the potential impact of NT fracking on global and regional climate change, it is fundamentally flawed, as it ignores the systemic existential risk which is now being locked-in by global climate inaction, none more so than in Australia. This is a risk unlike any previously encountered by humanity, and cannot be handled by conventional, reactive, learn-from-failure techniques. To suggest that the development of a major shale gas hydraulic fracturing industry in the NT would have negligible impact on global climate warming, and that the associated emissions, whether fugitive or life cycle, represent a medium risk of low consequences, demonstrates a serious failure to understand the existential nature of climate change risk, and its potentially catastrophic impact on the NT, Australia and humanity in general.

In this regard, the report reflects the groupthink, reticence, denialist ideology and vested interests within Australia's political, bureaucratic and corporate hierarchies which have blinded leaders to the fact that the greatest threat to our security now is human-induced climate change, the accelerating impacts of which have been driving political instability and conflict globally for some time. Unless this is addressed as an emergency, catastrophic consequences are the likely outcome.

Australia, particularly the NT, along with the adjacent Asia-Pacific region is considered to be "*Disaster Alley*", where the most extreme impacts of climate change are already being experienced, as documented in our recent report, copy included with this submission¹. These risks are either not understood or wilfully ignored at the leadership level in Australia, which is a profound failure of imagination, far worse than that which triggered the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. We only play this game once, so we must get it right first time.


This should mean an honest, objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed, guarding especially against the more extreme possibilities which would have consequences damaging beyond quantification, and which human civilization as we know it would be lucky to survive.

Instead, the climate and energy policies adopted by successive Australian governments over the last twenty years, State and Federal, have deliberately refused to acknowledge this existential threat to our future security. Our leaders have access to the best possible scientific advice and to the overwhelming evidence that we have badly underestimated both the speed and extent of climate change impact. In such circumstances, to ignore this threat, as the DFT is doing, is a fundamental breach of the fiduciary and security responsibilities with which political, bureaucratic, scientific and corporate leaders are entrusted by the community they are supposed to serve.

This may sound extreme to those not close to the climate science and evidence, but it should be the primary concern of this Inquiry in considering a major fossil fuel development in the NT. The rationale for this view follows:

The Key Issue – The Existential Risk of Climate Change

Climate change is about the management of global existential risk. Government policy fails to recognise that climate risk is an existential risk beyond the conventional risk management experience of corporates, investors, financial markets and regulators. It is an unprecedented danger to the survival of humanity.




The concept of existential risk is not understood or accepted in our political and policy considerations:

It is a risk posing permanent large negative consequences to humanity which can never be undone. One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential ^{2 3}.

Overwhelming expert opinion considers that the world is now exposed to this risk unless global carbon emissions are rapidly reduced. Our current global emission trajectory would lead to a temperature increase in the 4-5°C range, a world which would be “incompatible with an organised global community”, with global population dropping from 7 billion to below 1 billion as the impact of climate extremes takes effect ⁴. The World Bank has pointed out that “There is no certainty adaptation to a 4°C world is possible” ⁵.

Even the 2.7 – 3.5°C outcome which would eventuate if current voluntary Paris commitments were implemented, would result in outright social chaos in many parts of the world. The US Military Advisory Board warns against a “failure of imagination” in thinking through these implications of climate change ⁶, which is exactly what is occurring in Australia at present, as political, bureaucratic and corporate leaders continue to deny even the existence of a climate change problem.



This is extremely irresponsible given that our region, comprising Australia, South Asia and the Pacific, is where the most extreme impacts of climate change are already being felt, as indicated above ⁷. Northern Australia is particularly exposed to these risks.

Existential risk requires fundamentally different risk management from conventional practice; this must become a key component of national planning at all levels, particularly in considering any new fossil fuel investments.

The Rapidly Changing Context of Global Climate Change

Any balanced assessment of the climate science and evidence accepts that climate change is driven primarily by human carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion, agriculture and land clearing, superimposed on natural climate variability, and that it is happening faster and more extensively than previously anticipated.

In this context, scientists have long been concerned about the extreme “tipping point” risks of the climate system; non-linear positive feedbacks which trigger rapid, irreversible and catastrophic change.

These feedbacks are now kicking in. For example, Arctic weather conditions are becoming increasingly unstable as jetstream fluctuations warm the region 20°C or more above normal levels; sea ice is at an all-time low with increasing evidence of methane emissions from melting permafrost ⁸. Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are melting at worst-case rates ⁹, with the potential for several metre sea level rise this century ¹⁰. The Antarctic Larsen ice sheet and Pine Island glacier are showing signs of major breakup as a result of warming Southern Ocean waters, a process which is probably now irreversible ^{11 12}. Coral reefs around the world, not least the Australian Great Barrier Reef, are dying off as a result of record high sea temperatures ¹³. Global temperature increases are accelerating, with 2016 being the hottest year on record ^{14 15}. Major terrestrial carbon sinks are showing signs of becoming carbon emitters ¹⁶. And much more.

The social disruption and economic consequences are already devastating, leading to extensive forced migration and economic collapse in some countries. The refugee crisis engulfing Europe, emanating from Syria and North Africa, is fundamentally climate change driven ¹⁷ and a precursor of greater conflict ahead. The viability of the Middle East in toto is questionable in the circumstances now developing ^{18 19}. Major centres of economic activity, such as the Pearl River Delta, responsible for 40% of China’s exports, the Mekong River Delta and other parts of SE Asia are now under threat from climate-induced sea level rise prior to 2050 ²⁰. The recent unprecedented hurricane season in the Atlantic, devastating bushfires in California and extreme heat in many parts of South Asia are only the most recent portents of what is to come as human-induced climate change intensifies natural extreme weather events. The climate-related damage bill in the US alone for 2017 is likely to exceed \$300 billion.

These developments have profound implications for both Australia and the NT’s economic and social future.

Climate Policy Implications

The Paris Agreement, the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, came into force on 4th November 2016. It requires the 195 countries participating to hold global average temperature to “*well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C*” ²¹. Regional temperature variations would be far greater than these global averages, rendering many parts of the world uninhabitable even at 2°C, beyond the capacity of human physiology to function effectively. This may well be the case across many parts of Northern Australia.

Without rapid carbon emission reductions far greater than the voluntary Paris Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), the planet will become ungovernable. Dangerous climate change, which the Paris Agreement and its forerunners seek to avoid, is happening at the 1.2°C increase already experienced as extreme weather events, and their economic costs, escalate. The negative impact on human health and mortality is already substantial ^{22 23}.

It is now impossible to stay below the 1.5°C Paris aspiration. To have a realistic chance, say 90%, of staying below even 2°C, rather than the unrealistic 50-66% chance upon which official analyses are based, means that there is no global carbon budget remaining today. Thus no new fossil fuel projects should be built globally, existing operations, particularly coal, have to be rapidly replaced with low carbon alternatives, and carbon sequestration technologies which do not currently exist have to be rapidly deployed at

scale ²⁴ ²⁵. Even accepting the 50-66% risk levels excludes constructing any new fossil fuel projects in toto, coal, oil or gas.

Most dangerously, the climate impact of investments made today do not manifest themselves for decades to come. If we wait for catastrophe to happen, as we are doing, it will be too late to act. However governments, business and investors are complacently encouraging the continuation of such investment, for example the Adani coal project in Queensland's Galilee Basin, similar coal investments in NSW, CSG expansion and now the possibility of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in the NT, all on the basis that the 2°C limit is some way off, with a substantial carbon budget still remaining. Neither proposition is correct and the existential risk and security implications are ignored. Indeed, in circumstances of high uncertainty, which is the case currently with tipping points, even greater precautions should be taken than might be the case with better scientific knowledge. We should plan for the worst outcomes and be pleasantly surprised if they do not eventuate.

The transition to a low-carbon economy is unprecedented. It represents the greatest investment opportunity the world has ever seen. We have the technology, the expertise, wealth and resources to make it happen. What we lack is the maturity to set aside political ideologies and corporate vested interests to cooperate in the public interest.

And most importantly, time. Any realistic chance of avoiding catastrophic climatic outcomes requires emergency action to force the pace of change. We cannot afford any further investment in fossil fuels.

These views are not irrational alarmism. They may be regarded as extreme relative to mainstream debate within the political, corporate, financial and investment communities. However they are well-grounded in the science and evidence, as set out in more depth in the "*Climate Reality Check*" paper referenced ²⁶ and included with this submission. Leading scientists are expressing increasing concern that events are now moving rapidly beyond our ability to constrain irreversible climate change ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹. Further, it has become evident that official, often politically constrained, scientific statements have badly underestimated both the extent and speed of climate change, as outlined in our report "*What Lies Beneath: The Scientific Understatement of Climate Risks*", referenced ³² and copy included with this submission.

A brief presentation summarising these points is included with this submission.

Implications for the Northern Territory, Australia and Humanity

For the last two decades in Australia climate change policy has been a political football with neither side of politics prepared to accept the science and evidence of escalating climatic impact from humanity's continued reliance on fossil fuel, and to seriously address the issue. This largely stems from the fact that many Federal politicians, egged on by corporate fossil fuel interests, still do not accept that human-induced climate change is even a problem let alone an existential threat, as confirmed yet again in recent commentary ³³. For a country whose entire prosperity has been based on innovative science and its sensible application, this is an astonishing state of affairs, and extremely dangerous for our security.

The dominant denialism can be seen in recent reports spanning the national policy agenda, such as the December 2017 Review of Climate Change Policies, the December 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, the debacle over our national climate and energy policy culminating in the National Energy Guarantee, and so on.

The implications of this leadership failure are now starting to emerge in a series of cascading issues which are argued about in separate silos. In reality they are inextricably linked, and must be addressed holistically:

- The Federal government has signed and ratified the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement. However Australia's INDC offered under the agreement is far below a reasonable contribution in comparison with other countries, and even further from proportionally meeting the Paris 1.5-2.0°C temperature limit objective.
- Recent problems with the Eastern Australian power grid are not due to excessive amounts of renewable energy usage, but to the procrastination and inaction of successive Federal governments of both political persuasions who have chosen to ignore the urgent need to reduce our carbon emissions, and then endeavoured to prevent State Governments taking such action, which even our

minimalist Paris undertakings require. That is now costing our community dearly as climate impact intensifies, creating a totally unnecessary security risk to our energy supply.

- The government argue for an “agnostic” choice of energy supply to meet future energy needs, insisting that should include coal and gas whilst refusing to implement carbon pricing or emissions trading in any form to accurately reflect the true cost of that fossil fuel use. Thus the field is not “agnostic” but weighted heavily in favour of fossil fuels purely to satisfy the minority of climate denialist within the government ranks. Again in total contradiction to our Paris undertakings, and to sensible economic and national security policy.
- Policy reviews are initiated to address these issues, most recently the Finkel Review, which due to such political sensitivities, only consider fourth or fifth best solutions. The most important parts of even these inadequate recommendations, such as the Clean Energy Target, are then ignored. The ephemeral National Energy Guarantee is the result.
- In Queensland, the Federal and Queensland governments strongly advocate development of the Galilee Basin coal province, initially by subsidising the Adani Carmichael coal mine, as indicated above. Such development would more than negate our Paris undertakings, and of itself ensure global temperatures exceeded the 2°C upper limit of the Paris objectives. Justifications, such as the “*better quality of Galilee coal*”, or the drug-dealers argument that “*other will supply if we don’t*”, do not hold water in current circumstances.
- Meanwhile the Great Barrier Reef is already in serious trouble from the effects of coral bleaching as ocean temperatures rise as a result of global warming, to the point that its continued existence is in doubt even at existing levels of warming, along with the substantial industries linked to it ³⁴. Its demise would be guaranteed by development of the Galilee Basin, and certainly by NT gas fracking.
- The climate science capability of Australia’s scientific community has been seriously undermined by government cutbacks in recent years, at the time when the need for improved knowledge has never been greater ³⁵. Again, this arises from denialist political ideology which completely ignores the national security imperative of access to leading edge scientific understanding, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere where Australian climate science has been the leading contributor.

These issues are debated around short term economics and ideology. There is a total inability “to join the dots” and recognise the security implications of these dysfunctional and contradictory policies. If Australia insists on continually increasing our carbon emissions by such actions, in addition initiating major NT hydraulic fracturing, thereby contributing to escalating warming globally, the climate impact on Australia itself will only intensify, particularly in Northern Australia, inter alia more than negating any development benefit. Similarly in Asia and the Pacific, where Australia’s actions as a “*climate pariah*” have markedly diminished its reputation in recent years ³⁶. In effect we have one foot lightly on the climate change brake whilst the other foot is hard on the accelerator.

All too often we are told that Australia is such a small part of the global emission picture (about 1.3%), that anything we do is meaningless in attempting to solve the global challenge. Thus we can continue to expand our high-carbon economy with impunity. Such arguments completely ignore the massive carbon emissions we export with our fossil fuel commodities sold overseas which, under UNFCCC formulae, are accounted for in the consuming country. If they are included, which they should be given the critical stage climate change has now reached, Australia is in the top half dozen carbon emitters world wide (around 5%), with our denialist policies acting as a major accelerant of climate impact worldwide, in turn increasing the damage to the Australian economy and society.

In a broader geopolitical sense, it is totally untenable in a rapidly warming world, for Australia as one of the worst carbon polluters globally, to increase our carbon emissions at all, but particularly when we also have some of the world’s best renewable energy resources, much of which is in the NT, which we are not using to anywhere near their full potential. If allowed to continue, this will inevitably lead to conflict and further national security threats.

Such concerns are dismissed by climate denialist politicians on the basis that the climate science is uncertain and hence we should wait for better information before acting. This fails to understand the critical distinction between science and risk. The uncertainties relate not to the basic science, but to the speed and extent of

climate impact, both of which have been badly underestimated. Climate change has moved out of the twilight period of much talk and limited impact. It is now turning nasty, with the risk in some regions, often the poorest, translating into major disasters, as in Australia over recent years. How long will it take and how much economic damage must we suffer, particularly in Northern Australia, before our leaders accept that events like Cyclone Debbie and the collapse of much of the Barrier Reef are being intensified by man-made climate change?

So it becomes a matter of risk management. General Gordon Sullivan, Chair of the US Military Advisory Board, in commenting on climate change put it concisely: *"If you wait for 100% certainty on the battlefield, something bad is going to happen"*³⁷. Bad things are already happening in this country and globally.

In current circumstances, any further development of fossil fuels amounts to nothing less than a crime against humanity and an existential threat to future generations. This is the context in which decision-makers must now view their investment decisions.

Existential Risk Management

When the risk posed by climate change is existential, there is even greater justification for action rather than waiting for perfect information. Further, that risk is now immediate, not some years or decades into the future, the reasons being that:

- there is no global carbon budget remaining today if the world is to stay below the 2°C temperature increase limit.
- Our actions today are locking-in irreversible, existential outcomes.
- Sensible risk management addresses risk in time to prevent it happening - that time is now.

