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5.1 Differences between conventional and unconventional gas

5.1.1 Occurrence of conventional and unconventional gas
The terms ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ gas are often misunderstood and have assumed different meanings in different material relating to the gas industry. For the purpose of this Inquiry, ‘unconventional’ gas is found in relatively impermeable source rocks, where the gas has been trapped where it was formed (Figure 5.1). This is different from ‘conventional’ gas, which has migrated from its original source rocks into more porous, permeable rocks and has then been trapped under a seal of impermeable rocks. Unconventional gas includes CSG, which is found in coal seams, shale gas (found in shale rocks), and tight gas (found in sandstone). The Inquiry’s Terms of Reference require the Panel to consider unconventional shale gas only.

Figure 5.1: Schematic showing different types of petroleum accumulations and development. Source: Modified from US Environmental Protection Agency.

Irrespective of where it occurs, natural gas is composed mainly of methane with varying amounts of carbon dioxide and trace gases such as ethane, propane, butane and other hydrocarbons. From a consumer’s perspective, unconventional gas is effectively identical to conventional gas.

5.1.2 Extraction of conventional and unconventional gas
Conventional gas can typically be developed with a limited number of wells due to the accumulation of the hydrocarbons in a confined area with well-connected pore spaces within the rock storing the gas that enable effective gas production from strategically placed wells. The gas will generally flow to the surface under its own pressure without the need for pumping, most likely driven by a water table (or aquifer) underneath a pressurised gas cap or an impermeable barrier.
By contrast, the shales that hold unconventional gas have much lower porosity (that is, the void spaces between the grains that make up the rock are very small) and much lower permeability (that is, the interconnectedness of the pore spaces to allow the gas to move through the rock is very low). In order to extract shale gas, it is necessary to increase the level of porosity and permeability. This is achieved by ‘artificial stimulation’, which is another term for hydraulic fracturing.\(^1\)

There are differences in the extraction techniques for the different forms of unconventional gas:

- **coal seams**: are typically found relatively close to the surface (usually no more than 1,000 m deep). The extraction of CSG does not always require hydraulic fracturing (currently around 8% of wells in Queensland), but does require the removal of water from the coal to unlock the gas (‘dewatering’). Large amounts of water are produced (known as ‘produced water’), which must often be treated to remove excess salt prior to disposal;

- **shale gas source rocks**: occur deeper at between 1,500 and 4,000 m underground. Extraction of shale always needs hydraulic fracturing, but does not need the removal of large quantities of groundwater to unlock the gas. Only a portion of the water that is used in the hydraulic fracturing process is returned to the surface. This returned water (‘flowback water’) can often be reused for subsequent hydraulic fracturing operations, or must be treated and disposed of; and

- **tight gas deposits**: usually occur at similar depths to shale gas source rocks. These rocks have such low permeability that hydraulic fracturing is always necessary to allow the trapped gas to be liberated. Like shale gas, the returned water (flowback water) can often be reused for subsequent hydraulic fracturing operations, or must be treated and disposed of.

### 5.2 Shale gas development

#### 5.2.1 History

Hydraulic fracturing was developed more than 100 years ago, but its combination with horizontal drilling in the 1990s began a shale gas revolution in the US that has since transformed the energy market in North America and significantly affected world trade in gas and oil. The shale gas industry has since developed in countries such as Canada, Europe and the UK, and other countries such as China, Russia and Argentina are evaluating its potential. The current world ranking among countries of recoverable shale gas resource is: China, Argentina, Algeria, US, Canada, Mexico, Australia, South Africa, Russia and Brazil, although recent NT discoveries in the Beetaloo Sub-basin are likely to increase Australia’s global ranking of gas resources from seventh to sixth (see Chapter 6).

Although shale gas resources have been known to exist in Australia for many years, shale gas development is still in its infancy. In 2012, Santos’ Moomba-191 well in the Cooper Basin in SA became the first commercially producing unconventional gas (tight gas) well in Australia, following almost 10 years of exploration for unconventional gas in that basin. None of the Northern Territory’s considerable shale gas resources have yet been commercially developed (Chapter 6).

#### 5.2.2 Stages of exploration and development

The commercial production of shale gas is the culmination of a process spanning several years, and includes exploration, drilling, hydraulic fracturing, testing and economic analysis (Figure 5.2).\(^2\)

The different stages of shale gas development are:

- **stage 1**: identification of the gas resource – negotiating land access agreements; securing seismic survey and drilling permits, and undertaking initial geological, geophysical and geochemical surveys;

- **stage 2**: early evaluation drilling – seismic mapping of the extent of gas-bearing formation and other geological features such as faults, initial vertical drilling to evaluate shale gas resource properties, and collection of core samples;

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1 King 2012.
• **stage 3**: pilot project drilling – drilling of initial horizontal wells to determine reservoir properties and to help optimise operational techniques, and initial production testing;

• **stage 4**: pilot production testing drilling – drilling of multiple horizontal wells from a small number of single pads, full optimisation of operational techniques including drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing, pilot production testing, and planning of pipeline corridors for field development;

• **stage 5**: commercial development – following a commercial decision to proceed, and government approvals for production and for construction of gas plants, pipelines and other infrastructure, drilling and fracturing of a network of production wells. During drilling and hydraulic fracturing of the wells, there will be a concentration of heavy equipment on site, along with large stockpiles of drilling supplies and hydraulic fracturing chemicals. This can involve thousands of truck movements per well site over several months, with directional drilling occurring over several months, and hydraulic fracturing usually taking less than one month.\(^3\) After the completion of drilling and hydraulic fracturing, all heavy equipment is removed and permanent surface infrastructure is constructed, including a cement well pad, a well head, gas pipeline, and fencing to keep livestock and other fauna away from the well. The final footprint of the wells and surface facilities is much smaller than the original drilling footprint (see Section 8.3);

• **stage 6**: decommissioning – the removal of the well head, plugging the steel casing with cement and covering the plugged well with soil to ground level. The removal of all production equipment, production waste, pipelines and other infrastructure and the rehabilitation of all cleared areas; and

• **stage 7**: abandonment (also referred to as’ relinquishment’, if a planned process) – as far as the operator is concerned, this occurs when a period of post-decommissioning monitoring (groundwater quality and fugitive methane) has shown no unacceptable leakage issues and the state assumes responsibility for long-term stewardship of the well. At this time, the well is technically defined as an orphan, under the care of the state (see Recommendation 14.13 for the establishment of an orphan well fund).

Figure 5.2: Schematic representation of a project phasing in gas developments, with specific estimates of activity for a notional development in the Beetaloo Sub-basin. Source: Origin.\(^4\)

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3 ACOLA Report.

4 Origin Submission 153, p 38.
5.3 Extraction of onshore shale gas

5.3.1 Overview

As stated above, shale gas reservoirs are typically located at depths of 1,500 to 4,000 m below the ground surface. Because of their very low permeability, shales need to be split (fractured) before the gas can flow into the well and up to the surface.

The drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies used in extraction of onshore shale gas have evolved considerably from those used for the conventional petroleum resources over the past two decades. Drilling for shale gas now typically involves the drilling of multiple wells from a single well pad with horizontal extensions (‘lateral’) increasing the exposure to the target shale formation. In order to produce shale gas, multiple intervals, or sections for hydraulic fracturing, are placed along the horizontal section of the well. The most common hydraulic fracture designs for shale gas wells in the US use water-based hydraulic fracturing fluids, which are pumped into the well at a high pressure. The adoption of these technologies has led to a rapid growth of shale gas and oil production in the US.