This requires existential climate risk to become the primary consideration in designing climate change and energy policy. That policy should be built around existential risk management unlike anything being contemplated officially at present. The components would encompass:

- **Normative Goal Setting.** *"Politically realistic"*, incremental change from *"business-as-usual"* is not tenable. This must be replaced with a normative view of limits which must be adhered to if catastrophic consequences are to be avoided, based on the latest science. Action is then determined by the imperative to stay within the limits, not by incremental, art-of-the-possible, change from business-as-usual.
- **Change Mindsets,** to now regard the climate change challenge as a genuine global emergency, to be addressed with an emergency global response.
- **Genuine Global Leadership.** Current responses reflect the dominance of managerialism – an emphasis on optimising the conventional political and corporate paradigms by incremental change, rather than adopting the fundamentally different normative leadership needed to contend with the potential for catastrophic failure.
- **Integrated Policy.** Climate change, though difficult, is only one of a number of critical, inter-related, issues now confronting the global community, which threaten the sustainability of humanity as we know it. Rather than viewing these issues separately in individual "silos" as at present, integrated policy is essential if realistic solutions are to be implemented. Climate and energy policy needs to fit within a systemic Australian approach to emergency action.
- **Honesty.** There needs to be an honest articulation of the catastrophic risks and the integrated sustainability challenge we now face, with extensive community education to develop the platform for commitment to the major changes ahead. That has not happened thus far.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Consideration of the Inquiry

The implications of existential climate risk are profound. Climate change will be the most important issue for decades hence, determining policy across the spectrum. If handled sensibly, the transition to a low-carbon world will be our real source of “*innovation, jobs and growth*” throughout Australia, and particularly in the NT.

But lack of knowledge, or lack of acceptance, of its real risks and opportunities by governments, along with the dysfunctional and contradictory policies which have resulted, represent a major governance failure, a breach of fiduciary responsibility to the community, and the greatest threat to Australia’s national security and prosperity.

We have left it too late to solve this challenge with a graduated response. If we wish to avoid catastrophic outcomes, emergency action, akin to establishing economies on a war-footing, is now essential, halting new fossil-fuel investment, and rapidly weaning ourselves off established fossil-fuel use. We have solutions, but thus far have lacked the will to implement them.

The following recommendations are made for consideration by the Inquiry:

- Recognise that climate change now represents an immediate existential risk to the national security of Australia, and to humanity generally, which must be handled on an emergency basis.
- Recognise that development of a hydraulic fracturing industry for shale gas in the NT would create carbon emissions far greater than those being contemplated by any other project in Australia, for example from the Adani coal mine in Queensland³⁸. In the absence of any remaining carbon budget to stay below 2°C warming, such emissions, of themselves, would push the world well into catastrophic warming territory.
- Recognise that to avoid such outcomes and meet the objectives of the Paris Climate Change Agreement which Australia has ratified, no further fossil fuel developments particularly at the scale implied by a NT hydraulic fracturing industry can be contemplated.
- Acknowledge that the DFT almost completely ignores these issues, skirting around the real implications of climate risk in cursory fashion (Chapter 9). As such it contradicts all five principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development upon which the Inquiry’s Risk Assessment is based (Table 4.1)
- Extend the Inquiry risk assessment to encompass the points raised above, and to incorporate the existential risk management principles outlined.
- Conclude that the development of an NT Hydraulic Fracturing Industry for Shale Gas is not warranted. It would be detrimental to the short, medium and long term future of Australia and the NT community. In a wider sense, it would be a crime against humanity.

I would be pleased to discuss these issues further at the convenience of the Inquiry



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“They go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent.....Owing to past neglect, in the face of the plainest warnings, we have now entered upon a period of great danger..... The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedients, of delays, is coming to a close. In its place we are entering a period of consequences..... We cannot avoid this period, we are in it now.....”

Winston S. Churchill, November 1936

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**Summary for the
Scientific Inquiry into Hydraulic Fracturing in the Northern Territory
2nd February 2018**

Facing Reality

Reframing Climate Change as an Immediate Existential Risk


Ian T. Dunlop

Former Chair, Australian Coal Association & CEO Australian Institute of Company Directors

Member, Club of Rome


TRAJECTORY

Potential climate tipping points



TRAJECTORY

Paris commitments (INDCs) 2015




Paris accord has no emissions reductions before 2030, whereas they should be dropping rapidly

RISK


To stay below the Paris limits

- with 50% chance of success for 1.5°C , or 66% for 2°C
 - no new fossil fuel projects can be built
 - managed decline of existing fossil fuel industry



RISK

But 50% or 66% not good odds for humanity



RISK

Climate change is an existential risk

SCOPE	Global	Ozone thinning	Existential
	Local	Recession	Genocide
	Personal	Car is stolen	Death
		Endurable	Terminal
		INTENSITY	


A risk posing permanent large negative consequences to humanity which can never be undone.

An adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential

“Even for an honest, truth-seeking, and well-intentioned investigator it is difficult to think and act rationally in regard to global catastrophic risks and existential risks.”

RISK AND CLIMATE POLICY

We are on a path to an **existential crisis**



Why an *Immediate* Existential Risk ?

- We have no carbon budget left for any realistic chance (90%) of staying below 2°C
- Our actions today are locking-in irreversible, existential, outcomes
- Sensible risk-management addresses risk in time to prevent it happening.
- That time is now

A Failure of Imagination



The big question




“Who at the highest levels of leadership in corporates and public service will take the bold risks (that are required), not gradually or incrementally, but decisively in line with the new scale and speed that ‘unthinkables’ emerge.”

Nik Gowing and Chris Langdon, *Thinking the Unthinkable*, CIMA, 2015

A photograph of the Earth rising over the horizon of the Moon. The Earth is a bright blue and white sphere in the center of the frame, set against the black background of space. The horizon of the Moon is a dark, silty line at the bottom of the image. The text "HONESTY • IMAGINATION • LEADERSHIP" is centered in the lower half of the image.

HONESTY • IMAGINATION • LEADERSHIP



DISASTER

ALLEY

CLIMATE

CHANGE

CONFLICT

& RISK

WRITTEN BY

**IAN DUNLOP
& DAVID SPRATT**

FOREWORD BY

SHERRI GOODMAN

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
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The authors thank Nic Maclellan for his advice on the Pacific scenario and climate financing in this report.



COVER IMAGE:
SATELLITE IMAGE OF DADAAB REFUGEE CAMP, KENYA.
HOME TO OVER 100,000 REFUGEES

Published by Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration
Melbourne, Australia | June 2017 breakthroughonline.org.au

OVERVIEW

The first responsibility of a government is to safeguard the people and their future well-being. The ability to do this is threatened by climate change, whose accelerating impacts will also drive political instability and conflict, posing large negative consequences to human society which may never be undone. This report looks at climate change and conflict issues through the lens of sensible risk-management to draw new conclusions about the challenge we now face.

- From tropical coral reefs to the polar ice sheets, global warming is already dangerous. The world is perilously close to, or passed, tipping points which will create major changes in global climate systems.
- The world now faces existential climate-change risks which may result in “outright chaos” and an end to human civilisation as we know it.
- These risks are either not understood or wilfully ignored across the public and private sectors, with very few exceptions.
- Global warming will drive increasingly severe humanitarian crises, forced migration, political instability and conflict. The Asia–Pacific region, including Australia, is considered to be “Disaster Alley” where some of the worst impacts will be experienced.
- Building more resilient communities in the most vulnerable nations by high-level financial commitments and development assistance can help protect peoples in climate hotspots and zones of potential instability and conflict.
- Australia’s political, bureaucratic and corporate leaders are abrogating their fiduciary responsibilities to safeguard the people and their future well-being. They are ill-prepared for the real risks of climate change at home and in the region.
- The Australian government must ensure Australian Defence Force and emergency services preparedness, mission and operational resilience, and capacity for humanitarian aid and disaster relief, across the full range of projected climate change scenarios.
- It is essential to now strongly advocate a global climate emergency response, and to build a national leadership group outside conventional politics to design and implement emergency decarbonisation of the Australian economy. This would adopt all available safe solutions using sound, existential risk-management practices.

FOREWORD

BY SHERRI GOODMAN

In April 2017, I was invited by Breakthrough to visit Australia and talk to elected representatives, key government officials and business leaders, researchers and analysts, and at public meetings, to advance awareness of the capacity of climate change to amplify global conflict and instability, social and economic disruption, humanitarian crises and forced migration.

Working at the highest level in the United States on these issues for more than two decades, I have come to understand that these impacts have already placed the internal cohesion of many nations under great stress, including in the United States, as a result of a dramatic rise in migration, changes in weather patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, from low-lying Pacific Islands to the United States, Europe, South Asia and China, has the potential to challenge the very survival of regional communities and even some nation states.

My tour to Australia was also an opportunity to discuss what needs to be done. Internationally, we must establish methods to better forecast potentially disruptive climate changes – such as severe drought – well in advance. Only then can we develop the capacity for reducing risks through building global and community resilience and strength before we encounter full-on crises. We also need to rethink refugee governance to better support the climate refugees who will comprise an increasing proportion of the refugee mix. Current governance structures are simply inadequate.

Strengthening the resilience of vulnerable nations to the climate impacts already locked into the system is critical; however this will only reduce long-term risk if improvements in resilience are accompanied by strong actionable agreements to stabilise the climate.

Climate change is a threat multiplier to humanity that demands a whole-of-society response. If Australia recognises this reality it would be placed, *inter alia*, at the leading edge of innovation and competitiveness in the advanced energy economies that are rapidly evolving in China and elsewhere in Asia.

Responding effectively to climate change requires greatly increased co-operation globally, regionally and among Australian institutions, to build more resilient communities. Australia is at an inflection point in its approach to climate, energy and security. It is time to act with clarity and urgency.

Sherri Goodman is former US Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Environmental Security, Founder and Executive Director of the CNA Military Advisory Board, and a Senior Fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.



A high-angle, wide shot of a sprawling tent camp in a dry, dusty landscape. Hundreds of simple, light-colored tents are packed closely together, stretching towards the horizon. In the background, a few small, simple buildings are visible, including one with a green wall. The sky is filled with heavy, grey clouds, creating a somber and overcast atmosphere. The overall color palette is dominated by the tan of the tents and ground, the greys of the clouds, and the muted colors of the distant buildings.

**“WHAT IS THE BIGGEST
LONG-TERM THREAT IN
THE PACIFIC REGION?
CLIMATE CHANGE.”**

ADMIRAL SAMUEL LOCKLEAR
FORMER COMMANDER
US PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM)



A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION

Climate change is an existential risk that could abruptly end human civilisation because of a catastrophic “failure of imagination” by global leaders to understand and act on the science and evidence before them.

At the London School of Economics in 2008, Queen Elizabeth questioned: “Why did no one foresee the timing, extent and severity of the Global Financial Crisis?” The British Academy answered a year later: “A psychology of denial gripped the financial and corporate world... [it was] the failure of the collective imagination of many bright people... to understand the risks to the system as a whole” (Stewart 2009).

A “failure of imagination” has also been identified as one of the reasons for the breakdown in US intelligence around the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

A similar failure is occurring with climate change today.

The problem is widespread at the senior levels of government and global corporations. A 2016 report, *Thinking the Unthinkable*, based on interviews with top leaders around the world, found that: “A proliferation of ‘unthinkable’ events... has revealed a new fragility at the highest levels of corporate and public service leaderships. Their ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected, non-normative events is... perilously inadequate at critical moments... Remarkably, there remains a deep reluctance, or what might be called ‘executive myopia’, to see and contemplate even the possibility that ‘unthinkables’ might happen, let alone how to handle them.” (Gowing and Langdon 2016)

Such failures are manifested in two ways in climate policy. At the political, bureaucratic and business level in underplaying the high-end risks and in failing to recognise that the existential risk of climate change is totally different from other risk categories. And at the research level in underestimating the rate of climate change impact and costs, along with an under-emphasis on, and poor communication of, those high-end risks.

EXISTENTIAL RISK

An existential risk is an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential (Bostrom 2013). For example, a big meteor impact or large-scale nuclear war.

Existential risks are not amenable to the reactive (learn from failure) approach of conventional risk management, and we cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, or social attitudes developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Because the consequences are so severe – perhaps the end of human global civilisation as we know it – “even for an honest, truth-seeking, and well-intentioned investigator it is difficult to think and act rationally in regard to... existential risks” (Bostrom and Cirkovic 2008).

Yet the evidence is clear that climate change already poses an existential risk to global stability and to human civilisation that requires an emergency response. Temperature rises that are now in prospect could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%. But this conversation is taboo, and the few who speak out are admonished as being overly alarmist.

Prof. Kevin Anderson considers that “a 4°C future [relative to pre-industrial levels] is incompatible with an organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable” (Anderson 2011). He says: “If you have got a population of nine billion by 2050 and you hit 4°C, 5°C or 6°C, you might have half a billion people surviving” (Fyall 2009).

Asked at a 2011 conference in Melbourne about the difference between a 2°C world and a 4°C world, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber replied in two words: “Human civilisation”. The World Bank reports: “There is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible” (World Bank 2012). Amongst other impacts, a 4°C warming would trigger the loss of both polar ice caps, eventually resulting, at equilibrium, in a 70-metre rise in sea level.

The present path of greenhouse gas emissions commits us to a 4–5°C temperature increase relative to pre-industrial levels. Even at 3°C of warming we could face “outright chaos” and “nuclear war is possible”, according to the 2007 *Age of Consequences* report by two US think tanks (see page 10).

Yet this is the world we are now entering. The Paris climate agreement voluntary emission reduction commitments, if implemented, would result in the planet warming by 3°C, with a 50% chance of exceeding that amount.

This does not take into account “longer-term” carbon-cycle feedbacks – such as permafrost thaw and declining efficiency of ocean and terrestrial carbon sinks, which are now becoming relevant. If these are considered, the Paris emissions path has more than a 50% chance of exceeding 4°C warming. (Technically, accounting for these feedbacks means using a higher figure for the system’s “climate sensitivity” – which is a measure of the temperature increase resulting from a doubling of the level of greenhouse gases – to calculate the warming.


A median figure often used for climate sensitivity is ~3°C, but research from MIT shows that with a higher climate sensitivity figure of 4.5°C, which would account for feedbacks, the Paris path would lead to around 5°C of warming (Reilly et al. 2015).

So we are looking at a greater than one-in-two chance of either annihilating intelligent life, or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential development. Clearly these end-of-civilisation scenarios are not being considered even by risk-conscious leaders in politics and business, which is an epic failure of imagination.

The world hopes to do a great deal better than Paris, but it may do far worse. A recent survey of 656 participants involved in international climate policy-making showed only half considered the Paris climate negotiations were useful, and 70% did not expect that the majority of countries would fulfil their promises (Dannenberget al. 2017).

Human civilisation faces unacceptably high chances of being brought undone by climate change’s existential risks yet, extraordinarily, this conversation is rarely heard. The Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) says that despite scientific evidence that risks associated with tipping points “increase disproportionately as temperature increases from 1°C to 2°C, and become high above 3°C”, political negotiations have consistently disregarded the high-end scenarios that could lead to abrupt or irreversible climate change. In its *Global Catastrophic Risks 2017* report, it concludes that “the world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of catastrophic climate change”. (GCF 2017)

PARIS EMISSIONS PATH & CLIMATE RISKS



SCHOLARLY RETICENCE

The scientific community has generally underestimated the likely rate of climate change impacts and costs. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports are years out of date upon publication. Sir Nicholas Stern wrote of the IPCC *Fifth Assessment Report*: “Essentially it reported on a body of literature that had systematically and grossly underestimated the risks [and costs] of unmanaged climate change” (Stern 2016).

Too often, mitigation and adaptation policy is based on least-drama, consensus scientific projections that downplay what Prof. Ross Garnaut called the “bad possibilities”, that is, the lower-probability outcomes with higher impacts. In his 2011 climate science update for the Australian Government, Garnaut questioned whether climate research had a conservative “systematic bias” due to “scholarly reticence”. He pointed to a pattern, across diverse intellectual fields, of research predictions being “not too far away from the mainstream” expectations: and observed in the climate field that this “has been associated with understatement of the risks”. (Garnaut 2011)

In 2007, *The Age of Consequences* reported:

“Our group found that, generally speaking, most scientific predictions in the overall arena of climate change over the last two decades, when compared with ultimate outcomes, have been consistently below what has actually transpired. There are perhaps many reasons for this tendency—an innate scientific caution, an incomplete data set, a tendency for scientists to steer away from controversy, persistent efforts by some to discredit climate “alarmists,” to name but a few...” (Campbell et al. 2007)

For many critical components of the climate system, we can identify just how fast our understanding is changing. Successive IPCC reports have been reticent on key climate system issues:

- **Antarctica:** In 2001, the IPCC projected no significant ice mass loss by 2100 and, in the 2014 report, said the contribution to sea level rise would “not exceed several tenths of a meter” by 2100. In reality, the Amundsen Sea sector of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet has been destabilised and ice retreat is unstoppable for the current climate state. It is likely that no further acceleration in climate change is necessary to trigger the collapse of the rest of the ice sheet, with suggestions of a 3–5 metre sea-level rise within two centuries from West Antarctic melting. (Spratt 2017)
- **Sea levels:** In the 2007 IPCC report, sea levels were projected to rise up to 0.59 metre by 2100. The figure was widely derided by researchers, including the head of NASA’s climate research (Hansen 2007) as being far too conservative. By 2014, the IPCC’s figure was in the range 0.55 to 0.82 metre, but they included the caveat that “levels above the likely range cannot be reliably evaluated.” In reality, most scientists project a metre or more. The US Department of Defence uses scenarios of 1 and 2 metres for risk assessments, and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides an “extreme” scenario of 2.5 metres sea level rise by 2100 (NOAA 2017).

- **Arctic sea ice:** In 2007, the IPCC reported that summer sea-ice was “projected to disappear almost completely towards the end of the 21st century”, even as it was collapsing that year. In 2014, the IPCC had ice-free projections to 2100 for only the highest of four emissions scenarios. In reality, Arctic sea ice has already lost 70% of summer volume compared to just thirty years ago, and expectations are of sea-ice-free summer within a decade or two.
- **Coral reefs:** Just a decade or two ago, the general view in the literature was that the survival of coral systems would be threatened by 2°C warming. In 2009, research was published suggesting that preserving more than 10% of coral reefs worldwide would require limiting warming to below 1.5°C (Frieler et al. 2009). The coral bleaching events of the last two years at just 1–1.2°C of warming indicate that coral reefs are now sliding into global-warming-driven terminal decline. Three-quarters of the Great Barrier Reef has been lost in the last three decades, with climate change a significant cause.

Climate change assessments need:

“a much more thorough exploration of the [high-end] tails of the distributions of physical variables such as sea level rise, temperature, and precipitation, where our scientific knowledge base is less complete, and where sophisticated climate models are less helpful. We need greater attention on the strength of uncertain processes and feedbacks in the physical climate system... to determine scientifically plausible bounds on total warming and the overall behavior of the climate system. Accomplishing this will require synthesizing multiple lines of scientific evidence... as well as new modeling experiments to better explore the possibility of extreme scenarios.” (Weaver et al. 2017)

A prudent risk-management approach for safeguarding people and protecting their ways of life means a tough and objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed, including climate and conflict risks, and especially those “fat tail” events whose consequences are damaging beyond quantification, and which human civilization, as we know it, would be lucky to survive. We must understand the potential of, and plan for, the worst that can happen and be relieved if it doesn’t. If we focus on “middle of the road” outcomes, and ignore the “high-end” possibilities, we will probably end up with catastrophic outcomes that could have been avoided.

It is not a question of whether we may suffer a failure of imagination. We already have. Yet people understand climate risks, even as political leaders wilfully underplay or ignore them. 84% of 8000 people in eight countries recently surveyed for the Global Challenges Foundation consider climate change a “global catastrophic risk”. The figure for Australia was 75%. The GCF report found that many people now see climate change as a bigger threat than other concerns such as epidemics, population growth, weapons of mass destruction and the rise of artificial intelligence threats. GCF vice-president Mats Andersson says “there’s certainly a huge gap between what people expect from politicians and what politicians are doing” (Goering 2017).

The survey also found 81% of 1000 Australians polled agreed with the proposition: “Do you think we should try to prevent climate catastrophes, which might not occur for several decades or centuries, even if it requires making considerable changes that impact on our current living standards?” (ComRes 2017).

**“AUSTRALIA LIES IN
THE REGION MOST
VULNERABLE TO THE
IMPACT OF A CHANGING
CLIMATE, INCLUDING
SECURITY THREATS...”**

REAR ADMIRAL NEIL MORISETTI (RET)
FORMER UK GOVERNMENT CLIMATE & SECURITY
ENVOY & FORMER INTERIM SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE



AN ACCELERANT TO INSTABILITY

A hotter planet has already taken us close to, or past, tipping points which will generate major changes in global climate systems such as the oceans, polar sea ice and ice sheets and large permafrost carbon stores (Spratt 2016). The impacts include a hotter and more extreme climate, stronger storms and cyclones, drought and desertification, and coastal inundation.

Climate change impacts basic resources such as food and water, which allow human societies to survive. Scarce resources, declining crop yields and rising prices become catalysts for conflict (CNA MAB 2014).

This makes climate change a key component in international relations as it aggravates pre-existing problems to function as a “threat multiplier”, causing escalating cycles of humanitarian crises, political instability, forced migrations and conflicts. The war in Syria and conflicts across the Sahel from Darfur to Mali have a major climate-change fingerprint (Werrell and Femia 2013).

A number of circumstances made the Syrian state extremely vulnerable to the consequences of the severe drought which hit the country a decade ago. Declining oil revenues and a fiscal deficit led the Syrian government to slash fuel subsidies in May 2008. The price of petrol tripled overnight, and pushed up food prices, whilst the state’s agriculture policies encouraged

groundwater depletion. And Syria had already accepted 1.5 million refugees from Iraq. From 2006-2010, 60% of Syria had its worst long-term drought and crop failures since civilisation began. 800,000 people in rural areas had lost their livelihood by 2009. More than two million people were driven into extreme poverty, and 1.5 million people migrated to cities. The cities grew very rapidly, as did food and housing prices. The Syrian regime was unable to safeguard the people and protect their way of life, resulting in social breakdown, state failure, the rise of Islamic State and foreign military intervention. Global and regional climatic changes were major underlying causes and continued to exacerbate this already explosive situation.

Extreme weather and climate change also played a part in the “Arab Spring”. Per capita, the world’s top nine wheat importers are in the Middle East and North Africa. The region relies on food imports for more than 30% of calories consumed, making it highly vulnerable to global food price shocks. In 2010, a heatwave and wildfires in Ukraine and Russia, and a “once-in-a-century” winter drought in China, resulted in wheat shortages and a global wheat price spike, with bread prices rocketing across the Middle East. Food riots followed in Egypt, where basic food costs were already one-third of household budgets, and became one trigger for the Arab Spring. (Werrell and Femia 2013)

The European migration crisis is a consequence of multiple conflicts, accelerated by climate change. This crisis was driven by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the civil war in Syria, the Arab Spring, political disruption across the Maghreb, and drought, desertification and war across the Sahel.



“CLIMATE CHANGE IS IMPACTING STABILITY IN AREAS OF THE WORLD WHERE OUR TROOPS ARE OPERATING TODAY”

MARINE CORPS GENERAL JIM MATTIS
U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

These recent climate-accelerated conflicts also point to the changing character of the major players, and transcend old understandings:

“ We are seeing the steady erosion of the nation-state as the primary international security entity. Non-state actors, such as globalized financial institutions and corporations, and even internet-empowered individuals – or the causes they represent – are having increasing impacts on the political landscape. The world has also become more politically complex and economically and financially interdependent. We believe it is no longer adequate to think of the projected climate impacts to any one region of the world in isolation. Climate change impacts transcend international borders and geographic areas of responsibility.” (CNA 2014)

Australia’s near region includes communities increasingly threatened by climate impacts and the resulting effects including dislocation and migration. The climate and conflict hotspots of Pakistan and the Philippines are discussed on pages 14-15. A Pacific scenario is outlined on page 19.

Sixty per cent of Vietnam’s urban areas are 1.5 metres or less above sea level. The Mekong Delta provides 40% of Vietnam’s agricultural production, and more than half of national rice production and agricultural exports. Yet the Delta is also very vulnerable to coastal inundation, with over half its area less than two metres above sea level.

Bangladesh is the “ground zero” of climate change impacts, says Maj. Gen. Munir Muniruzzaman, former military adviser to the president of Bangladesh and chairman of the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change (Daily Mail 2016). A one-metre sea level rise would flood 20% of the area of Bangladesh and displace 30 million people. India has already surrounded Bangladesh with a double strand “climate refugee” fence patrolled by 80,000 troops, in anticipation of a migration crisis.

Estimates of global average sea-level rise this century range from 1 to 2.5 metres, but that is just the beginning. In 2009, eminent climate scientist Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber warned that 1°C of warming – the current state – would “in the long run translate into 15–20 meters sea level rise at equilibrium. 2°C – the target of the European Union – means sea level rise of 30–40 meters over maybe a thousand years. Draw a line around your coast, probably not a lot would be left”. (Zieler 2009)

The consequences of unabated climate change cannot be resolved by an emphasis on increasing militarisation, as demonstrated by the example of sea level rise. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of climate-driven forced mass migrations:

“ Perhaps the most worrisome problems associated with rising temperatures and sea levels are from large-scale migrations of people – both inside nations and across existing national borders... potentially involving hundreds of millions of people. The more severe scenarios suggest the prospect of perhaps billions of people over the medium or longer term being forced to relocate. The possibility of such a significant portion of humanity on the move, forced to relocate, poses an enormous challenge even if played out over the course of decades.” (Campbell et al. 2007)



THE GROWING WATER CRISIS

The impact of climate change on the health and wellbeing of peoples and nations starts with one element above all others: water.

Following the water flow reveals how a hotter and more extreme climate is likely to trigger or exacerbate conflict and migration. This, in turn, points to humanitarian intervention and resource allocation to build community resilience as a means of alleviating the drivers of future conflict and preventing wars.

It is with more extreme and prolonged droughts that this journey starts, across the southern and eastern Mediterranean in places such as Syria, and across the African Sahel.

Between 1970 and the mid-1990s, the amount of economically available water per person globally dropped by more than 35%, according to the United Nations. One estimate projects a gap of 40% between global water requirements and accessible, reliable water supply by 2030 (WRG 2009).

Today, approximately 1.8 billion people around the world lack access to safe drinking water and nearly two billion people lack access to sanitation. According to the 2017 report, *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress*, “more than 30 countries – nearly half of them in the Middle East – will experience extremely high water stress by 2035, increasing economic, social, and political tensions” (US NIC 2017). Countries already experiencing water stress or far worse include Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel,

Syria, Yemen, India, China, and parts of the United States.

As the world’s population and living standards continue to grow, the projected climate impacts on the nexus of water, food, and energy security become more profound:

“ Fresh water, food, and energy are inextricably linked, and the choices made over how these finite resources will be produced, distributed, and used will have increasing security implications... From today’s baseline of 7.1 billion people, the world’s population is expected to grow to more than 8 billion by 2025... by 2030, population growth and a burgeoning global middle class will result in a worldwide demand for 35% more food and 50% more energy. Rising temperatures across the middle-latitudes of the world will increase the demand for water and energy. These growing demands will stress resources, constrain development, and increase competition among agriculture, energy production, and human sustenance. In light of projected climate change, stresses on the water-food-energy nexus are a mounting security concern across a growing segment of the world. ” (CNA MAB 2014)

The decline of water availability and its distribution will be pivotal as climate change causes tropical wet zones to become wetter and subtropical dry zones to become drier. Scientists project the subtropical zone will experience a 5–10% reduction in precipitation for each degree Celsius of global warming.

INDIA & CHINA

Over the coming decades, climate change is projected to cause southern Australia, portions of India, and much of inland China to experience sustained drought, resulting in lowered agricultural production and food security issues (CNA MAB 2014).

Many of the major river systems in Asia – home to more than a billion people – are fed by glacial melt from the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau. With less snowfall and the predicted shrinking of glaciers, in the future they may not provide enough water to meet year-round demand. Water challenges will increase the risk of instability and state failure, and exacerbate regional tensions in South Asia. India's national water supply is forecast to fall 50% below demand as early as 2030, and increasing irregularities in the pattern of monsoon rains are likely to undermine South Asia's agricultural and domestic water needs. (Ahmed 2017)

Exacerbating the growing water crisis in Asia is the overuse of groundwater, leading to falling water tables in India and China.

China contains 20% of global population but only 7% of available fresh water. Changing climate patterns are causing droughts and increasing desertification, with freshwater reserves falling 13% between 2000 and 2009. 24,000 villages in north and west China have been abandoned due to desertification in the last 50 years, and the advancing Gobi Desert is now only 150 miles from Beijing. In rural areas, 300 million people have no access to safe drinking water, and 54% of the main rivers contain water unfit for human consumption. (Cho 2011)

Four-fifths of China's grain harvest comes from irrigated land, most of it drawing on surface water, principally the Yellow and Yangtze rivers, which are fed from the Tibetan Plateau. The water table under the North China Plain, an area that produces half of the country's wheat and a third of its corn, is falling fast. Overpumping has largely depleted the shallow aquifer, forcing well-drillers to turn to the region's deep aquifer, which is not replenishable. A World Bank report on China's water situation foresees "catastrophic consequences for future generations" unless water use and supply can quickly be brought back into balance (Brown 2013).

TOO MUCH WATER

Whilst drought is a long-term climate change challenge in Asia, in some cases too much water is an immediate problem. More intense monsoons driven by warmer sea-surface temperatures are an increasing threat to the region, a phenomenon hitting China's coastal region and the Philippines. Witness the destructive force of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. As the sea level rises, storm surges will become more invasive, more destructive, costlier, and deadlier. Densely populated areas, including many large cities along coasts or major waterways are particularly vulnerable to monsoon and storm surge flooding (CNA MAB 2014):

- Asia has 15 of the world's 20 largest urban areas – including Tokyo, Jakarta, Mumbai, and Dhaka – and most are on the coast or alongside low-lying deltas, vulnerable to inundation.
- Low-lying nations – such as Bangladesh, and island countries such as the Maldives and Kiribati – face existential threats in the near term from sea level rise and devastating storm flooding.
- Projected sea-level rise will put critical regions at risk, including key rice growing areas, Asia's primary food staple.

**CLIMATE CHANGE
“... CAN ADD TO THE
CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL
INSTABILITY, HUNGER,
POVERTY, AND CONFLICT”**

CHUCK HAGEL
FMR US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SCENARIO: THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES

Scenario planning is a structured way to think about the future. It does not say “this will happen”, but constructs a possible future based on analysis of what could credibly happen, and asks: “what would be the consequences, and what actions could we take now to change this possible future?” This is important where the event may be low in probability but high in impact: nuclear war, for example. And climate change.

In 2007, two US think tanks produced an extraordinary report titled *The Age of Consequences: The foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change* (Campbell et al. 2007). This report constructs three scenarios, of which the second is titled “Severe”. This scenario assumes that climate responds much more strongly to continued carbon loading over the next few decades than predicted by current scientific models, and hypothesises profound and potentially destabilising global consequences over the course of the next human generation or longer.

SETTING THE SCENARIO

It is worth considering this scenario's assumptions, because most of them appear to be now in play, though the timeline may vary with current circumstances.