The very nature of the extraction process, which involves drilling to great depths and the injection of chemical mixtures at high pressure into the well, is of paramount concern to the community. The maintenance of ‘well integrity’ throughout the operational life of a well and beyond is of crucial importance.

For this reason, the Panel commissioned CSIRO to produce a comprehensive review of this topic (the report is located at Appendix 14). The Panel has drawn heavily on CSIRO’s report for producing the well integrity section of this Chapter. However, all conclusions and recommendations are those of the Panel.

5.3.2 Well life cycle

All wells follow a similar life cycle, with some variations in their design and operational aspects depending upon their purpose and the local geology. The well life cycle phases are described below.

5.3.2.1 Design phase

The design phase includes consideration of the overall well life cycle, including all future operations for the well, through to its eventual abandonment. A description of this type of approach to well design was provided by Origin in a submission to the Panel. The design of the casing, cementing and completion are critical considerations for long-term well integrity, and for ensuring isolation between the shale formation and the surface, including isolation of any aquifers and problematic layers between the target shale and the surface, such as those containing gas, hydrocarbons and/or saline water. The well design is based on a detailed analysis of the following:

- well design and specification of materials and equipment (such as casing and cement);
- data acquisition program, including well logging, sample collection and well testing;
- well-stimulation activities;
- well barriers to manage well integrity;
- operating procedures, including risk management and well integrity management; and
- plans for final abandonment.

The ‘casing’ is the steel pipe that provides a pressure-tight conduit between the shale gas resource and the surface. It is a highly engineered product that must cope with anticipated wellbore conditions, including the potentially very high pressures applied during hydraulic fracturing (see Section 5.3.2.3). International standards cover the manufacture, testing.

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5 Golden and Wiseman 2015, pp 968-974.
6 ACOLA Report, pp 54-56.
7 Gallegos et al. 2015.
8 ACOLA Report.
9 Origin submission 153, pp 55-60.
The casing is designed to prevent the unintended flow of drilling and hydraulic fracturing fluids out of the well, to keep the well open through weak or broken rock layers, and to prevent formation fluids from entering the well and from moving between layers of rock through the well.

Well drilling occurs in stages, with each stage cased before further drilling using a smaller diameter drill bit. Figure 5.3 shows the general layout of casing used in shale gas wells, demonstrating that the diameter of the well decreases with depth, as successive casings are placed inside the previous casing strings. The design of casing for a well needs to take into account the depths of layers of rock or aquifers that must be isolated from each other, the corrosive nature of fluids or gases (such as hydrogen sulfide or carbon dioxide) that may be encountered, the stresses that the casing will be subjected to, and the operational requirements of the well.

**Figure 5.3:** General layout of casing in a shale gas well. Not to scale (width is significantly exaggerated). Note that the casing sizes are specified in imperial and not metric units Source: CSIRO.13

The casing is cemented to the well, and this is essential for two reasons. First, to provide strength to the well, and second, to provide a seal between the casing and the surrounding rock so that gas and fluids cannot flow from the shale formation (and other intersected formations) to the surface.14 During the cementing process, a cement slurry is pumped down the centre of the well and flows up the annulus (the gap between the rock formation and the most recently placed casing) (Figure 5.4). Well cements are designed, tested and prepared using established procedures to meet relevant specifications and have negligible permeability to formation fluids when cured.15 Well cements are very different to those used in normal construction. While most

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12 ISO 2014.
13 CSIRO 2017, at Appendix 14 of this Report.
14 Taoutaou 2010.
wells can be cemented with standard well cements, there are situations that can require a special cement blend to create the best seal in the well. Some of the well types that require a specialised blend of cement include moderate to high-pressure gas wells, horizontal wells, wells completed through salt zones, high temperature wells, and wells that are very deep (below 5000 m).\textsuperscript{16} The casing and cement work together as an integral system that is critical to well integrity. The stability and longevity of cements is covered in Section 5.4.2.4.

**Figure 5.4:** The process for cementing casing into a well. The cement is pumped down the centre of the well and returns up the outside of the well (A). The well requirements for an effective cementing are shown in (B). Not to scale. Source: Modified from Smith.\textsuperscript{17}

The design of wells, the specification of materials and equipment used in their construction, and well operations are covered by a large number of standards. As at June 2016, the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers listed more than 150 primary standards related to well construction and well operations.\textsuperscript{18} These standards are mandatory in some, but not all, jurisdictions. Most of them relate to quality control for operations and the provision of services and materials to the industry.

### 5.3.2.2 Construction phase

Well construction involves drilling, cementing, and hydraulic fracturing in accordance with the well design. Drilling fluids (drilling muds) are an essential component of drilling operations\textsuperscript{19} because they provide cooling and lubrication to the drill bit and drill string and lift drill cuttings from the well.

Casing is installed and cemented in place in a number of stages, as shown in **Figure 5.3**. Initially, a large diameter surface casing is set sufficiently deep to protect surface aquifers and is fully cemented in the ground. Once a well is drilled to the depth where a casing string is required, a steel casing string is run into the borehole and cemented (**Figures 5.3 and 5.4**). The cement fills and seals the annulus between the casing strings, or between the casing string and the formation rock. This process is repeated until the well construction is complete. The term ‘sheath’ is used to describe this encasing layer of cement.

\textsuperscript{16} US National Petroleum Council 2011.
\textsuperscript{17} Smith 1990.
\textsuperscript{18} IOGP 2016.
\textsuperscript{19} Hossain and Al-Majed, pp 73-139.
At each stage the well is prepared (cleaned by the circulation of drilling fluid) then cement is pumped down the centre of the well so that it flows around and up the annulus between the casing and the surrounding rock. The well integrity provided by the cement is not only dependent on the cement slurry design but also on a number of other aspects of the well cementing process, such as the cleaning and preparation of the wellbore and the condition and centralisation of the casing in the wellbore.\(^{20}\)

Importantly, during drilling and cementing, testing of the well’s integrity is undertaken.\(^{21}\) For example, pressurising the well to verify that it can hold the maximum pressures that it may be exposed to over its life, including the initial hydraulic fracturing operation. This is designed to test the integrity of both the well casing and cement.\(^{22}\) Additionally, there are a number of downhole sensor and logging tools that can be used to measure the state of the casing and the integrity of the bond between the casing, cement and rock.\(^{23}\) If the pressure testing indicates a problem, there are a number of procedures that can be undertaken by way of remediation (see Section 5.3.2.4).

The final activity in the construction phase is the ‘completion’ of the well; that is, preparing it for the production of gas.\(^{24}\) Completion involves the installation of hardware in the well and on the surface to allow the safe and efficient production of gas from the well at a controlled rate.

### 5.3.2.3 Hydraulic fracturing

Hydraulic fracturing is a stimulation technique used to increase the production of oil and gas from unconventional reservoirs, such as shales, by the injection of a hydraulic fracturing fluid at high pressure into a cased wellbore (Figure 5.5). Hydraulic fracturing is usually conducted over a number of intervals along the production zone of the well (the horizontal or lateral section), called ‘hydraulic fracture stages’ (Figure 5.6).