“ Average global surface temperature rises at an unexpectedly rapid rate to 2.6°C above 1990 levels by 2040, with larger warming over land masses and at high latitudes. Dynamical changes in polar ice sheets (i.e., changes in the rate of ice flow into the sea) accelerate rapidly, resulting in 0.52 meters of global mean sea level rise. Based on these observations and an improved understanding of ice sheet dynamics, climate scientists by this time express high confidence that the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets have become unstable and that 4 to 6 meters of sea level rise are now inevitable over the next few centuries. Water availability decreases strongly in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about 2 billion people worldwide. The North Atlantic MOC [Meridional Overturning Circulation] slows significantly, with consequences for marine ecosystem productivity and fisheries. Crop yields decline significantly in the fertile river deltas because of sea level rise and damage from increased storm surges. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics, where irrigation becomes exceptionally difficult because of low water availability and increased soil salinization resulting from more rapid evaporation of water from irrigated fields. Arid regions at low latitudes expand, taking previously marginal productive croplands out of production. North Atlantic fisheries are affected by significant slowing of the North Atlantic MOC. Globally, there is widespread coral bleaching, ocean acidification, substantial loss of coastal nursery wetlands, and warming and drying of tributaries that serve as breeding grounds for anadromous fish (i.e., ocean-dwelling fish that breed in freshwater, e.g., salmon).

Because of a dramatic decrease in the extent of Arctic sea ice, the Arctic marine ecosystem is dramatically altered and the Arctic Ocean is navigable for much of the year. Developing nations at lower latitudes are affected most severely because of climate sensitivity and low adaptive capacity. Industrialized nations to the north experience clear net harm and must divert greater proportions of their wealth to adapting to climate change at home. ”

SCENARIO CONSEQUENCES

This is how the scenario played out.

“ In the case of severe climate change, corresponding to an average increase in global temperature of 2.6°C by 2040, massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to outright chaos. In this scenario, climate change provokes a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature.”

It should be noted that “2.6°C above 1990 levels” is ~3.1°C above the late nineteenth-century baseline, as a means of providing a comparison with the Paris outcome. The current emissions path from the Paris accord is for 3°C or more of warming, so this scenario may well represent the future (Climate Interactive 2017). The consequences are clear:

“ Perhaps the most worrisome problems associated with rising temperatures and sea levels are from large-scale migrations of people – both inside nations and across existing national borders... potentially involving hundreds of millions of people. The more severe scenarios suggest the prospect of perhaps billions of people over the medium or longer term being forced to relocate. The possibility of such a significant portion of humanity on the move, forced to relocate, poses an enormous challenge even if played out over the course of decades...”

“ The scale of the potential consequences associated with climate change —particularly in more dire and distant scenarios —made it difficult to grasp the extent and magnitude of the possible changes ahead. Global temperature increases of more than 3°C and sea level rises measured in meter... pose such a dramatically new global paradigm that it is virtually impossible to contemplate all the aspects of national and international life that would be inevitably affected. The collapse and chaos associated with extreme climate change futures would destabilize virtually every aspect of modern life.” (Campbell et al. 2007)

CASE STUDIES

MALI

The crises in Mali in 2012–2014 were shaped by an intersection of three trends: desertification and food insecurity exacerbated by climate change; an ongoing rebellion by Arab Tuareg nomadic herdsman in northern Mali; and weak government institutions that could not address the marginalization of the Tuareg and their increasing clashes with non-Arab Muslim ethnic sedentary agriculturalist tribes in the southern and central areas of the country. Overwhelmed by these challenges, the fragile government was overthrown by a coup in March 2012 but the Malian political system was unable to maintain influence in northern Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other groups moved in and took control. (CNA MAB 2014)

SAHEL

The Malian conflict fits a pattern of other such conflicts in Africa's Sahel region, including Darfur, South Sudan, Niger, and Nigeria. Climate change – particularly drought and desertification – have impacted the region for hundreds of years; yet the region's environmental stressors have now become a threat multiplier across Sub-Saharan Africa, and have contributed to conflict dynamics in countries that have never enjoyed popular internal sovereignty in the post-colonial era or robust institutions to settle conflicts over vital resources. Add to this the involvement of transnational militias such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Janjaweed in Darfur, and these conflicts become more complex, transforming resource competition into ethnopolitical conflict. (CNA MAB 2014)

NIGERIA

There is a basic causal mechanism that links climate change with violence in Nigeria. A US report concludes that in Nigeria poor responses to climatic shifts created shortages of resources such as land and water, which were followed by negative secondary impacts, such as more sickness, hunger, and joblessness. The inadequate government response provoked unrest. Many Boko Haram foot soldiers were people displaced by severe drought and food shortages in neighboring Niger and Chad. Some 200,000 farmers and herdsman had lost their livelihoods and, facing starvation, crossed the border to Nigeria. The inadequacy of the government's climate adaptation programs led to exposure of the vast population of farmers in northern Nigeria to harsh environmental effects, consequently generating conflict. (Ahmed 2017)

IRAQ

The rapid rise of Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 coincided with a period of unprecedented heat in Iraq from March to May 2014. Recurrent droughts and heavy rainstorms have played havoc with Iraq's agriculture, and the Shi'ite-dominated government largely failed to address the burgeoning challenges of dwindling water supplies and waning agriculture. ISIS moved quickly to exploit these failures, for instance by using dams as a weapon of war, and filling the vacuum left by the incapacity of the central government to feed its own population and deliver basic goods and services. (Ahmed 2017)

HOTSPOT: PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a clear example of a country where the social and political landscape and susceptibility to climate harm are a potentially unstable mix. Increasing instability in Pakistan would contribute to the risk of instability in India and even China, which are key economic partners for Australia.

Pakistan is a pivot state between Central and South Asia. Salafist Islamist non-state actors play a significant role in conflict in Pakistan's immediate neighbourhood and within the country. Armed opposition groups target energy infrastructure. The military and intelligence have a powerful say in politics. The Pakistani state has a direct interest in wars in neighbouring Afghanistan and in disputed Kashmir, and it is nuclear armed.

Climate change has contributed to recent record-breaking drought events. On 30 May 2017, the thermometer in Turbat, Balochistan hit 54°C, the hottest reliably measured temperature ever recorded in Asia. In 2010, devastating floods affected one-fifth of the land area and 20 million people, destroyed 1.7 million homes, and damaged 5.4 million acres of arable land. The damage was made worse by a shift in the distribution of monsoonal rainfall to areas of the country with poorer flood mitigation measures. Increases in the frequency and intensity of drought and flooding are consistent with climate change projections.

Pakistan will face severe water scarcity by 2025 and is "one of the most water-stressed countries in the world" (World Bank 2005), driven by changing snow melt from the Himalayan/Karakoram ranges, more variable monsoons, increases in population, inefficient drainage practices, a shift in agriculture towards more water-intensive export cropping, and competing demands for water by the agriculture and power generation sectors.

Pakistan's agricultural sector relies heavily on irrigation. 80% of agricultural land is irrigated (not rain-fed), the highest proportion in the world. Agriculture employs 45% of workers. Cotton, textiles and clothing make up half of Pakistan's exports.

In quantitative terms, cubic yards of surface water available per person fell from 6,880 in 1951 to 1,358 in 2010. By 2025 it is projected to decrease to 1,046 cubic yards.

The Indus river system is the core of Pakistan's water system and most flow comes from Karakoram glaciers in its headwaters. There is evidence that glacial changes may be reducing river flows. The Karakoram glaciers have stable or increasing areas and possibly mass – with reduced melt flows – and are behaving differently from rapidly retreating eastern Himalaya glaciers.

Competition for water between the agricultural and power sectors is already intense and is likely to increase.

Decreased flows in the Indus, and decisions to allocate water to irrigation instead of power generation, have been in part responsible for ongoing electrical blackouts. Power shortfalls in summer are up to half of demand, with power outages of up to 18–20 hours driving protests and increasing civil unrest. In one episode in 2012 rioters "burned trains, damaged banks and gas stations, looted shops, blocked roads, and, in some instances, targeted homes of members of the National Assembly and provincial assemblies" (Steinbruner et al. 2013).

The blackouts are "a contentious political issue with the potential to inflame Pakistan–India relations. The Pakistani foreign minister blamed the decreased flows on illegal water withdrawals upstream by India", although the commissioner of the Indus River System Authority in Pakistan attributed them to climate change (Steinbruner et al. 2013).

**UNREST IN PAKISTAN
COULD CONTRIBUTE
TO INSTABILITY OF
AUSTRALIA'S KEY
ECONOMIC PARTNERS**

HOTSPOT: PHILIPPINES

Key factors for identifying where large-scale violence, regime change, or state breakdown may occur include:

- Semi-democratic regimes which are corrupt, favour special groups and lack “diffuse” legitimacy and support.
- Climate/disaster responses are under-resourced, poorly managed, and lacking compassion.
- Well-organized pre-existing opposition groups within the system (parties) or outside (mass movements/insurgencies capable of leading or increasing anti-regime violence). (Steinbruner et al. 2013)

From this perspective, the Philippines may become a climate and conflict hotspot. Politics is fiercely contested – often on the streets – and the current president is authoritarian, unpredictable and violent. There is a decades-old, re-energised insurgency in the south with some leadership allegiance to ISIS, bolstered by a flow of militants from Indonesia and those returning from the Middle East.

Climate warming impacts include more extreme flooding, prolonged and intensified droughts, more powerful typhoons, and intense storm surges.

The Philippines was ranked as the fifth most affected nation by climate-related disasters between 1994 and 2013. Manila is one of the most vulnerable cities in the world to inundation from rising sea levels and was rated as the second-most-at-risk city to climate change in the world, in the “extreme” category, in 2013. Manila can expect more power shortages, disease and interruptions to water supply with more warming.

Oceans to the east of the Philippines are the most rapidly warming surface waters anywhere in the world, driving cyclones such as Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, which was the most powerful tropical cyclone to make landfall in recorded history. Over the past 37 years, typhoons that strike East and Southeast Asia have intensified by 12–15%, with the proportion of storms of categories 4 and 5 having doubled or even tripled (Mei and Xie 2016). In 2009, during tropical storm Ondoy, a month’s worth of rain fell on Manila and 25 provinces in a few hours. Nearly 80% of Manila was flooded, 246 people died and hundreds of thousands had to be evacuated.

Climate change and human activities have taken a heavy toll on coral reef ecosystems, on which millions of Filipinos depend for food and income. 75% of the mangrove area has been lost, as has 30–50% of the country’s seagrass beds in the last 50 years.

Climate change will have a modestly negative effect on rice, sugarcane, and banana yields, and a large negative effect on maize. Climate change will increase prices of agricultural food and this will disproportionately affect poor people (Thomas et al. 2016). The country’s food production system is highly vulnerable. One in four Filipinos live below the poverty line.

TYPHOON HAIYAN WAS THE MOST POWERFUL TROPICAL CYCLONE TO MAKE LANDFALL



AUSTRALIA: SHIRKING RESPONSIBILITY

Australian institutions are failing in their fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the people and their future well-being. Australia is also failing as a world citizen, by downplaying the profound global impacts of climate change and shirking its responsibility to act.

Australia's per capita greenhouse emissions are in the highest rank in the world, and its commitment to reduce emissions are rated as inadequate by leading analysts. For example, Climate Action Tracker says that "Australia's current policies will fall well short of meeting" its Paris agreement target, that the Emissions Reduction Fund "does not set Australia on a path that would meet its targets" and "without accelerating climate action and additional policies, Australia will miss its 2030 target by a large margin" (CAT 2016).

Australia's biggest corporations are no better. The S&P/ASX All Australian 50 has the "highest embedded carbon" of any group in the S&P Global 1200, according to the S&P Dow Jones *Carbon Scorecard* report, which assesses global companies' carbon footprint, fossil fuel reserve emissions, coal revenue exposure, energy transition and green-brown revenue strain (Investor Daily 2017). At the 2017 Annual General Meeting of Santos, one of Australia's biggest oil and gas companies, chairman Peter Coates asserted that it is "sensible" and "consistent with good value" (Davidson 2017) to assume for planning purposes a 4°C-warmer world, thus abrogating his director's responsibility to understand and act on the risks of climate change.

The most dangerous aspect of fossil-fuel investments made today is that their impacts do not manifest themselves for decades to come. If we wait for catastrophe to happen – as we are doing – it will be too late to act. Time is the most important commodity. To avoid catastrophic outcomes requires emergency action to force the pace of change.

To have a realistic chance of meeting the Paris aspiration of constraining the temperature increase "to well below 2°C, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C" means that no new fossil fuel projects – coal, oil or gas – can be built globally, and that existing operations have to be rapidly replaced. As well, carbon drawdown technologies to reduce the amount of atmospheric carbon – which do not currently exist at scale – need to be rapidly deployed.

In these circumstances, opening up a major new coal province, as both the Federal Liberal–National Party and the Queensland Labor governments, along with the Federal Opposition, are proposing in Queensland's Galilee Basin, is a crime against humanity.

The defence sectors of Australia's key partners are taking climate change very seriously, but government disinterest means that Australia itself is much less well prepared. The conflict and security aspects of climate change were flagged a decade ago, but have not been a significant component of public discourse in Australia in recent years. Media commentators have accorded it little space. Defence and security think tanks in general have not given the issue a high priority, and some have barely been in this field at all. The output from Australia's intelligence analysts appears negligible.

Recent reports by the Centre for Policy Development (Sturrock and Ferguson 2015) and the Climate Council (2015) have highlighted Australia's relatively poor state of preparedness and policy-making on these issues, in comparison to the USA and the UK. The public reports produced by think tanks are, in general, somewhat timid compared to the forthrightness of those of the CNA Military Advisory Board, and *The Age of Consequences* (Campbell et al. 2007). The science overviews in the Australian reports, which generally take the IPCC framing at face value, often lack critical perspective on high-end risks. This contributes to a failure of imagination in assessing potential challenges.

Successive defence white papers have all but ignored the topic, until limited recognition in the most recent white paper. A major stumbling block continues to be successive ministers for defence and their cabinet colleagues who have, by their lack of interest and public commitment, frustrated the Department of Defence's (DoD) efforts to develop their climate preparedness work. No committee of either house of the Australian Parliament has specifically reported upon these issues. Neither of the two main political parties displays a deep understanding or accepts the real implications of climate change for Australians' security.

The Global Change and Energy Sustainability Initiative, within the DoD, has had some success in assessing risks to the defence estate and preparedness, pushing climate change up the agenda. One significant public sign of this work were remarks by Lieutenant General Angus Campbell to the 2016 Chief of Army's Exercise, in which he identified climate change ("an unstable planet") as one of the three issues central to the security challenges Australia will encounter in redefining boundaries for the 21st century land force (Campbell 2016).

The Longest Conflict, a report by the Centre for Policy Development (Sturrock and Ferguson 2015), assessed Australia's security response to climate change as "parts without a whole", noting:

"Most of the defence officials and experts interviewed for this study acknowledged Australia has not integrated climate security considerations into broader national security and defence strategic frameworks. Indeed, Australia has been unique among developed states because of the absence of a climate and energy security discourse..."

"Interviewees offered a number of explanations for the absence of a strategic framework. One was that, whilst there is significant concern about climate change amongst middle and junior level defence bureaucrats, the defence establishment as a whole remains resistant to 'securitising' climate change. This resistance stems from both those who do not believe that climate change is a serious problem and those who accept the climate science but do not believe climate change should be conceived of as a security issue..."