Most hydraulic fracturing treatments in shale gas wells take place in the relatively long (up to several kilometres) horizontal or nearly horizontal section of the well (lateral). The number of fracture stages in a single well has increased over time in US unconventional gasfields. For example, in 2009, 10–12 fracturing stages would have been typical, with a spacing of around 200 m. In 2017, it is common for 40–100 fracture stages in a single lateral, with a spacing of around 15–30 m between segments that are being fractured.\(^{25}\)

The hydraulic fracturing fluid is predominantly a mixture of water, proppant (commonly sand, or ceramics where formation pressures are high), and a small percentage of chemical additives (typically less than 1\%).\(^{26}\)
Figure 5.5: Schematic diagram of shale gas extraction process showing hydraulic fracturing. Source: Modified from Total S.A.

Figure 5.6: Hydraulic fracture stages. Source: CSIRO27

Hydraulic fracturing is typically conducted in stages. Each coloured zone in (A) shows a different stage. For each stage, the casing must be perforated to allow the hydraulic fracturing fluid to access the shale formation (B). Hydraulic fracturing is then conducted in each stage within a short section of the well that has been isolated, in this case using packers (C). Not to scale.

27 CSIRO 2017.
The most common approach to hydraulic fracturing in use today is called ‘plug and perf’ (short for ‘perforation’) by the gas industry (Figure 5.6). This involves initially perforating the zone within the lateral for each fracturing stage using shaped charges. The perforated stage is then isolated using mechanical plugs or other devices before the hydraulic fracturing fluid is injected into the isolated wellbore section. The stage nearest the end of the horizontal well (that is, the most distant segment from the vertical wellbore) is stimulated first by injecting the hydraulic fracturing fluid through the main production casing of the well.

As the hydraulic fracturing fluid is constrained within the isolated wellbore zone, the pressure builds up until it exceeds a threshold known as the ‘breakdown pressure’. Once the hydraulic fracture fluid pressure exceeds the breakdown pressure, it fractures the rock. The direction in which the hydraulic fracture propagates depends on the orientation of in-situ stress in the rock, with growth mainly occurring in a direction perpendicular to the minimum principal stress.

After the end stage is fractured, a plug is installed between that stage and the next furthest stage, and hydraulic fracturing fluid is injected again. This is repeated until the stage closest to the vertical section has been stimulated. Once all stages have been stimulated, the plugs are removed. The key operational feature of this approach is that the vertical wellbore is exposed to many cycles of pressurisation and depressurisation and needs to be designed to cope with this regime. As noted in Sections 5.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.3, this is a risk factor for well integrity.

New technologies are being developed and tested that involve the direct physical coupling of the hydraulic fracturing stage to the surface by a tubing string so that only that stage, and not the entire production casing up to the surface, is exposed to the cycling high pressure regime. This technology has the benefit of minimising the exposure of the production casing to cycling pressures and the risk this poses to the wellbore, especially in the context of bonding the outer cement sheath to the steel casing (Section 5.4.2.3). However, such technology is not yet in general use.

Once the hydraulic fracture has been initiated, further propagation is controlled by the fluid flow. Some of the hydraulic fracturing fluid drives hydraulic fracture growth, with the rest being injected or lost by absorption into the formation (a process known as ‘leak-off’). The surface area of the hydraulic fracture increases as the fracture grows, thereby increasing the fluid loss into the formation. The hydraulic fracturing fluid injection rate is calculated to propagate hydraulic fractures to the desired size given the expected fluid loss into the formation.

At the start of the stimulation, the hydraulic fracturing fluid is injected without any ‘proppant’ to initially open a fracture wide enough to allow the proppant to travel along the hydraulic fracture. Proppant is added to the hydraulic fracturing fluid to hold the fractures open at the end of the treatment. At the end of the treatment stage, the wellbore is finally flushed to remove any residual proppant, leaving behind proppant-filled fractures that act as conductive channels through which gas can flow into the wellbore (Figure 5.7).
5. Shale Gas Extraction and Development

5.3.2.4 Operational or production phase

Most shale gas wells are designed to keep producing hydrocarbons for decades. The main activities during production are the monitoring of the well’s integrity and performance, and its maintenance. Wireline logging is generally the only means of checking the integrity of casing and cement down a well. Abnormal pressures in the annulus between casing strings and changes in production rates can also indicate integrity issues.

In some cases, it is necessary to re-enter a well (called a ‘workover’) to perform maintenance, repairs or replacement of components, for surveillance, or to increase productivity. Such interventions can be critical to maintaining well integrity, and there are a range of technologies that can be applied to repair the casing and cement if integrity issues are detected. Wells may also need to be hydraulically re-fractured to extend their production lifetime.

5.3.2.5 Well decommissioning and abandonment

The final phase in the well life cycle occurs when the wells are decommissioned and ultimately abandoned. As stated above, decommissioning involves: the removal of the well head; plugging the steel casing with cement and steel; the removal of all production equipment, production waste, pipelines and other infrastructure; capping the plugged well below the land surface, and the rehabilitation of all cleared areas.

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30 Jeffrey et al. 2017, Section 3.5.
The goal of decommissioning a well and its final abandonment is to ensure well integrity in perpetuity, effectively re-establishing the natural barriers formed by impermeable rock layers originally drilled through to reach the resource. The aims of decommissioning a well at the end of its productive life are to:

- prevent the release of formation fluids, or well fluids, to the environment, including aquifers;
- prevent the flow of groundwater or hydrocarbons between different layers of rock; and
- isolate any hazardous materials left in the well.

There are five phases involved in decommissioning a well:

- **stage 1**: decommissioning the well, including plugging, capping and burial below the surface;
- **stage 2**: monitoring the performance of the decommissioned well and applying further remediation if necessary;
- **stage 3**: relinquishment of decommissioned wells that are performing as specified to the Government;
- **stage 4**: post-relinquishment confirmatory monitoring or repair if required; and
- **stage 5**: abandonment.

The requirements for each of these phases are discussed further below.

A schematic of a properly decommissioned well is shown in Figure 5.8. The plugs which are in place to ensure zonal isolation typically consist of cement in conjunction with a mechanical plug. To provide long-term integrity, the cement (or other barrier material) must not shrink, be able to withstand the stresses in the wellbore, be impermeable, be impervious to chemical attack from formation fluids and gases, be able to bond with steel casing and rock, and not cause damage to the casing.

![Figure 5.8: A decommissioned well, showing the cement plugs that are placed in the well to prevent vertical flow of fluids. This figure is for illustrative purposes only, noting the precise locations and numbers of cement and mechanical plugs will depend on local geology and the design of the well. Not to scale. Source: CSIRO.](image-url)
For a leak to occur in a decommissioned well, whether the leak is to the surface or to the subsurface between different geological formations, three elements must exist:

1. first, a source formation where hydrocarbons or other fluids exist in the pore space;
2. second, a driving force (due to a difference in pressure, temperature, salinity or buoyancy) between the source formation and surface in the case of a leakage to surface, or between different geological formations in the case of a subsurface flow; and
3. third, a leakage pathway between the source formation and the surface, or between different geological formations.

**Figure 5.9:** Routes for fluid leakage in a cemented wellbore. Source: Modified from Davies et al.39

In common with operating wells, leakage or failure of decommissioned wells could occur by poorly cemented or deteriorating casing/hole annuli, faults in the interface between cement and the formation rock and casing failure.40 Additionally, for decommissioned wells, the interface between cement plugs and casing has been identified as a preferential pathway for gas/fluid flow.41 Migration of gas/fluid can also occur through fractures, channels, and the pore space in the cement sheath. In the latter case, gas/fluid flow will only occur when the cement sheath is degraded or did not form properly during the cementing process.42 For shale gas wells decommissioned using current practices, it is highly unlikely that if any of these leakage pathways were to develop they would allow large gas/fluid flow rates, but some flow of gas would be more likely. The small cross-sectional areas and long vertical lengths of the pathways will strongly limit the flow of fluids, with the potential for upward migration of gas being additionally limited by the post-production depressurised state of the formation and the intrinsically low permeability of the shale itself.

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39 Davies et al. 2014.
40 Watson and Bachu 2009.
42 Zhang and Bachu 2011.
The low permeability of shale gas formations is also a factor mitigating the potential for adverse impacts due to loss of well integrity post well decommissioning. Pressures within the part of the reservoir accessed by the well will have been depleted by production, and the very low permeability of the shale will also act to prevent gas from other parts of the reservoir migrating to the well. Restoration of pore pressure in the reservoir is likely to be slow because of the low permeability preventing migration of any high-pressure fluids from outside the reservoir, and the geological time scale of processes that might increase pressures from within the shale. But some gas will remain in the part of the reservoir accessed by the well, and its buoyancy will provide drive for upward flow should pathways be available.

The combination of small cross-sectional areas, long vertical lengths of flow pathways and low driving pressure differentials means that overall, there is a low likelihood of substantial vertical movement of fluids post decommissioning.

Well decommissioning and abandonment is a global issue, with estimates that around 30,000 wells globally will need to be decommissioned and abandoned over the next 15 years. It is highly likely that well decommissioning practices will experience innovation as the scale of decommissioning activity increases globally in the context of increased scrutiny of environmental performance.

The Panel has found that there is a paucity of information available on the performance of decommissioned and/or abandoned onshore shale wells (refer also to Section 9.8). Indeed, it appears to be only recently that specific attention has been paid to this issue by regulators. This issue was the subject of specific questions to expert consultants by the UK Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering when it undertook an extensive review of shale gas extraction in the UK in 2012. When asked about the long-term pressure behaviour of wells after they are decommissioned, Halliburton, one of the largest service providers worldwide to the shale gas industry, responded that pressures are not routinely monitored post decommissioning and that there is no statistically based data available to indicate the percentage of wells that fail. Halliburton continued, “based on reported MIT failure rates in active wells, the percentage should be very low and may be less than 1%.”

Even if the current moratorium is lifted, there is unlikely to be a substantial number of wells decommissioned in the NT in the near future, which provides an opportunity to establish a long-term decommissioned and abandoned well program. Such a program should assess well decommissioning options in the context of the NT’s shale resources and consider:

- geological zones along the well which need to be isolated long term;
- reviewing and testing of the durability of cements and casing;
- the partial decommissioning of some wells to allow long-term monitoring;
- evaluation of post-decommissioning monitoring approaches;
- trials of novel decommissioning methods and materials; and
- the costs of decommissioning and ultimate abandonment to assist in the calculation of security bonds.

In this context, it should be noted that 236 oil and gas wells have been drilled over the past 50 years in the NT. Out of this total, 145 have been decommissioned, 26 have been suspended for future data gathering or production, and 65 are currently producing from conventional reservoirs. In the event that the moratorium is lifted, these existing decommissioned and suspended wells represent a starting point for implementation of a decommissioned and abandoned well assessment program.

In the NT, the rules around well abandonment are set out in the Schedule of Onshore Petroleum Exploration and Production Requirements 2016 (Schedule). A gas company must apply to the Minister for Primary Industry and Resources (Minister for Resources) to abandon a well, and the application must include a proposed abandonment program “including the method by which the well will be made safe”. A well cannot be lawfully abandoned unless Ministerial approval is given.

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43 Ouyang and Allen 2017.
44 Royal Society Report.
45 Halliburton Royal Society submission, pp 5-6.
46 Department of Primary Industry and Resources, submission 226 (DPIR submission 226), p 46.
47 DPIR submission 226, p 46.
48 Schedule, cl 328(6)(f).
However, the Schedule does not make explicit what the Minister must consider when making a decision about a proposed abandonment program. Clause 329 of the Schedule prescribes how a well must be abandoned, including that cement plugs are to be placed at certain intervals of the well. It is not clear whether the terms of the approved abandonment program or the requirements of cl 329 will prevail in the event of an inconsistency. The Schedule also provides that, “on completion of production activities and prior to the surrender of a production licence” all wells must be decommissioned in accordance with an “approved decommissioning plan.” Again, it is not clear how the approved decommissioning plan and the requirements of cl 329 interact. The Panel’s concerns about the Schedule are discussed in further detail in Chapter 14.

Current practice in the NT, as stated by DPIR, is that DPIR does not monitor wells that have been decommissioned. It was further noted by DPIR “that it is not common industry/regulator practice to monitor wells that have been plugged and abandoned in line with current best practice methodology”.

The Panel considers that a mandatory period of monitoring is needed following the decommissioning of a well to determine if the well is leaking gas or other fluids. In the event that leakage is detected within this period, the operator must be required to carry out remedial works. Prudent practice is to reset the period required to demonstrate acceptable performance following confirmation that the remedial works have been successful. If no issues are found during the post-decommissioning surveillance monitoring (or reset) period, the gas company can apply to the regulator for relinquishment. Once the well is relinquished, custody for future stewardship of the well is transferred to the Government.

Ensuring that world-leading well decommissioning practices are used, and that ongoing assessment of abandoned wells is undertaken, represents a challenge for any regulator because it occurs at a time when the cash flow associated with the well has come to an end. The regulatory aim is to ensure that wells are abandoned safely, that there is funding available for ongoing monitoring, and that in the event that a well has not been decommissioned properly, that there is money available (from the gas industry) to ensure that problems can be remedied. In Chapter 14, the Panel recommends the establishment of an ‘orphan well levy’ (Recommendation 14.14) to ensure that long-term funding is available to monitor and, if necessary, repair wells that have not been decommissioned properly and to implement the ongoing monitoring program recommended below.

**Recommendation 5.1**

That prior to the grant of any further exploration approvals, the Government mandates an enforceable code of practice setting out minimum requirements for the decommissioning of any onshore shale gas wells in the NT. The development of this code must draw on world-leading practice. It must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate improved decommissioning technologies. The code must include a requirement that:

- wells undergo pressure and cement integrity tests as part of the decommissioning process, with any identified defects to be repaired prior to abandoning the well; and
- cement plugs be placed to isolate critical formations and that testing must be conducted to confirm that the plugs have been properly set in the well.

**Recommendation 5.2**

That the Government:

- implements a mandatory program for regular monitoring by gas companies of decommissioned onshore shale gas wells (including exploration wells), with the results from the monitoring to be publicly reported in real-time. If the performance of a decommissioned well is determined to be acceptable to the regulator then the gas company may apply for relinquishment of the well to the Government; and
- implements a program for the ongoing monitoring of all orphan wells.