"Most interviewees intimated that the most significant factor inhibiting climate security in Australia is the reluctance to embroil the DoD or the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in climate change politics, which have become extremely divisive and partisan in Australia in recent years. When asked why the senior ADF personnel have not been prepared to echo the call of the US top brass to make climate change a defence priority, one senior defence department official pointed to the differences in political culture between the two countries. In the US, this official suggested, the defence establishment is pushing very hard publicly on climate security largely to force a recalcitrant Congress to take the issue seriously... whereas the policy-making culture in Australia is generally more technocratic and secretive."

"[The] Global Change and Energy Sustainability Initiative... attempts to improve the understanding of climate change on defence preparedness. The Initiative ... draws upon research done across the services, connects with academia, think tanks and other government agencies such as CSIRO or the Office of the Chief Scientist. The Initiative has made progress in recent years [including] to assess the impact of climate risks on ADF operational capability..."

The Department of Defence is making significant progress in mission preparedness and operational resilience, but there has been less work done thinking about strategic implications of climate change impacts on regional stability.

At a federal government department level, some steps are being taken in inter-agency work and moving towards a whole-of-government approach, especially with regard to domestic emergency and climate resilience, but consideration of the full extent of the broader international climate and conflict risks remains very inadequate.

HOT TOPIC: PROTECTION

OUR MORAL SYSTEM

The first responsibility of a government is to safeguard the people and protect their way of life.

Safety and well-being is valued in all aspects of our lives: at home and around the swimming pool and at the beach, in the workplace, on the road, and in our schools. In business, engineering and government, this is practised as risk management. We value keeping people well and safe from harm with our health system, insurance, social security, and emergency services, and we value protecting nature.

The basis of democracy, according to the cognitive linguist George Lakoff, is "empathy – citizens caring for each other, both social and personal responsibility – acting on that care, and an ethic of excellence". From these, our freedoms and our way of life follow, as does the role of government: to protect and empower a nation's citizens. Empowerment starts with education and infrastructure. No one can be free without these, and without a commitment by one's fellow citizens to care and to act on that care says Lakoff.

In his 2004 book, *Don't Think of an Elephant*, Lakoff explains:

"First, if you empathize with your child, you will provide protection. This comes into politics in many ways. What do you protect your child from? Crime and drugs, certainly. You also protect your child from cars without seat belts, from smoking, from poisonous additives in food. So progressive politics focuses on environmental protection, worker protection, consumer protection, and protection from disease. These are the things that progressives want the government to protect their citizens from. But there are also terrorist attacks, which liberals and progressives have not been very good at talking about in terms of protection. Protection is part of the progressive moral system, but it has not been elaborated on enough. And on September 11, progressives did not have a whole lot to say. That was unfortunate... Protection is important. It is part of our moral system."

A failure to protect vulnerable communities from climate change impacts is behind the daily news from Africa, The Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, but the news often lacks the climate context. By locating climate responses in a moral system of protection, we can better engage the community in action to minimise future climate harm.

DISASTER ALLEY SCENARIOS

Australia is already experiencing some of the extreme impacts of climate change, including extended heat waves above 40°C, catastrophic bushfires and record rains and flooding. Fortunately, severe heatwaves and floods have not yet occurred simultaneously, but this can be anticipated with the increasing intensity and frequency of such events. However extreme events and climate impacts such as coastal inundation within our region do not seem to receive much attention. The two preliminary scenarios outlined here are a way of thinking about how such climate change-driven regional crises could directly impact Australia, and how we might act.

These scenarios were constructed on the basis of the following.

- **Rising sea levels:** Low-lying Pacific islands, Asian cities (such as Manila, Bangkok, Shanghai, Kolkata) and river deltas in the region (including the Mekong, Brahmaputra and Ganges, China's Pearl River industrial/export zone, the Rewa in Fiji and Fly in PNG) are all vulnerable to rising sea levels and inundation from high-intensity cyclones and storm surges. China's Pearl River Delta special industrial zone in Guangdong Province is responsible for 20% of national GDP, more than 30% of foreign direct investment, and 40% of China's exports, but is less than two metres above sea level and built on a sinking delta. It contains the second greatest number of people (after Kolkata) estimated to be at risk of flooding anywhere in the world. In 2012, the ports of Guangdong handled more than 1.2 billion tons of freight. "Hard" defences are not considered to be feasible.
- **Cyclones:** Cyclone Haiyan, which hit the Philippines in 2013, was the strongest cyclone on record to make landfall anywhere in the world, and Cyclone Winston (Fiji, 2016) was the strongest cyclone on record to make landfall in the Pacific. Cyclones are intensifying in concert with rising sea surface temperatures. Waters to the east of the Philippines are likely the fastest warming tropical waters in the world.
- **Antarctica:** It is likely that climate change has already triggered the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), with loss of a significant fraction of WAIS on a decadal to century time-scale. Antarctica alone could contribute more than a metre of sea-level rise by 2100. A US government agency has just lifted its maximum sea-level rise estimate to 2.5 metres by 2100.
- **Water insecurity:** More variable monsoon patterns and strong El Ninos will add to the problem of water insecurity across Asia and the Pacific. As the climate becomes hotter, the dry season may extend in length and droughts are likely to become more severe. Small island developing states are especially vulnerable to the effect of drought and flooding on food production, which can affect the whole country. A strong El Nino in 2015–16 caused significant drought and frosts across Melanesia, with negative impacts on agriculture, water supply, women's labor and villagers' health. By late 2015, a maximum of 770,000 people in Papua New Guinea – nearly 10% of the population – were living in locations where food was very or extremely scarce.

SCENARIO: THE CHINA SYNDROME

In this scenario, in China's north a water crisis deepens as decreased snowmelt flows from the Tibetan Plateau intersect with overexploitation of groundwater, reduced irrigation capacity, and a two-year northern monsoon failure. A political crisis develops in impoverished rural communities, strengthened in the north-west by long-standing grievances among the Muslim minority, and there is significant internal migration to the large cities.

A category 5 typhoon hits the Pearl River Delta/Guangdong free trade zone, and storm surges inundate half of the delta, destroying infrastructure and significantly disabling export capacity for up to a year.

Consequently, the Chinese economy stalls and tips into recession, while chronic and opaque debt, especially in the state sector, cascades into a full-blown credit crisis. The crash infects Asian markets, and Australian banks are exposed. As Chinese output stagnates, Australian resource exports fall, putting further pressure on a fragile Australian domestic stock market. (China is Australia's largest trading partner, while Australia is a leading source of resources for China.)

Chinese employers try to replace organised labour with new migrants from the countryside, but workers resist, especially in unionised overseas firms in the Guangdong zone, and labour disputes escalate. The middle class joins the revolt as they lose out from over-leveraged stocks in a plunging share market. The state cracks down, and maintaining civil order becomes their focus.

An emboldened United States decides the crisis provides an opportunity to challenge Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. This security crisis in East Asia intersects with a new Asian financial crisis in Australia's largest export market.

**“NEITHER THE WORLD NOR
AUSTRALIA ARE PREPARED FOR
THE SERIOUS, LARGE-SCALE
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES
AND REFUGEE PATTERNS”**

ADMIRAL CHRIS BARRIE (RET)
FMR CHIEF OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE



PACIFIC HUMANITARIAN AIRDROP MISSION

SCENARIO: PACIFIC OVERLOAD

Small Pacific nations are increasingly unhappy with Australia's climate policies. The President of the Marshall Islands, Dr Hilda C. Heine, told the audience at the S.T. Lee Lecture at the Australian National University in Canberra on 16 May 2017 that:

“ Now is not the time to be debating the science, trashing solar power, or building new coal mines... I can assure you it does influence the way Australia is viewed in the Pacific... Imagine how you'd feel if your big brother or big sister was not only openly mocking the science but even occasionally mocking your very own plight... This not only does your country disservice, it openly weakens your ability to be a force for good on the world stage ” (Fettes 2017).

In this scenario, a tsunami storm surge has a devastating impact on a significant portion of the coastline of the Solomon Islands due to the loss of natural coastal defences that exist there today, including coral reefs, mangroves and kelp forests. Australia deploys significant resources including a Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) ship to the politically-fragile state, and is also called upon for help by Papua New Guinea to provide aid and assistance due to an ongoing severe drought. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capacity provided by the Australian government and aid organisations is stretched.

The problem worsens when a helicopter crash on Australia's only other LHD ship immobilises the vessel, and the ADF helicopter fleet is grounded. (The grounding of ADF air fleets occurred following the Navy's Sea King helicopter crash on Nias in April 2005 during the Aceh aid deployment, and the crash of a Blackhawk helicopter during naval exercises off Fiji during Operation Quickstep at the time of the 2006 coup. Both of Australia's LHD ships are out of operation for most of 2017 with serious propulsion problems.)

An intense cyclone then hits Fiji's capital, Suva. Australia cannot respond adequately. China, which has spent two decades building relationships in the Pacific region and funding local infrastructure, development programs and business investment, says it will act to assist and evacuate stranded Chinese nationals, using naval forces already engaged in exercises in the region.

It also offers direct disaster relief support by its naval forces. Fiji accepts, and Australia faces a diplomatic crisis in the Pacific, an area which it considers its own political backyard, but which it has neglected as a declining overseas aid budget turns old friends into regional critics, as well as coming under increasing regional criticism for its rigid migration and inadequate climate policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In April 2017, a group of global institutions including the World Bank, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry told the Turnbull government that containing the effects of climate change must be a central pillar of Australia's new foreign policy. Further mitigation and adaptation will be needed to address the economic and security impacts of the widespread upheaval it will produce. (Hunter & Wroe 2017)

Australians could live in an Asian region with 150 million climate change refugees this century, according to Prof. Alan Dupont (Lowy 2017). Dupont has been an advisor to a number of Australian ministers of defence and foreign affairs.

This is the sort of climate change scenario the Australian government must consider now, before the possible becomes the probable. Displacement and forced migration form only one element in the complex challenge of imagining a hotter world.

On the present path of climate warming, the consequences will escalate to such a level of disruption and conflict that "outright chaos" may result, and militarised solutions could play little, if any, role compared to the scale of the problem.

Climate change has moved on from a period of much talk but limited impacts, and is now turning nasty. Official rhetoric which continues to avoid the full reality of climate change must be replaced with urgent action encompassing the following responses.

RISK MANAGEMENT

We must recognise the current failure of imagination in assessing and preparing for the full range of climate change risks, and its existential implications for global financial and societal stability. Abrupt climate change can come faster than expected or planned for, forcing more reactive – rather than proactive – modes of behavior that fail to deal with the underlying issues and drive a cycle of deepening crisis. Existential risks require a different approach from conventional risk management. This includes:

- Deploying new existential risk management techniques outside conventional politics and policy making. Irreversibility, particularly if occurring on a global scale, suggests that special precautions should be taken that go well beyond those that might otherwise apply.
- A normative view of the targets required to avoid catastrophic consequences, based on the latest science and on a qualitative, moral basis, with action determined by the imperative to achieve the target. Incremental, "politically-realistic" changes from a business-as-usual mindset dominated by vested interests cannot meet this requirement.
- A frank articulation of the catastrophic risks and the necessary time frame of response. A truthful and accurate definition of the problem is 90% of the solution. With extensive community education we can develop commitment to the major transformation ahead and change the context of debate. That has not happened thus far.
- Integrating policy at the national, regional and global levels rather than treating issues such as climate, energy, the ecological crisis and resources overuse in "silos".
- Recognising the irreducible role of global leadership. The task is to change mindsets and build coalitions, so that the risks can be addressed with an emergency global response.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

UNDERSTAND THE RISKS

Establish a top-level climate and conflict task-force in Australia to urgently examine the existential risks of climate change and develop risk-management techniques and policy-making methodologies appropriate to the challenge.

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Climate change is now a wicked problem. Very rapid cuts in emissions are required, but are considered unachievable within the prevailing economic orthodoxy.

The 2015 Paris climate conference declared its aim was “to hold the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”, yet it agreed upon measures that would instead result in warming of 3–5°C (see page 5).

Warming of 2°C is now widely considered a boundary between “dangerous” and “very dangerous” climate change. Former NASA climate science director, James Hansen, says it is “well understood by the scientific community” that goals to limit human-made warming to 2°C are “prescriptions for disaster”, because “we know that the prior interglacial period about 120,000 years ago was less than 2°C warmer than pre-industrial conditions” and sea level was at least five to nine metres higher (Hansen et al. 2015; ABC 2015).

A significant fraction of the total impacts of climate change on particular system elements occur with less than 2°C of warming. This is the case for coral reefs, fresh-water security, terrestrial vegetation and increased river flooding (Ricke et al. 2015). At the current level of warming — around 1°C above the late nineteenth century — coral bleaching is devastating, Arctic sea ice and some West Antarctic glaciers have passed their tipping points, and a multi-metre sea level rise is a medium-term consequence.

The safe level of warming for some polar system elements is well under 1°C and probably under 0.5°C. Polar researchers say the Paris commitments will not prevent Earth “crossing into the zone of irreversible thresholds” in polar and mountain glacier regions, and that crossing these boundaries may result in processes that cannot be halted unless temperatures were returned to below the pre-industrial level (IPCC 2016).

Yet human activity has already caused 1°C of warming compared to the late nineteenth century – or 1.2°C compared to the late seventeenth century pre-industrial climate – and at least another 0.5°C of warming is temporarily masked by sulfate and other cooling aerosols, whose primary source is fossil fuel combustion. There is no pathway limiting warming to under 1.5°C without unproven solar radiation management. Current emissions scenarios for 1.5°C assume “overshoot”, in which the target is significantly exceeded before returning to below 1.5°C by the deployment of large-scale negative-emission technologies later in the century.

The challenges we face are not amenable to a “politically-realistic” response. Emergency action is essential when events threaten to overwhelm the capacity to respond; when failure is not an option; when action is time sensitive (delay leads to event escalation, to the point of passing climate system tipping points); and when the costs of inaction massively outweigh the costs of acting.

An emergency response is not alarmism. It is a rational precautionary “due care and diligence” response to an existential risk crisis.

Clearly the processes of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change through the regular Conference of the Parties are not capable of delivering the actions that are now required.

We also need to set aside the reflex taboo that some people have begun to build up around geoengineering, including drawdown and solar radiation management, and openly and rigorously assess whether these interventions are able to contribute in strategically important ways.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

EMERGENCY PROGRAM

Climate change now represents a global emergency, which threatens human civilisation. Build international processes that specifically recognise and formulate the practical steps necessary for a coordinated, global climate emergency response based on a sound, existential risk-management approach.

RAPID EMISSIONS REDUCTION

The scale of the challenge is reflected in a recent “carbon law” articulated by a group of leading scientists (Rockström et al. 2017). They demonstrated that for a 66% chance of holding warming to 2°C and a 50% chance of holding warming to 1.5°C (with overshoot), their “carbon law” requires:


- Halving of global emissions every decade from 2020 to 2050;
- Reducing carbon dioxide emissions from land use to zero by 2050; and
- Establishing carbon drawdown capacity of 5 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide per year by 2050.

Lead author Johan Rockström says: “It’s way more than adding solar or wind... It’s rapid decarbonization, plus a revolution in food production, plus a sustainability revolution, plus a massive engineering scale-up [for carbon removal].” In other words, an emergency-scale effort.

As noted on page 21, the world has passed some disturbing climate milestones at the current level of 1°C of warming, so the goal must be the restoration of a safe climate well under that figure, if multi-metre sea-level rises are not to occur. The “carbon law” does not describe a safe-climate path. Such a path would include:

- A large scale transition to a safe-climate economy that delivers zero emissions and large-scale carbon drawdown as fast as humanly possible;
- All known safe solutions implemented at maximum scale now; and
- Critical research and development of solutions to close the gap between what is needed for effective protection and what is currently possible.