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49 Schedule, cl 329.
50 Schedule, cl 426.
51 Department of Primary Industry and Resources, submission 1191 (DPIR Submission 1191), p 4
5.4 Well integrity

5.4.1 Overview
The integrity of any onshore shale gas wells has been a key issue raised during the Panel’s consultations throughout the NT (see Chapter 3), with many comprehensive submissions received by the Panel on this topic.\textsuperscript{52} Well integrity is crucial for the safe operation of a well and to ensure that aquifers are not contaminated. The International Standards Organisation (ISO) defines well integrity as follows:

“Well integrity refers to maintaining full control of fluids (or gases) within a well at all times by employing and maintaining one or more well barriers to prevent unintended fluid movement between formations with different pressure regimes or loss of containment to the environment.”\textsuperscript{53}

Knowledge of the processes that force fluids and gases to move to the surface from a shale layer is important to understanding how these may flow out of or into the well, or between layers of rock or to the surface by the well. \textbf{Figure 5.10} shows a simplified shale gas resource, consisting of the shale layer at the base, with overlying layers of various sedimentary rocks referred to as overburden. Overburden includes layers that can be classified as ‘permeable’, that is, that allow fluid to flow through them, and ‘impermeable’, that is, that form a barrier to fluid movement. Some of the permeable layers may be aquifers containing water that is used for agriculture or stock and domestic purposes, while others may contain salty water (brine). Hydrocarbons (oil and/or gas) may also be present in some rock layers.

\textbf{Figure 5.10:} Simplified shale gas resource. Source: CSIRO.\textsuperscript{54}

![Figure 5.10: Simplified shale gas resource. Source: CSIRO.\textsuperscript{54}](image)

Rock layers A-F are overburden that cover the shale resource (layer G). The graph shows the pore pressures in the rock, the gradient in blue is the hydrostatic gradient. The gradient in red shows the pore pressures in an overpressured scenario, with layer D and F trapping higher pressures below them. Not to scale.

\textsuperscript{52} For example, Don’t Frack Katherine, submission 65; Dr Matthew Currell, submission 311; Jason Trevers, submission 409.
\textsuperscript{53} ISO 2017.
\textsuperscript{54} CSIRO 2017.
The pressure of the fluids in the rock (pore pressure) increases with depth, and if this is greater than the hydrostatic pressure (the pressure that is equal to the weight of the column of fluid above it), the overpressure provides the driving force for the fluids to flow vertically. Methane, which is lighter than water, will move upwards through the rock unless there is an impermeable barrier in between.

When considering fluid movement, the presence of overpressures is a significant contributor to well integrity. High overpressures, which drive vertical fluid movement, are not a common feature of shale resources, and the limited data collected in the Beetaloo Sub-basin indicates that this Sub-basin also has low overpressures.\textsuperscript{55}

By contrast, the buoyancy and low viscosity of gas means that it is more likely to be able to move along these pathways. In addition, gas may also be present in shallower layers of rock as well as the target shale gas reservoir. Gas from any of these sources may move upwards along the well if a pathway is present. The rate at which fluid or gas can flow up a pathway will be limited by the aperture of the opening through which it flows. Where the annulus between the well casing and the rock is cemented, the size of any opening will be limited.

The integrity of the well drilled through the rock barriers between the surface and the shale deposit is crucial to ensuring that a new pathway is not created through which gas or fluids can travel to the surface, or to drinking water aquifers.

Discussed below are two broad categories of problems with well integrity:

- first, the unintended flow of fluids or gases between rock layers or to the surface along the outside of the well; and
- second, the unintended flow of drilling fluids or hydraulic fracturing fluid from inside the well into the surrounding rock, or from formation fluid or gas into the well.

5.4.2 Failure modes for well integrity

There are many elements that make up a well barrier system. All of these elements need to be tested to confirm well integrity. Figure 5.11 shows examples of the (at least) two-barrier system that needs to be maintained throughout the well life cycle.

**Figure 5.11:** The two-barrier concept showing the two barriers to various pathways for fluid flow out of the well. Source: CSIRO.\textsuperscript{56}

56 CSIRO 2017.
There are two types of well failures:

- **well integrity failure**: all barriers have failed, and a pathway exists for fluid to flow into or out of the well. In a dual-barrier design, both barriers must fail for a well integrity failure to occur; and

- **well barrier failure**: one barrier has failed but this does not result in a loss of fluids to, or from, the environment as long as the second barrier is intact.

CSIRO discusses in detail the three commonly considered well barrier failure mechanisms:

- first, failure during drilling and prior to casing;
- second, failure of the casing; and
- third, failure of the cement.

### 5.4.2.1 Failure mechanisms related to drilling

Drilling is the first step in constructing a well. Prior to the casing and cement being installed into the borehole, there are a number of potential risks to the early integrity of a well, such as loss of drilling fluid out of and into shallow aquifers or into the borehole, or distorted geometry of the wellbore (for example, enlargement of the borehole size). During drilling, the primary well barrier is the drilling fluid pressure exerted on the rock formation surrounding the well, with the drilling fluid density or mud weight playing a vital role in maintaining well integrity prior to a casing being cemented. Blowout of onshore shale gas wells is unlikely during drilling because of the very low permeability of shale gas reservoirs.

Risks of losses of drilling fluid during drilling can be reduced by the identification of geological hazards prior to drilling, the monitoring of drilling fluid pressure and volume, and the use of well control equipment.

### 5.4.2.2 Failure mechanisms related to casing

Failure of the wellbore casing could allow loss of fluid to the surrounding rock formations. Issues with casing can be caused through poor cementing placement, leaking through casing connections, corrosion of the casing, or casing unable to withstand the pressures during hydraulic fracturing. Corrosion can potentially attack every metal component, including the casing, at all stages in the life of an oil and gas well. Corrosion-induced casing damage and loss of well integrity have been widely reported. The cement quality, cement sheath, and bonding integrity, play a critical role in protecting the casing from external corrosion. Cement degradation, failure of the cement sheath, and debonding of the interfaces along the casing and rock formation can expose the casing to corrosive fluids (if present), and casing corrosion can start. Corrosion rates depend on the type of steel used, with higher rates for mild carbon steel compared to lower rates for stainless steel or steel coated with corrosion-resistant material.

Risks of casing failure can be reduced, however, by monitoring casing pressure, using multi-finger caliper logs and magnetic thickness tools to gauge casing integrity, employing borehole camera inspections, and casing patching and repair, if needed.

### 5.4.2.3 Failure mechanisms related to cement

Failure of the casing cement can create a conductive pathway and allow movement of fluid or gas up the cement annulus outside the casing. Potential failure modes include channels or voids in the cement, gaps between the wall of the wellbore and the cement, gaps between the cement and the casing for the inner layers of the multi-casing system, and poor adhesion to the casing. These issues can be caused through poor cement placement, leaking through casing connections, and cement sheath degradation.

The consistency and quality of casing cement is assessed using a technique called a cement bond log (CBL). This is based on the use of sound waves to detect flaws in the cement. Electronic measuring tools are lowered into the well to measure (or log) the cement along the
depth of the well. Sound waves are used to look at how effectively the metal casing is held, or bonded, to the cement. The sound waveforms on the log are evaluated for how well the sound waves travel from a transmitter through the pipe, cement and rocks before returning to receivers located along the tool. If the cement bonding is good, sound will not easily transmit through the pipe. Conversely, if the cement bonding is poor, the pipe is free to vibrate, allowing for easy transmission of sound. In the event a problem is detected by the CBL, there are various techniques that can be used to repair the compromised zone.

A good cement sheath is characterised as having very low permeability, with strong bonds to the casing and rock formation surfaces, which means that fluids and gases cannot migrate within or through the sheath. However, even if the cement sheath is initially in very good condition, large perturbations of pressure and temperature caused by casing pressure tests and hydraulic fracturing can induce radial deformation of the casing and failures in the cement sheath, resulting in de-bonding on the interfaces between the cement sheath and the casing, and the cement and the formations, creating radial fractures (Figure 5.12) and migration pathways.

Figure 5.12: Cement sheath failure, resulting in cracks developing from pressure cycling on the internal casing. Source: Watson et al.

The impact of failure of either the cement sheath or the bonds with the casing or rock formations on well integrity will depend on the extent of such failure along the wellbore and specific geological conditions. For example, one study found that in the Gulf of Mexico there was no breach in isolation between formations with pressure differentials as high as 97 MPa (14,000 psi) as long as there was at least 15 m of high-quality cement seal between the formations to ensure sufficient vertical isolation between them.

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63 Parcevaux et al. 1990.
64 Goodwin and Crook 1992; Watson et al. 2002.
65 Watson et al. 2002.
66 King and King 2013.
Risks of cement failure can be reduced by good quality geological information, including fractured formations or zones, and identification of hydrocarbon-bearing formations in the overburden and aquifers, good drilling practices to provide high-quality intact bore hole for cementing; cement bond logging to investigate the integrity of the cement sheaths; and remedial cement repairs applied to identified problem zones.

5.4.2.4 Long-term stability and integrity of cement

The cement used in well construction and abandonment is designed to have a long life span. There have been no studies on the long-term durability of cements of shale wells in Australia because the industry is only in its initial stages of development. However, there have been a number of overseas studies investigating the degradation of cement under simulated carbon dioxide (\( \text{CO}_2 \)) geological storage conditions.\(^{67}\) These have focussed on the behaviour of cement and the cement-rock and cement-casing bonding when exposed to high levels of \( \text{CO}_2 \), which is a much more corrosive environment than that found in a shale gas basin.\(^{68}\)

A numerical model simulating the geochemical reactions between the cement seals and \( \text{CO}_2 \)\(^{69}\) was developed and validated using the laboratory experimental results by Satoh et al. prior to its application to abandoned wells.\(^{70}\) The simulation of the geochemical reactions showed that the alteration length (that is, the length of cement with degraded properties) of cement seals after 1000 year exposure was approximately only 1 m, resulting in the conclusion that the length of the cement plug that was used would be able to isolate \( \text{CO}_2 \) (and therefore methane) in the reservoir over the long-term.

There have also been several relevant studies conducted to investigate the effect of well cement exposed to a mixture of acid gases (\( \text{CO}_2 \) and hydrogen sulfide (\( \text{H}_2\text{S} \))).\(^{71}\) The results have revealed that, given a moderate concentration of \( \text{H}_2\text{S} \) in the acid gas, increases in porosity and permeability of the cement are mainly determined by how much secondary carbonate mineral species are formed in the cement. Formation of sulphur-bearing minerals as a result of interaction between cement and \( \text{H}_2\text{S} \) does not result in significant porosity and permeability changes, and therefore, loss of mechanical strength of the cement.

Given that the extent of corrosion and cement degradation is likely to be much greater with \( \text{CO}_2 \) at high pressure than with methane,\(^{72}\) the Panel has concluded that if any onshore shale gas wells are properly designed, installed and maintained, the risk of long-term leakage from the wells through degradation of the cement will be ‘low’.

5.4.2.5 Potential impact of hydraulic fracturing on well integrity

The high pressures experienced during fracturing can damage the well casing and can lead to the escape of fluids. Therefore, to maintain integrity, the well and its components must have adequate strength to withstand the stresses created by the high pressure of hydraulic fracturing because if the well and casing are not strong enough to withstand these stresses, a casing failure may result.

Casing failures during hydraulic fracturing operations, or shortly following operations, have been reported in the US and Australia.\(^{73}\)

In the NT, the Baldwin 2HST-1 well experienced a shallow casing failure during the first stage of hydraulic fracturing in 2012.\(^{74}\) In this instance, the multiple casing design protected the shallow aquifer (according to groundwater monitoring data), noting, however, that the fluid in use at the time had minimal chemical content. The well was subsequently abandoned.

Multiple high-pressure events associated with hydraulic fracturing operations can also damage the cement sheath outside the casing and lead to fractures (cracks) within the cement sheath, or between the cement sheath and the casing or rock formation (debonding). If these cracks become extensive along the wellbore, they can allow migrations of fluid or gas. Gas (in particular, methane) migration is more likely than fracturing fluid migration because the lower density of

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\(^{67}\) Satoh et al. 2013.

\(^{68}\) Satoh et al. 2013; Popoola et al. 2013.

\(^{69}\) Yamaguchi et al. 2013.

\(^{70}\) Satoh et al. 2013.

\(^{71}\) Jacquemet et al. 2012; Kutchko et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2015.

\(^{72}\) Popoola et al. 2013.

\(^{73}\) US EPA 2015.

\(^{74}\) DPIR submission 226, p 55.
the gas provides a larger driving force for migration through these cracks than water. From the data available, methane migration along cracks appears to be the most likely well integrity issue caused by this process. However, the rate of methane leakage along any potential cracks is likely to be very low because of the limited aperture of this pathway and the limited driving force.\(^75\)

### 5.4.2.6 Summary

Historically, the highest instance of well barrier integrity failure appears to be related to insufficient or poor-quality cementing coverage to seal aquifers and/or hydrocarbon-bearing formations. In older wells, this is likely due to lack of information on non-reservoir hydrocarbon bearing geological layers and the weak regulatory regime under which the wells were constructed. The other common well barrier integrity failure mechanism is associated with the degradation of the cement sheath and the cement bonds to the casing and rock formations. This failure mechanism can be exacerbated if the well is subjected to cyclic pressures, such as those experienced during hydraulic fracturing. There is also a growing body of research conducted on cement durability related to CO\(_2\) storage that is relevant because CO\(_2\) is considered more corrosive than methane gas. This research has indicated that even after 1,000 years, only a small fraction of the total available length of the cement seals will have been degraded. Well barrier integrity failure can also occur through corrosion of the well’s metal casing. If a well barrier failure is observed, or suspected to have developed, technologies, tools and mitigation measures are available to conduct remediation operations (see the discussion in Section 5.2.3.4).

### 5.4.4 Well failure rates

#### 5.4.4.1 Review of international published data

CSIRO has reviewed the well barrier and well integrity failure rates reported in the open literature.\(^76\) Well barrier failure is identified in a number of ways, including by the sustained casing pressure, surface casing vent flow or requirements for remediation of barriers. Well integrity failure is identified by the detection of hydrocarbons in nearby water wells, gas migration outside the surface casing, or detection of solutes in groundwater. CSIRO notes that many studies of well integrity do not make the distinction between failures of individual barriers and well integrity failures, a distinction that is critical because a full integrity failure (that is, the failure of multiple barriers) is required in order to provide a pathway for any contamination of the environment.