GLOBAL CARBON LAW GUIDING DECADAL PATHWAYS



RECOMMENDATION 3:

RAPID DECARBONISATION

Launch an emergency-scale initiative to decarbonise the Australian economy no later than 2030 and build the capacity to draw down carbon dioxide from the atmosphere while protecting food-growing capacity.

ZERO EMISSIONS & LARGE-SCALE CARBON DRAWDOWN AS FAST AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE

BUILDING RESILIENCE

The Paris agreement recognises the need for large-scale financing by the developed economies for the less developed economies through the Global Climate Fund to reach US\$100 billion a year by 2020 from public and private sources. This would assist with mitigation and adaptation measures, based upon the principles of equity and historic responsibility. Those financing commitments have not fully materialised. Australian public climate funding has remained relatively steady since 2010, averaging A\$200 million per year.

Oxfam says that, based on relative economic strength and contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, Australia's total contribution from public and private sources should reach at least A\$3.2 billion per year by 2020, with at least half being public funding for adaptation (Maclellan and Meads 2016). ANU researchers have proposed that "a fair share for Australia may be around 2.4% or US\$2.4 billion a year" (Jotzo et al. 2011).

In the Australian Government's 2017 budget forward estimates, the public allocation to the Fund for 2020 is \$200 million, less than one-tenth of a "fair share". And whilst Paris agreed to "making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development", Japan and Australia, by contrast, consider funding for "high efficiency" coal plants should also be considered as a form of climate finance.

The UN Environment Programme says the cost of adapting to climate change in developing countries could rise to between US\$280 and US\$500 billion per year by 2050, a figure that is four to five times greater than previous estimates (UNEP 2016). Innovative forms of finance have been canvassed, including financial transaction taxes, use of revenues from carbon taxes and market auctions, crackdowns on corporate tax avoidance and tax havens, and re-direction of fossil fuel subsidies.

Analysts have also recognised the importance of reducing risks of instability and conflict in most vulnerable nations by building resilience and developing the capacity for early assessment of likely hotspots of instability and early intervention strategies to strengthen affected communities (CNA MAB 2014; Steinbruner et al. 2013). Ms Goodman notes in the Foreword it is critical to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable nations to climate impacts already locked into the system; yet this will reduce long-term risk only if such improvements in resilience are accompanied by strong actionable agreements to stabilise climate change.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

FINANCE RESILIENCE

Build more resilient communities in the most vulnerable nations by high-level financial commitments and development assistance; build a flexible capacity to support communities in likely hotspots of instability and conflict.

PREPAREDNESS

Recommendations on defence sector preparedness have been canvassed by several reports in Australia, including the Centre for Policy Development (Sturrock et al. 2015), the Climate Council (2015) and ASPI (Press et al. 2013), and in the USA by think tanks including the CNA Military Advisory Board. In a 2014 report, the Board recommended that US military commanders "factor in the impacts of projected climate change across their full spectrum of planning" and that "projected impacts of climate change should be integrated fully into the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the Strategic National Risk Assessment" (CNA MAB 2014). There is also the need to develop capacity "to improve understanding of the conditions under which climate-related natural disasters and disruptions of critical systems of life support do or do not lead to important security-relevant outcomes" (Steinbruner et al. 2013).

RECOMMENDATION 5:

BE READY

Ensure all levels of government and civil society organisations are prepared for the impacts of projected climate change. Ensure Australian Defence Force preparedness, their mission and operational resilience, and their capacity for humanitarian aid and disaster relief, is adequate across the full range of projected climate change scenarios.

IMAGINATION

Within one year of Pearl Harbour, the US economy in 1942 was transformed into the world's largest producer of military goods – an astounding emergency mobilisation. Today we have the material capacity for a climate emergency mobilisation. The question is, do we have the imagination and the leadership?

In reflecting on what they had learned in researching *Thinking the Unthinkable*, Nik Gowing and Chris Langdon asked: "The big questions centre on who at the highest levels of leadership in corporates and public service will take the bold risks [that are required], not gradually or incrementally, but decisively in line with the new scale and speed that 'unthinkables' emerge.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

BUILD LEADERSHIP

Establish a national leadership group outside conventional politics, drawn from across society, charged with implementing the national climate emergency program.

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


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The background is a watercolor-style illustration. It features a large, abstract splash of colors: deep blues and teals at the top, transitioning into vibrant pinks and reds towards the bottom. A white silhouette of the Eiffel Tower is centered vertically, with its upper portion appearing to emerge from the blue watercolor and its lower portion extending into the pink/red watercolor. The tower's structure is detailed with cross-hatching.

CLIMATE REALITY CHECK

AFTER PARIS, COUNTING THE COST

BY DAVID SPRATT

FOREWORD BY IAN DUNLOP

“OUR CLIMATE IS NOT SAFE NOW, SO WHAT DOES DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE MEAN?”

Prof. David Karoly, The Age, 4 December 2015



Written by David Spratt

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FOREWORD

Recount, our Breakthrough report published in April 2015, emphasised the need for emergency action if the potentially catastrophic and irreversible impacts of climate change are to be avoided.

It explained why the international policy target of limiting warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels is too high, and why there is no remaining carbon budget if we are to have a realistic chance of holding warming to even the 2°C level.

The Paris December 2015 climate summit in part acknowledged this, endorsing the goal “to hold the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”.

It is progress to have unanimous agreement from global and corporate leaders about the urgent need to meet these objectives. In political terms, the agreement was far more than expected, but in practical terms it is a disaster in which the chasm between rhetoric and scientific reality has dramatically widened. There is now an unjustified sense of complacency amongst many of the key players that the Paris objectives can be met by tweaking “business-as-usual” policies without radical change, as the glossy brochures and promises pouring forth since Paris from politicians, the corporate sector and international agencies demonstrate.

Ironically, climate change has accelerated rapidly over the last year, in part due to the unprecedented El Niño weather system generating record extreme events. But dangerous impacts from the underlying trend have also manifested far faster and more extensively than global leaders and negotiators are prepared to recognise.

The fundamental point being missed is that the “fat-tail” risks of climate change — the irreversible, positive-feedback tipping points which have long concerned scientists — are being triggered at today’s warming of just 1°C. This can be seen in the Arctic and the Antarctic, in our oceans, and not least with the destruction of the Great Barrier Reef. These are genuine, existential risks unlike anything previously experienced by humanity, which will result in a substantial reduction in global population unless rapidly addressed. They cannot be handled by existing risk-management techniques.

Given the latest evidence, it is almost impossible to now keep the temperature increase below 1.5°C or even 2°C with the current approaches. We have left it too late to solve the climate dilemma with a graduated response; emergency action, akin to placing economies on a war footing, remains essential.

This is not irrational alarmism, but an objective view of the latest science and evidence, as set out in this paper, which should be read and absorbed by every decision maker. New leadership, prepared to grasp and act on this reality, is essential.

IAN DUNLOP

Former Chair, Australian Coal Association & CEO, Australian Institute of Company Directors;
Member, The Club of Rome.



New Jersey coastline in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (Olsen/ New Jersey Army National Guard)

AFTER PARIS, COUNTING THE COST

George Monbiot wrote of the December 2015 Paris climate accord: "By comparison to what it could have been, it's a miracle. By comparison to what it should have been, it's a disaster." Big flaws in the deal mean it gives the impression that global warming is now being properly addressed, when in fact the measures fall alarmingly short of what is needed to avoid escalating climate change, and set the world on course for well over 3°C of warming.

Prof. Kevin Anderson of the UK Tyndall Centre for Climate Change is fond of quoting the twentieth century quantum physicist and Nobel laureate Richard P. Feynman: "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."

We fool ourselves if we are not deeply alarmed by recent events. In 2015, atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentrations jumped by 3.05 parts per million (ppm), the largest year-to-year increase in 56 years of research data. 2015 was the fourth consecutive year that CO₂ grew more than 2 ppm.¹ Methane levels also reached a new instrumental high, 254 per cent higher than the pre-industrial level.² And Arctic sea-ice extent hit a record winter low.

2015 was the hottest year on record by a significant margin. The UK Met Office says 2016 will be as hot or hotter, and observations support this forecast.³ Scientists were stunned by NASA data that February 2016 was an "unprecedented" 1.65°C warmer than the beginning of the twentieth century. That is 1.9°C higher than the pre-industrial level.⁴ The El Niño conditions contributed around 0.2°C or more to the record figures⁵ but, compared to previous big El Niños, we are experiencing blowout temperatures.

Prof. Michael Mann says, "We have no carbon budget left for the 1.5°C target and the opportunity for holding to 2°C is rapidly fading unless the world starts cutting emissions hard right now."⁶ Other experts agree.

Prof. Stefan Rahmstorf of Germany's Potsdam University considers that we are now "in a kind of climate emergency"⁷ and that at least 1.5°C is "locked in".⁸ More and more scientists concur.

Like the dramatic and unexpected Arctic "big melt" in 2007, these record temperatures confront us with the terrifying reality of global warming. Nature cannot be fooled. The recent data suggest it has taken just months for the Paris climate accord — with its escalating emissions to 2030 — to become a relic because of its gross inadequacy for the task the world now faces.

So what is the reality after Paris? What do recent research findings and observations teach us? And what does decisive leadership look like in the era of climate emergency?

1. CARBON EMISSIONS & TEMPERATURE

Human-caused carbon dioxide emissions increase the global average temperatures, such that the elevated temperatures remain roughly constant for many centuries.⁹ One landmark research paper says that "any future anthropogenic emissions will commit the climate system to warming that is essentially irreversible on centennial timescales".¹⁰

In other words, we cannot, on human time scales and in the normal course of events, undo the elevated temperatures and damage done by CO₂ emissions. The only exception to this understanding would be the deployment of incoming solar radiation management or very large-scale CO₂ removal (negative-emission) technologies to cool the Earth. In the main, these technologies at present are at little more than a conceptual stage of development and not currently deployable at scale (see Section 15).¹¹

2. "COMMITTED" WARMING

Accounting for inter-annual variability, global warming has now reached ~1°C above the 1880-1920 level.¹² And warming is now ~1.2°C above the 1750 pre-industrial level.¹³

If we were to cease burning fossil fuels today, the loss of aerosol cooling (see next section) would quickly add ~0.5°C or more to temperatures, taking warming to ~1.7°C above the pre-industrial level.¹⁴ The more fossil fuels we burn, the higher this level of "committed" warming will become in the absence of yet unproven, large-scale, negative-emission and/or solar radiation technologies.

Each decade, human activity is adding ~20 ppm of CO₂ to the atmosphere,¹⁵ enough to cause an extra ~0.2°C of warming. So if the emissions trajectory over the next 15 years follows the Paris path — in which annual emissions would be ~10% higher in 2030 than they are today¹⁶ — then by 2030 "committed" warming will have risen by ~0.3°C to ~2°C.

Analyst Bill Hare of Climate Analytics says: "If the Paris meeting locks in present climate commitments for 2030, holding warming below 2°C could essentially become infeasible."¹⁷ In this sense, Paris has locked out a less-than-2°C outcome, unless immediate and radical emission reductions occur across the high-polluting, developed economies.¹⁸

3. FAUSTIAN BARGAIN

A by-product of burning fossil fuels is a group of substances known as aerosols (including black-carbon soot, organic carbon, sulphates and nitrates) which have a short-term (~one week) cooling impact generally estimated to be in the range of ~0.5–0.8°C. For now, these aerosols are ameliorating the warming impact of increasing levels of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.

Reducing the use of fossil fuels, however, will also reduce the production of aerosols, and the loss of their cooling effect will increase the global temperature. But not stopping fossil fuel use will eventually cause global warming sufficient to threaten human civilisation.

Former NASA climate science chief Prof. James Hansen keenly observed this dilemma to be our Faustian bargain, in which the "devil's payment" will be extracted from humanity via increased global warming as we end fossil fuel use: "As long-lived CO₂ accumulates, continued balancing requires a greater and greater aerosol load. Such a solution... would be a Faustian bargain. Detrimental effects of aerosols, including acid rain and health impacts, will eventually limit the permissible atmospheric aerosol amount and thus expose latent greenhouse warming."¹⁹

4. PARIS COMMITMENTS


Although the Paris deal gives the impression that global warming is now being properly addressed, in fact the measures fall alarmingly short of what is needed to avoid escalating climate change.²⁰ Amongst its "deadly flaws" is the lack of any obligation on the parties to upgrade their existing pledges before 2030.

Indeed, analysis reveals that the Paris voluntary commitments, with no further progress in the post-pledge period, would result in expected warming by 2100 of 3.5°C (uncertainty range 2.0–4.6°C).²¹

Claims that the Paris commitments represent a 2.7°C path are dangerously overconfident as they are based on a highly uncertain assumption that countries will commit, in the future, to keep reducing emissions after 2030 at the rate they did beforehand.²²



PARIS COMMITMENTS COMPARED TO 2°C PATHWAY



SOURCES: WBGU special report 2009; Boyd, Stern & Ward (May 2015); IPCC 2014; Climate Action Tracker; Philip Sutton.

5. FEASIBILITY OF 1.5°C GOAL

The Paris agreement's stated aims are to keep warming "well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels" and to "pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C".

A goal far below 1.5°C is highly desirable, because climate change is already dangerous.

"Committed" warming today is now 1.7°C²³ and will be ~2°C by 2030 if emissions proceed along the Paris pathway. So there is no carbon budget left for 1.5°C: "And what about 1.5°C stabilisation? We're already overdrawn", says Prof. Michael E Mann, one of the world's foremost climate scientists.²⁴

Researchers say there are no model scenarios currently in the literature "where global temperatures remain below 1.5°C throughout this century". Current "overshoot" scenarios — exceeding 1.5°C of warming and returning to below 1.5°C by assuming the deployment of large-scale negative-emission technologies later in the century — impose challenging requirements, including "curtailing future energy demand... with only a slight increase over today's demand by 2100, despite rising populations and growing economies".²⁵

The possibility of staying below 1.5°C of warming for the whole of this century would require geo-engineering techniques such as the deployment of sulphate aerosols to reduce the amount of incoming solar radiation (see Section 15). Such approaches are not proven or safe technology, and are opposed by the large climate action NGOs, without exception. Likewise, the large-scale negative-emission technologies necessary to get warming back under 1.5°C by 2100 in the "overshoot" scenarios are not presently deployable in an environmentally safe way and at manageable cost, and are strongly opposed by significant elements of the climate justice movement.

6. RELIANCE ON NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES

Rather than requiring large emissions reductions in the short-to-medium term, the Paris accord instead relies on being able to successfully suck the carbon pollution back from the atmosphere in the longer term, plumping for biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) as the most promising negative-emissions technology.

BECCS is an unproven technology at scale and "negative-emission technologies... are currently at little more than a conceptual stage of development", yet the framing of the 2°C goal and, even more the 1.5°C one, is premised on the massive uptake of BECCS some time in the latter half of the century.²⁶

Potsdam Institute head Prof. John Schellnhuber warns against "the illusion you can just extract huge amounts of carbon from the air in order to restore the atmosphere".²⁷

The land-use intensity of BECCS is quite high, with values of ~1-1.7 hectares per ton of carbon per year.²⁸ In other words, if all the world's land currently devoted to cropping (~3 billion hectares) were devoted to BECCS, the drawdown would be ~4 billion tonnes of carbon per year — still only about 40% of the world's current annual emissions. Whether the storage of the compressed carbon dioxide in expired oil and gas fields and other underground geological sites would be secure and stable over the long term is another question for which there is yet no satisfactory answer.

CHANCES OF KEEPING BELOW 2°C Releasing a further...