CSIRO, largely using data sets from the US, found that the rate of well integrity failures that have the potential to cause environmental contamination is in the order of 0.1%, with several studies finding no well integrity failures, while the rate for a single well barrier failure was in the order of 1–10% (Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1:** Summary of published well integrity data specific to shale gas resource development. Source: CSIRO.\(^77\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Number of wells</th>
<th>Well barrier issue rate</th>
<th>Well integrity failure rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2010 - Feb 2012</td>
<td>4,934</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2008 - August 2011</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>0.17% blowouts and gas migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2005 - 2012</td>
<td>6,466</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.25% release to groundwater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2002 - 2012</td>
<td>6,007</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2005 - 2013</td>
<td>8,030</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>1.27% leak gas to surface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>2010 - 2014</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1993 - 2008</td>
<td>16,818</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 Rocha-Valadez et al. 2014.  
76 CSIRO 2017.  
77 CSIRO 2017 and references therein, p 45.
Importantly, there are few studies that have investigated the correlation between well construction methods, geological conditions and failure rates. Stone et al. found strong correlations between well construction category and well barrier failure rates, and well barrier failure rates and well integrity failure rates, with very few barrier failures observed for wells constructed to Category 9 (Table 5.2) or above, and no well integrity failures for that category (standard) of well construction.

Table 5.2: Wellbore barrier categories that are ranked from highest risk to lowest risk. Modified from Stone et al. 79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Surface Casing</th>
<th>Intermediate Casing Strings</th>
<th>Level of top of production casing cement</th>
<th>Risk Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Below over pressured hydrocarbon reservoir</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Below under pressured hydrocarbon reservoir</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Above top of gas</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Above surface casing shoe</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Below under pressured hydrocarbon reservoir</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Above top of gas</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Above surface casing shoe</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Below top of gas</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Above casing shoe</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Above top of gas</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Above casing shoe</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Above casing shoe</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Panel notes Origin’s submission that its “internal standards would require a well to meet Category 6 requirements, at a minimum, during production operations and at least Category 7 for well abandonment. The design of Origin’s Beetaloo wells align with the Category 9 requirements.” Origin also submitted that, “Beetaloo wells are designed such that the surface casing is always set below the deepest aquifer and the intermediate and production casing strings are cemented to surface to ensure isolation between the hydrocarbon bearing formations and the aquifers. The design addresses the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)’s two primary causal factors of aquifer contamination resulting from fluid migration pathways within and along the production well which are:

- Inadequate surface casing depth (that is, casing not set below the aquifer).
- Inadequate top of cement (that is, cement not set above the shallowest hydrocarbon bearing zone).”

The design of the Amungee NW-1H well is discussed further in Section 5.5.4 to illustrate what is meant by a Category 9 standard of well construction that incorporates cement casing from the shale formation to the surface.

Watson and Bachu demonstrated that well barrier failure rates reflect the geological conditions of the wells, the regulatory requirements in place during well construction and abandonment, the era of the well construction, the well type, the well purpose and history, and many other factors (such as oil price, equipment used, materials available, operators’ technical competence in the well construction and abandonment). They also found the occurrence of well barrier and well integrity failures decreased for newer wells.

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78 Watson and Bachu 2009; Stone et al. 2016a.
80 Origin submission 153, p 56.
81 Origin submission 153, p 56.
82 Watson and Bachu 2009.
5.4.4.2 Queensland

The Queensland Gasfields Commission has published statistics on well integrity compliance audits undertaken from 2010 to 2015 on CSG wells.\(^\text{83}\) During this period, 6,734 CSG exploration, appraisal and production wells had been drilled in Queensland, and approximately 3,500 wells were actively producing at the end of 2014. The non-producing wells had no gas flow at the wellhead. The audit involved both subsurface gas well compliance and surface well head compliance testing. For the subsurface equipment, no leaks were reported, and there were 21 statutory notifications (a rate of 0.3%) concerning suspect quality of down hole cement during construction. After remediation, the cement failure rate was determined to be 0%. For subsurface equipment, it may be concluded that the risk of a subsurface breach of well integrity in this jurisdiction can be assessed as very low to almost zero.

5.4.4.3 Western Australia

Patel et al. reported a study on well integrity issues for all the oil and gas wells drilled onshore in WA, and including offshore wells in State waters that have not yet been decommissioned.\(^\text{84}\) The study found that 122 out of 1,035 non-decommissioned wells (that is, 12%) had compromised well barriers. Tubing failure dominated well barrier failure occurrences. Of the 1,035 wells studied, 86 wells had tubing failure (or 8.3% of the total wells studied). Tubing leaks can occur through holes corroded or eroded by production and injected fluid inside the tubing or from the twisting of the tubing. Casing failure occurs predominantly in production casing due to corrosion, pressure differential, and thermal effects, causing the pressure behind the production casing to exceed the collapse resistance of the casing. Approximately 22 out of the 1,035 non-decommissioned wells had production casing failure (or 2% of the total wells studied).

However, none of the 122 wells with single barrier failures had leakage to the external environment. That is, there was no evidence of well integrity failure.

5.4.4.4 South Australia

CSIRO could not locate any publicly available information on well integrity from this state. However, Santos provided to the Panel the full historical integrity record for the 2,736 wells it has drilled and fractured in the Cooper/Eromanga Basin of SA over the past 50 years.\(^\text{85}\) Of this number of wells, 460 have been decommissioned. Table 5.3 shows the relative well integrity risk level rating that Santos applies to the measured condition of the well barrier assembly.

Table 5.3: Santos well integrity risk level ratings. Source: Santos.\(^\text{86}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Well integrity level</th>
<th>Condition of well barriers/integrity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>As new well with all required barriers tested and verified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Evidence of some degradation of any or both barriers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Primary or secondary barrier failed. Remaining barrier intact - that is, single barrier failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Primary or secondary barrier failed. Remaining barrier suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Both barriers failed - that is, failure of well integrity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the formations targeted in the Cooper Basin are sandstone and not shale, the drilling and hydraulic fracturing processes used are very similar. The tight sandstones of the Cooper Basin are sufficiently similar from a well design standpoint to the NT shales due to similar formation depths and separation from aquifers, similar low formation permeability requiring hydraulic fracturing to produce gas, multiple fracture stages required per well, and similar requirements for casing design and cementing. Therefore, the historical performance of gas wells in the Cooper Basin provides a good analogy to what can be expected to occur if Santos’s operational systems are approved by the regulator and implemented in the NT.

Only 11 (0.4%) of the total number of wells have been assigned a Level 4 rating at some stage over their life. Level 4 means that (at the time this rating was operating) one barrier remained

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\(^{83}\) Queensland Gasfields Commission 2015a.

\(^{84}\) Patel et al. 2015.

\(^{85}\) Santos Ltd. submission 168 (Santos submission 168), pp 74-75.

\(^{86}\) Modified from Figure 36, Santos submission 168, p 75.
intact. This corresponds to the failure of a barrier, rather than the failure of well integrity (as described above). All the affected wells were either decommissioned or remediated to restore well barrier function to allow continued production. Only two (0.06%) of the wells were assigned a Level 5 rating (that is, failure of well integrity). Both of these wells were either remediated or decommissioned.

Since 1992, when improved well design specifications, cementing practices and an improved well integrity monitoring program were introduced, only one well out of the 1,727 wells (0.06%) drilled during this period reached a Level 4 rating, compared with 0.4% for the entire record of operations. The statistics above are consistent with the conclusions of the CSIRO analysis using the much larger databases from the US, that is, the risk of failure of well integrity leading to contamination of groundwater is ‘very low’.

5.4.4.5 Conclusions on well failure rates

Current industry practice for onshore shale gas well design is to have a minimum of two independent and verified physical barriers in place to maintain well integrity. A well integrity failure requires the failure of both physical barriers. Well integrity issues that include the degradation or the failure of one barrier in a multi-barrier system will not lead to the release of fluids from the well. The likelihood of a well integrity failure (that is, where all barriers fail), which is required for an actual release of fluids to the environment, is very low, typically less than 0.1%.