400,000,000,000
TONS OF CARBON
= 33%
CHANCE
OF KEEPING BELOW 2°C



7. CARBON BUDGETS

Any temperature target only has practical meaning if the risk of exceeding it is known, and the scale of the impacts of exceeding the target are also known. A low-impact risk target for atmospheric greenhouse gases is very much less than the current level: the IPCC reported that "to provide a 93% mid-value probability of not exceeding 2°C, the concentration (of atmospheric greenhouse gases) would need to be stabilised at or below 350 parts per million carbon dioxide equivalent (ppm CO₂e)" compared to the current level of ~485 ppm CO₂e.²⁹

The catastrophic consequences caused by 2°C of warming demand a strong risk-management approach of having a very low probability of exceeding the target, and fully accounting for the likelihood of changes in the carbon cycle. Yet policymakers focus on "middle of the road" outcomes, and turn a collective blind eye to the bad possibilities that are much more likely to occur than is widely acknowledged (see Appendix).

While policy-makers and advocates often talk about a carbon budget of allowable fossil fuel use that would limit warming to 2°C, the evidence shows we have no such budget for a sensible risk-management, low-risk probability of exceeding that target.³⁰ There is no carbon budget if 2°C is considered a cap (an upper boundary not to be exceeded) as per the Copenhagen Accord, rather than a target (an aspiration which can be significantly exceeded). And there is certainly no carbon budget for fossil fuel emissions after accounting for likely emissions resulting from future food production and deforestation.

Anderson and Bows have shown that even with a too-high goal of holding temperatures to 2°C (with only a 66% probability of success), for developed economies to play a fair role they would have to cut their emissions by 40% by 2018, 70% by 2024, and 90% by 2030 from 1990 levels.³¹

There is
no carbon
budget if 2°C
is considered
a cap

310,000,000,000

= 50%

CHANCE

120,000,000,000

= 66%

CHANCE

ZERO

= 90%

CHANCE

8. CARBON CYCLE FEEDBACKS

There is an unacceptable risk that before 2°C of warming is reached, significant “long-term” feedbacks will be triggered, in which warmer conditions make carbon sinks (stores) such as the oceans and forests less efficient at storing carbon, and polar warming triggers the large-scale release of greenhouse gases from melting terrestrial permafrost and frozen methane deposits on the ocean floor.

This escalating release of greenhouse gases generates even more warming in a cycle of reinforcing feedbacks that could make an effective human response extremely difficult.

It is conventionally considered that these feedbacks operate on millennial timescales. Yet the rate at which human activity is changing the Earth’s energy balance is without precedent in the last 66 million years and about ten times faster than during the Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum, a period with one of the largest extinction events on record.³² The rate of change in energy forcing is now so great that these “long-term” feedbacks have already begun to operate within short time frames.

A recent study makes use of projections from the most recent IPCC report to estimate that up to 200 billion tonnes of carbon could be released due to melting permafrost and cause up to 0.5°C extra warming.³³ Some carbon stores have already reached a tipping point, and are now becoming carbon emitters rather than carbon sinks.

These include Arctic tundra.³⁴ One research paper concluded that: “the permafrost carbon feedback will change the Arctic from a carbon sink to a source after the mid-2020s and is strong enough to cancel 42–88% of the total global land sink.”³⁵

In February 2013, scientists using radiometric dating techniques on Russian cave formations to measure melting rates warned that a 1.5°C global rise in temperature compared to the pre-industrial level was enough to start a general permafrost melt.³⁶

In the first half of 2015, new lines of evidence were published suggesting that more elements of the system may be heading towards tipping points or experiencing qualitative change. These include the slowing of the major sea current known as the Atlantic conveyor, likely as a result of climate change; accelerating ice mass loss from Antarctic ice shelves and the vulnerability of East Antarctica glaciers; declining carbon efficiency of the Amazon forests and other sinks; rapid thinning of Arctic sea-ice; and the vulnerability of Arctic permafrost, exemplified by the proliferation of Siberian methane craters.³⁷

9. CRYOSPHERE THRESHOLDS

In late 2015, a chilling report on *Thresholds and closing windows: Risks of irreversible cryosphere climate change*³⁸ warned that the Paris commitments will not prevent the Earth “crossing into the zone of irreversible thresholds” in polar and mountain glacier regions, and that crossing these boundaries may result in processes that cannot be halted unless temperatures were returned to below the pre-industrial level.

It warns that: “These thresholds are drawing closer... some of these changes may close during the 2020–2030 (Paris) commitment period.”

The consequences would include the loss of reliable water resources from mountain glaciers for millions of people; the melting of polar ice sheets that would set the world on a course to a sea-level rise of 4–10 metres or more; and fisheries and ecosystem loss from polar ocean acidification.

The report says it is not well understood outside the scientific community that cryosphere dynamics are slow to manifest but once triggered “inevitably forces the Earth’s climate system into a new state, one that most scientists believe has not existed for 35–50 million years”.

Observational estimates based on model simulations and the record of past climates make it appear very likely that “the loss of certain vulnerable parts of our planet’s ice sheets will become unstoppable at temperatures and CO₂ concentrations at, or very close to those of today”. The “best estimate” for “the threshold for Greenland melt to become irreversible” is 1.6°C, a threshold beginning near today’s levels and well below the 2.7–3.5°C estimate from the Paris accord.

10. ACCELERATING SEA-LEVEL RISE

Climate warming causes the ocean volume to expand. It melts polar and mountain glaciers. Both raise the sea level. The questions are how far, and how fast?

Most estimates of sea-level rise for this century have been 0.5–2 metres, and centred around 1 metre, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. Prof. Kenneth Miller says: “The natural state of the Earth with present CO₂ levels is one with sea levels about 70 feet (21 metres) higher than now.”³⁹ Other research scientists agree it is likely to be more than 20 metres.⁴⁰ The long-term sea-level rise associated with a 2°C warming would submerge parts of Australia on which 25–50% of the population lives.⁴¹

Major recent studies show a number of polar ice sheets are unstable and heading toward collapse. As to how fast the seas will rise, one answer is "several metres" this century, according to Prof. James Hansen and 17 highly-regarded co-authors, who map a potential path to the "loss of all coastal cities" and the arrival of "super storms" not previously experienced by humans.⁴² Superstorm Sandy and Cyclone Haiyan may be precursors of such a future.

This research surveys evidence from the previous warm Eemian interglacial period around 120,000 years ago. At that time there were rapid fluctuations in sea level, and the research identifies a mechanism in the Earth's climate system not previously understood, which points to a much more rapid rise in sea levels than currently anticipated. Increasing ocean stratification occurs when cooler surface layers from melting ice sheets trap warmer waters underneath, accelerating their impact on the melting of ice shelves and outlet glaciers. This in turn increases ice sheet mass loss, and generates more cool surface melt water in a positive feedback.

The consequences include the slowing or shutting down of key ocean currents including the Gulf Stream System, which would increase temperature differentials between tropical and sub-polar waters, and drive "super storms" such that "All hell will break loose in the North Atlantic and neighbouring lands."⁴³

The projected cooling pattern of waters around Antarctica and the north Atlantic waters from the injection of fresh ice-melt water is already visible in the observed data and is already contributing to a circulation decline of the Gulf Stream System and cooling of some European countries.⁴⁴

Another significant new study⁴⁵ dovetails with the Hansen study and concludes that "Antarctica has the potential to contribute more than a metre of sea-level rise by 2100 and more than 15 metres by 2500", doubling previous forecasts for total sea level rise this century to 2 metres and more. "People should not look at this as a futuristic scenario of things that may or may not happen. They should look at it as the tragic story we are following right now," says Eric Rignot, an expert on Antarctica's ice sheet and an earth sciences professor at the University of California.⁴⁶

11. THE FATE OF CORAL REEFS

The Great Barrier Reef is home to 600 different types of corals. It has greater diversity than any other UNESCO World Heritage site. But it is dying.

Record high water temperatures in the Coral Sea in early 2016 caused unprecedented destruction of the Reef, when corals stressed by water more than 1°C hotter than normal expelled the zooxanthellae algae with which they live in a symbiotic relationship.

This "bleaching" — so named because algae give corals their colour and their loss leaves the coral structures white and lifeless — is the worst such event on record. Of 911 reefs included in an initial survey, 500 were severely bleached. Of the 522 reefs surveyed in the pristine and isolated northern sector, 81% were severely bleached. Scientists found: "North of Port Douglas, we're already measuring an average of close to 50% mortality of bleached corals. At some reefs, the final death toll is likely to exceed 90%." Around Lizard Island there is almost no living coral left. Before this mass bleaching started, the Great Barrier Reef had lost 50% of its coral cover. It takes several months for the full mortality to take effect, but the final death rate in the northern sector will be much higher than 50%.⁴⁷

This means that significantly more than 60% of the Reef's coral cover has been lost in just three decades due to the effects of tropical cyclones, crown-of-thorns starfishes and reduced water quality, as well as climate change.

Moderately bleached corals can recover, but with severe bleaching mortality is high. Colonies may start to re-grow after healthy upstream reefs spawn; but it takes 10–15 years for reefs to regain health and that only happens if there is no further bleaching over that time. An adequate recovery time is crucial, somewhat like forests after a fire.

The global average land and sea surface temperature for January–March 2016 rose to 1.5°C above the 1880–1900 baseline, compared to the average warming of 1°C over recent years.

Researchers at the University of Melbourne say that for the Coral Sea there is "at least a 175 times increase in likelihood of hot (water temperature) March months because of the human influence on the climate", and that whilst the decaying 2015 El Niño event may have affected the likelihood of bleaching events, there was "no substantial influence for the Coral Sea region as a whole", which can be warmer than normal for different reasons.



They also found that: "March 2016 was clearly extreme in the observed weather record, but using climate models we estimate that by 2034 temperature anomalies like March 2016 will be normal."⁴⁸ In this scenario, reefs simply will not have the 10–15 years' recovery time they need, and will fall into a death spiral of more frequent bleaching events followed by increasingly inadequate recovery periods.

In 2009, Australian scientists contributed to an important research paper which found that preserving more than 10% of coral reefs worldwide would require limiting warming to below 1.5°C.⁴⁹

This year we have learned that, in fact, just 1°C of average global warming is deadly for the Reef. Pioneer coral researcher Charlie Veron told the Royal Society in 2009: "The safe level of atmospheric carbon dioxide for coral reefs is ~320 ppm (and) sets the safe limit for a healthy planet during a time of abrupt greenhouse-driven climate change."⁵⁰ Today's level is 400 ppm and rising.

Corals' calcium carbonate structures are vulnerable to higher levels of carbonic acid, a consequence of the draw-down of increasing amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere into the world's oceans. The last time oceans became acidic as fast as they are today, 96% of marine life became extinct. Parts of the Southern Ocean have already become acidic enough to dissolve sea snails' shells.

Coral reefs provide food and resources for over 500 million people along tropical coastlines, as well as coastal protection against storm surges.⁵¹ If the world's coral systems are lost, coastal ecosystems will only be able to provide 20–50% of the fish protein that they do today for those half a billion people.

Australia's neighbours are particularly vulnerable. The Coral Triangle — encompassing Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste — contains 76% of the world's reef building corals and over 35% of the world's coral-reef fish species. It is the richest place on earth in terms of biodiversity.

The 100 million people who live along the coasts of these islands depend on healthy ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds to provide food, building materials, coastal protection, and support industries such as fishing and tourism.⁵²

The 2016 mass bleaching extended from Tanzania to French Polynesia, devastating reefs in Australia's Kimberley region, at India's Lakshadweep Archipelago, at Reunion Island in the western Indian Ocean, around the Seychelles, Christmas Island and in New Caledonia, as well as the Great Barrier Reef. This climate catastrophe is truly global.



**“WHEN ARE WE GOING TO STOP
PRETENDING THAT +2°C IS SAFE FOR
THE GREAT BARRIER REEF, WHEN +1°C
ALREADY BLEACHES 93% OF IT?”**

Prof. Terry Hughes, ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies,
James Cook University, 21 May 2016

Coral bleaching at Lizard Island (XL Catlin Seaview Survey)

12. ONE-DEGREE IMPACTS

Evidence suggests tipping points for events, which may be irreversible on century time scales, are being crossed already. The Arctic is warming two-to-three times as fast as the global average.⁵³ Even before we reached 1°C of global warming, a dynamic had been established that will lead to sea-ice-free Arctic summer conditions, with severe consequences for the future stability of permafrost and frozen methane stores, and for sea-level rises, as well as for accelerated global warming as ice sheets retreat and the Earth's albedo (reflectivity) decreases.⁵⁴

One of the most significant research findings in 2014 was that the "tipping point" has already been crossed for the Amundsen Sea sector of West Antarctica at under 1°C of warming. Scientists found that the retreat of ice was "unstoppable" (unless temperatures return to the level of the 1970s). The consequences include that: "sea levels will rise one metre worldwide... [the ice's] disappearance will likely trigger the collapse of the rest of the West Antarctic ice sheet, which comes with a sea level rise of between 3–5 metres. Such an event will displace millions of people worldwide."⁵⁵ (Note: "millions" would seem a significant understatement.)


While a one-metre sea-level rise may sound manageable, it would destroy some nations, flood some of the world's richest river-delta agricultural lands or render them unusable due to salination, and likely create climate-change-driven failed states. In Bangladesh, a one-metre sea level rise would inundate 15–17% of the land and threaten more than a million hectares of agricultural land. The Mekong River Commission warns that a one-metre sea-level rise would wipe out nearly 40% of the Mekong Delta.⁵⁶ A one-metre rise would flood one-fourth of the Nile Delta, forcing more than 10% of Egypt's population from their homes. Nearly half of Egypt's crops, including wheat, bananas and rice, are grown in the delta.⁵⁷

Current climate trends, if not arrested and reversed rapidly, will likely lead to a substantial displacement of, and reduction in, global population, with attendant mass social conflict and migration, early signs of which are already evident in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Syrian conflict was preceded by the worst long-term drought and crop failures since civilisation began in the region, resulting in 800,000 people losing their livelihoods by 2009, and 2–3 million being driven into extreme poverty.⁵⁸ The eastern Mediterranean has experienced significant decreases in winter rainfall over the past four decades.⁵⁹

Central Melbourne & Bayside

2-metre sea-level rise plus 1-metre storm surge (coastalrisk.com.au)



13. DAMAGE BEFORE 2°C

The damage that will eventually be caused by the current level of warming of just 1°C is beyond adaptation for many nations and peoples, yet much higher temperature targets have been the goal of policy-makers. Prof. James Hansen maintains that it is "well understood by the scientific community" that goals to limit human-made warming to 2°C are "prescriptions for disaster", because "we know that the prior interglacial period about 120,000 years ago was less than 2°C warmer than pre-industrial conditions and sea level was at least five to nine metres higher, so it's crazy to think that 2°C is a safe limit".⁶⁰

The 2009 Copenhagen climate conference of governments agreed that there should be a scientific review of the 2°C cap. It was completed in 2015 for the secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and concluded that that 2°C is not a safe temperature cap and that a 1.5°C cap, while causing less damage than the 2°C cap, is also not safe.⁶¹


Scientists have found evidence of 41 cases of regional abrupt changes in the ocean, sea ice, snow cover, permafrost and terrestrial biospheres, many of which occur for global warming levels of less than 2°C. Although most climate models predict one or more abrupt regional shifts, any specific occurrence typically appears in only a few models.⁶²

Warming of 1.5°C would set sea level rises in train sufficient to challenge significant components of human civilisation, besides reducing the world's coral ecosystems to remnant structures.⁶³

Before or around 1.5°C, more significant events are likely to occur, including a decline in the efficiency of terrestrial and ocean carbon stores, and the already-documented accelerating ice-mass loss from the Greenland ice sheet and West Antarctic glaciers. New research looks at the damage to system elements — including water security, staple crops land, coral reefs, vegetation and UNESCO World Heritage sites — as the temperature increases. The findings are sobering. Almost all the damage from climate change to vulnerable categories like coral reefs, freshwater availability and plant life could happen before 2°C warming is reached, as the chart from this research dramatically shows.⁶⁴

Additionally, temperatures below 2°C could trigger the release of CO₂ and methane from natural carbon stores (e.g. permafrost, ocean-floor methane deposits, forests and peat deposits) on such a scale that human efforts to contain the level of future warming to manageable levels could be rendered ineffective.

Maximum potential climate change impacts for various sectors as determined by the sigmoidal fit



- Coral reefs
- Fresh water scarcity
- UNESCO world heritage sites
- Terrestrial vegetation
- Staple crop land
- Increased river flood
- Population affected by sea level rise

14. HOLOCENE CONDITIONS

Human civilisation has flourished over the last 11,000 years under relatively stable climate conditions and sea levels in a period known as the Holocene, which provided a "safe operating space" for global societal development.⁶⁵ However, we have already left the Holocene temperature range. Reestablishing Holocene conditions of less than 325 ppm CO₂e would be safe for humanity, especially given that so much of human civilisation comprises coastal settlement and delta/flood plain agriculture.

If a significant proportion of coastal settlement were to be overwhelmed by rising sea levels and forced to retreat, what then would be "safe" for humanity?

A small global warming above the level of the Holocene begins to generate a disproportionate warming on the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets.⁶⁶ Even a moderate sea level rise of 1–2 metres in less than a century would produce a change in coastlines that is unprecedented for human civilisation.

Current atmospheric greenhouse gas levels (~400ppm CO₂ and ~485 CO₂e) are likely to be the highest in the last 15 million years, and never previously experienced by humans. The current conditions, if maintained over centuries to millennia (that is, until the system reaches equilibrium), would likely produce temperatures 3–6°C warmer and sea level rises of 25 metres or more, based on evidence of past climates.⁶⁷ There is a widespread view amongst scientists that "a 4°C future is incompatible with an organised global community, is likely to be beyond 'adaptation', is devastating to the majority of ecosystems and has a high probability of not being stable".⁶⁸

Given the current state of the atmosphere, getting back to Holocene-like greenhouse gas conditions would require a rapid end to human-caused emissions, and the deployment at massive scale of efficacious biological and other carbon dioxide drawdown measures to reduce the level of atmospheric greenhouse gases for many, many decades and perhaps a century or more.

Vietnam drought 2016 (Thanh Nien News)



15. CLIMATE INTERVENTIONS

For thirty years, efforts to tackle climate change have focused almost entirely on emissions reduction. But the modest scale and slow pace of action, plus better scientific understanding of what constitutes dangerous climate change, have led to the realisation that what is required is not just a slowing or stabilisation of the warming, but instead a cooling of the earth to below its current temperature.

To cool the earth requires two steps. The first is an end to human emissions, to stop making warming worse. The second is to remove excess CO₂ from the atmosphere and/or solar radiation management, which reflects a small amount of the incoming sunlight back to space.

Solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) may be termed climate interventions or engineering: "purposeful actions intended to produce a targeted change in some aspects of the climate".⁶⁹ They could only make a practical contribution if they complement dramatic emissions reduction efforts, and their net benefit depends upon their technical effectiveness, cost, risk and governance.

SRM techniques are designed to produce immediate surface cooling by employing aerosol-cooling sulphates or similar into the lower stratosphere, or boosting the earth's reflectivity in some other way. The cooling effect would be almost immediate (within months) and substantial and the cost relatively low.⁷⁰

SRM techniques have not demonstrated clear net benefits because of as yet not-fully-understood but damaging side effects.⁷¹ They may not be able to simultaneously restore all features of the climate (e.g., temperature and rain/snow distribution) and do not address the issue of dangerous levels of ocean acidification. There are crucial unresolved ethical, political and governance issues. SRM could actually reduce the incentive to curb anthropogenic CO₂ emissions.

Some CDR techniques such as reforestation and afforestation are proven and safe, but limited in scale. Covering 3% of the world's surface with forests would be equivalent to negating just 10% of the world's current greenhouse gas emissions (a billion tonnes of carbon annually). Other CDR techniques include biochar, land management, accelerated weathering, bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS), direct capture and sequestration, ocean fertilization, and seaweed and algal farming.

Many of these are unproven, high cost at present, slow to implement, not currently deployable at the scale needed, and have implications for land use and the maintenance of food production and traditional land ownership, farming and biodiversity protection, because of the large spatial areas required (See section 6 above).

The impact of CDR would be slow and "will not have an appreciable effect on global climate for decades" and hence does not provide an opportunity for rapid reductions of global temperature.⁷²

The use of carbon capture and storage technology to store liquid CO₂ either from power and industrial plants or direct capture from the atmosphere in disused oil and gas fields and other geological formations is being deployed and has substantial business-sector and policymakers' support in establishing a liquid CO₂ market perhaps larger than the existing oil industry. There is concern about the ethics and efficacy of such an approach, and the safety and stability of such storage, especially in geological formations other than disused oil and gas fields and in deep ocean sediments. At the moment, most CDR options are much more expensive than emissions reduction costs, so in the first instance emissions reduction is the better option in giving more "bang for the buck", though some deployment of carbon drawdown will help drive it down the cost curve. CDR becomes important when the marginal cost is less than that of reducing emissions, only then, "with declining costs and stronger regulatory commitment, atmospheric CO₂ removal could become a valuable component of the portfolio of long-term approaches to reducing CO₂".⁷³

The bottom line remains a question of least-worst options. The US National Academy of Sciences poses a question most of us would hope does not materialize: "If, despite mitigation and adaptation, the impacts of climate change still become intolerable (e.g., massive crop failures throughout the tropics), society would face very tough choices regarding whether and how to deploy albedo modification until such time as mitigation, carbon dioxide removal, and adaptation actions could significantly reduce the impacts of climate change." It concludes that despite the moral hazard risk that albedo modification research may distract from the mitigation effort, "the potential risks from climate change appear to outweigh the potential risks from the moral hazard associated with a suitably designed and governed research program".⁷⁴

It must be emphasized that none of these technologies is currently viable at scale in terms of technical effectiveness, cost, risk and governance.

16. DISCUSSION

Over the medium-to-long term, living with 2°C or more of warming will, in Prof. James Hansen's words, condemn "our biggest, most prosperous and populated cities to an underwater existence".⁷⁵ Climate change is already dangerous, especially for the world's most vulnerable people and species. Yet, there is no pathway to keeping warming below 1.5°C without unproven solar radiation management. In light of the Paris commitments over the next 15 years, it is also very difficult to construct pathways that do not exceed 2°C thresholds and prevent more significant tipping points from being crossed, unless large-scale climate interventions are also adopted.

Humanity faces an existential crisis. What can be done about the immediate challenges this poses?

HOW DO WE RESOLVE THESE CHALLENGES?

- **The immediate goal of any climate strategy must be to avoid passing further significant tipping points, including those related to the carbon cycle, ice sheets and sea levels.** We must seek actions that form the least-worse path for future emissions, greenhouse gas levels and temperatures.

- **No matter what we do, there will be severe and unavoidable consequences, especially for peoples and ecosystems most vulnerable to a hotter climate.** We must focus on preparing for and adapting to the changes that are now inevitable, while working to achieve negative emissions and reduce warming in a manner that causes the least damage.

- **The best path is one that includes emergency-scale action to get to zero emissions as fast as possible and by 2030.** After a natural disaster such as an earthquake or flood, we know that deploying maximum resources as quickly and efficiently as possible will produce the best result. We must respond to the climate disaster in the same way. This requires a whole-of-government effort based on conscious recognition that climate warming now represents a near-term threat to human civilisation. It requires a strong regulatory approach, because simply pushing and prodding the market within a neo-liberal framework cannot get the job done. A rescue plan must lay out the many steps to solving the problem: a plan to drive rapid emissions reductions; a plan for a just transition out of fossil fuels; a plan for the labour, skills and investment to do it; a plan for sustainable modes of work and leisure; and so on. The transition will be economically and socially disruptive because old, carbon-intensive industries must die, and current lifestyles in the high-income economies are not sustainable.

- **Innovation has astounded us.** Forty years ago when solar PV cells were ~\$A100 a watt, who would have imagined that in 2015 they would be around 50 cents? We have many of the technologies we need, including battery storage rapidly falling in cost and new-generation electric vehicles that will make the petrol car obsolete. The obstacles are largely social and political, with a lack of commitment and poor regulatory systems slowing change for technologies that are already mature or rapidly sliding down the cost curve. Where technological challenges remain, we need a huge innovation and deployment effort on many fronts, including a search for efficacious climate interventions.

- **It is clear that a zero emissions strategy can't deliver, by itself, the degree of protection that would be desirable and that might be possible.**

We need to set aside the reflex taboo that some people have begun to build up around CO₂ drawdown or solar radiation management and openly and rigorously assess if these interventions are able to contribute in strategically important ways to a least worst, or most beneficial, climate outcome for all people and species, especially the most vulnerable.

- **Some claim that climate intervention technologies can justify continuing high fossil fuel use and are unethical.** It is clear however that these technologies can only be effective over the longer term if allied to a zero-emissions plan. It is suggested that climate interventions are not ethical, yet ignoring the path of least damage is surely less ethical in the face of intolerable future climate change impacts, such as massive crop failures throughout the tropics. We have a responsibility to investigate these through a large-scale research-and-development effort.

- **Radical emissions reductions can be driven more quickly by demand reduction than by replacing the energy supply system,** though of course both are essential. It is often said that the era of fossil fuels is coming to an end,⁷⁶ but it is not coming soon enough, however: the Paris path sees emissions increasing to 2030 and new coal power stations are still being planned and built. Energy-efficiency policies can reduce energy demand at a lower cost and more quickly than building new energy supply infrastructure.⁷⁷

- **A great social mobilization is needed to transform society.** Technological innovation in the energy sector by itself is insufficient to bring about the necessary change in energy use and production. When people are educated and motivated and act in concert, great social transformation can be achieved.

IDEAS LEADERSHIP

The reasons for failing to do what is obviously in our collective best interest have been widely canvassed, but one striking element is the lack of public ideas leadership. Only a handful of public figures in Australia have ever canvassed the main issues discussed here. Timidity and a relentless bright-siding infuse the public conversation, as if people cannot bear to hear the truth.

But what if the public is more prepared for the conversation than are our public ideas leaders?

Melanie Randle and Richard Eckersley recently investigated the perceived probability of threats to humanity and different responses to them (nihilism, fundamentalism and activism) in the US, UK, Canada and Australia. They found that:

Overall, a majority (54%) rated the risk of our way of life ending within the next 100 years at 50% or greater, and a quarter (24%) rated the risk of humans being wiped out at 50% or greater. The responses were relatively uniform across countries, age groups, gender and education level, although statistically significant differences exist. Almost 80% agreed "we need to transform our worldview and way of life if we are to create a better future for the world" (activism). About a half agreed that "the world's future looks grim so we have to focus on looking after ourselves and those we love" (nihilism), and over a third that "we are facing a final conflict between good and evil in the world" (fundamentalism). The findings offer insight into the willingness of humanity to respond to the challenges identified by scientists and warrant increased consideration in scientific and political debate.⁷⁸

So here is the great irony: people have a fair, intuitive sense of what might be coming, but our ideas leaders cannot talk about it.

Now is the time to press those who aspire to leadership on climate issues and action to ask the questions that prompted this discussion paper. If the propositions are contentious, we must debate them. Repressing troubling thoughts does not resolve them — they will come back to haunt us with increasing intensity.

APPENDIX: BEWARE THE “FAT TAIL” CLIMATE

The question “How should we respond to climate change, avoid catastrophe and get back to safer conditions?” is often posed in “risk-management” terms. But what does this mean? We have tended to underestimate the rate of climate change impacts.⁷⁹ Scientists are not biased toward alarmism but rather the reverse of “erring on the side of least drama, whose causes may include adherence to the scientific norms of restraint, objectivity, skepticism, rationality, dispassion, and moderation”.⁸⁰

Too often, policy is based on least-drama, consensus scientific projections that downplay what Prof. Ross Garnaut called the “bad possibilities”, that is, the relatively low-probability outcomes with very high impacts. But these events may be more likely than is often assumed, as Prof. Michael E. Mann explains:

One of the most under-appreciated aspects of the climate change problem is the so-called “fat tail” of risk. In short, the likelihood of very large impacts is greater than we would expect under typical statistical assumptions... With additional warming comes the increased likelihood that we exceed certain “tipping points”, such as the melting of large parts of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet and the associated massive rise in sea level that would produce.⁸¹

As one example of this “fat tail” risk, a greenhouse concentration may have a “most likely” outcome of ~3°C of warming, but a greater than 10% risk of warming of greater than 6°C!⁸²

Prof. Garnaut suggests climate research had a conservative “systematic bias” due to “scholarly reticence”.⁸³ Prof. Nicholas Stern wrote in similar vein about the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: “Essentially it reported on a body of literature that had systematically and grossly underestimated the risks of unmanaged climate change.”⁸⁴

As far back as 2007, Prof. James Hansen said that scientific reticence hinders communication with the public about dangers of global warming and a potentially large sea level rise.⁸⁵ More recently Hansen wrote that: “the affliction is widespread and severe. Unless recognized, it may severely diminish our chances of averting dangerous climate change.”⁸⁶

Scientific reticence also facilitates criticism of the presentation of climate science that is not the middle-of-the-road version. Such charges were made against *Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action*.⁸⁷ But the evolution of climate warming since publication shows that book was not wide of the mark, because “the worst” it discussed on many key issues has already become our bitter harvest. The book’s core proposition that we need an emergency-level response coincides with what many scientists are now saying.⁸⁸

Two climate research scientists who reviewed the present report said it reflected most of the recent climate system insights correctly, and one said it leaned toward the more “pessimistic perceptions”. But that is exactly the distinction that has to be drawn between the science and the risks it implies. Waiting for catastrophe to happen before acting means that it is too late to act. It is precisely this scenario that proper risk management is designed to avoid.

As with a bushfire, a flood, a plane malfunction or any other potential disaster, it is prudent to plan for the worst that can happen, and be pleasantly surprised if it does not. To hope and plan only for “middle-of-the-road” outcomes, which characterises most climate policy-making, including in Australia, is foolish.

A prudent risk-management approach would consider the full range of real risks to which we are exposed, including those “fat tail” existential events whose consequences would be damaging beyond quantification, and which human civilization as we know it would be lucky to survive. If we focus on the “middle of the road” and ignore the worst possibilities, we may end up in a fatal crash.





**“THIS IS BIGGER THAN US.
THIS IS WHAT CLIMATE
CHANGE LOOKS LIKE, THIS
IS WHAT SCIENTISTS HAVE
BEEN TELLING PEOPLE, THIS
IS SYSTEM COLLAPSE.”**

Fire ecologist David Bowman on the January 2016 Tasmanian World Heritage bushfires ⁸⁹

Fire-killed ancient pencil pines at Lake Mackenzie,
Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area,
Photographed 30 Jan 2016 © Rob Blakers

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“SOME COASTAL CITIES WILL DROWN FOR WHAT WE HAVE DONE AND WILL DO.”

Prof. Stefan Rahmstorf, University of Melbourne forum, 22 October 2015



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