Recommendation 5.3

That prior to the grant of any further exploration approvals, in consultation with industry and other stakeholders, the Government develops an enforceable code of practice setting out the minimum requirements that must be met to ensure the integrity of onshore shale gas wells in the NT. This code must require that:

- all onshore shale gas wells (including exploration wells constructed for the purposes of production testing) be constructed to at least a Category 9 standard (unless it can be demonstrated by performance modelling/assessment that an alternative design would give at least an equivalent level of protection), with cementing extending up to at least the shallowest problematic hydrocarbon-bearing, organic carbon rich or saline aquifer zone;
- all wells be fully tested for integrity before and after hydraulic fracturing and that the results be independently certified, with the immediate remediation of identified issues being required;
- an ongoing program of integrity testing be established for each well during its operational life. For example, every two years initially for a period of 10 years and then at five-yearly intervals thereafter to ensure that if any issues develop, they are detected early and remediated; and
- the results of all well integrity testing programs and any remedial actions undertaken be published as soon as they are available.

5.5 Management of well integrity

5.5.1 Objective versus prescriptive regulation

The Government has signalled its intention to adopt an objective-based regulatory regime. In this regard, the Government introduced the objective-based Petroleum Environment Regulations in 2016, and has indicated that it will replace the highly prescriptive Schedule with objective-based resource management and administration regulations as soon as possible. The Petroleum Act and its subordinate legislation will be supported by guidelines and codes of practice that will assist in the interpretation and implementation the regulations.

The WA and Commonwealth unconventional gas regulatory frameworks are examples of objective-based regulation. WA’s regulations require that a well management plan be in place for any well activities, and the regulations set out what must be included in a well management plan. The regulations do not prescribe minimum technical requirements. Rather, the gas company must demonstrate that it is managing risks in accordance with “sound engineering
principles, codes, standards and specifications” and “good oil-field practice”. In addition to the need for a well management plan under the regulations, there must also be an approved environment plan under WA’s petroleum environment regulations, and the environment plan must demonstrate that the environmental risks and impacts associated with the well activities have been reduced to levels that are ALARP and acceptable.

By contrast, Queensland and NSW have codes of practice that prescribe how well integrity is to be achieved. The codes were developed in consultation with industry and other stakeholders. In Chapter 14, the Panel gives consideration to the risks and benefits of objective-based and prescriptive regulation. The Panel concludes that in the NT context, where any onshore shale gas development will be an emerging industry, some prescription is required to provide certainty to gas companies, the regulator and the community as to the performance standards and criteria that must be met. However, in Chapter 14 the Panel also proposes that prescriptive and enforceable codes of practice and guidelines should operate alongside objective-based regulation to ensure that world-leading practice is implemented in a timely manner, and to ensure that appropriate environmental protection is achieved.

5.5.2 Management of well integrity in the NT

5.5.2.1 Drilling petroleum wells

The current legal framework for drilling activities in the NT requires gas companies to describe components of well integrity management but does not explicitly require an overall well integrity management plan for the full life cycle of a well.

A gas company must have Ministerial approval to drill a petroleum well. To obtain approval, the gas company must submit an application, which includes details about the proposed drilling program. The Schedule does not make it clear how the Minister approves the application, when the application must be approved by or what matters the Minister must be satisfied of to grant the approval. Further, it is implied, but not expressly stated, that the gas company must comply with the approved application and drilling program.

In addition to the requirement to have an approved application and drilling program in place, the Schedule prescribes that equipment and casing used to drill and construct the well must conform to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards, that blowout prevention systems must be in place, casing strings must be cemented to the surface, and pressure testing must take place.

With regard to well integrity, DPIR has implemented a process of continually assessing well integrity status during drilling operations. Specifically, the Well Integrity Verification Form, which was developed following the Montara Commission of Inquiry, requires the regulator to evaluate the integrity of the well, confirming that the well has been constructed to levels exceeding API standards. This assessment is based on information provided by the tenure holder in daily drilling and other reports, in addition to the well planning information submitted in the application for approval for the drilling activity. More details on the extent of information required by the regulator are documented in the CSIRO report.

5.5.2.2 Hydraulic fracturing

Hydraulic fracturing, like drilling, requires a separate approval under the Schedule. An application to conduct hydraulic fracturing must be accompanied by a “technical works program”, which must include information about, among other things, the well status, any pressure...
tests, an interpretation of cement evaluation logs, design of the hydraulic fracturing program, and geological and geomechanical hazards.102 DPIR uses the Checklist - Well Work-over and Stimulation Program Assessment to ensure all the relevant information has been provided.103 but, the Checklist similarly has no legal basis and cannot be used to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Schedule.

Like the approved drilling program, the Schedule does not expressly require that an approved technical works program for hydraulic fracturing must be complied with, which can create problems in the event that the Minister for Resources attempts to enforce compliance with an approved program. Again, the Schedule does not prescribe how or when, an application to conduct a hydraulic fracturing program will be approved, or the matters the Minister must take into account when approving such a program. Chapter 14 includes a discussion and recommendations regarding the use of the Schedule as a regulatory tool.

5.5.3 Well integrity management system

The management of well integrity throughout the well life cycle has become a focus in recent years because proactive well integrity management is key to reducing risks.104 Wells must be designed cognisant of the potential hazards that might arise throughout their life cycle, including hydraulic fracturing. The operating life of a well can span several decades, and responsibility for the well is often passed between different teams within a gas company and third parties involved in well drilling and operations. The level of complexity in the design and operating parameters for wells means that there are risks associated with the transfer of responsibility throughout the life of the well. Life cycle well integrity management aims to minimise these risks by placing processes around well integrity management. Origin provided the Panel with information on the well integrity management system it employs.105

The focus on well integrity management has led to the development of an ISO standard (ISO 16530-1:2017), which states that:

> “the well operator should have a well integrity management system to ensure that well integrity is maintained throughout the well life cycle by the application of a combination of technical, operational and organizational processes.”106

The NORSOK D-010 standard also requires management of well integrity requirement throughout the life cycle of a well.107

A well integrity management system (WIMS) provides a framework for managing the risks due to loss of well integrity over the life cycle of a well, and identifies the responsibilities of the organisation as a whole in safeguarding environmental assets and public health. CSIRO has listed the following as the key elements of a WIMS:108

- risk assessment that includes techniques to identify the well integrity hazards and associated risks over the life cycle of the well, methods to determine acceptable levels for risks, and to define control measures and mitigation plans for managing and reducing risks that exceed acceptable levels;
- an organisational structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all personnel involved in well integrity management;
- well barrier documents that clearly identify and define well barriers (combination of components or practices that prevent or stop uncontrolled movement of well fluids), methods to combine multiple barriers and redundancies to ensure reliability, and administrative controls that provide information on controlling activities related to well integrity, such as design and material handling standards, procedures, and policy manuals;
- performance standards for people, equipment, and management systems;
- defined standards for well barrier verification, such as functional, leak and axial load tests, and well load case modelling verification to ensure that well barriers meet all acceptance criteria;

102 Schedule, cl 342(2).
103 DPIR submission 226, pp 224-235.
105 Origin submission 153, pp 55-68.
107 NORSOK D-010 Rev. 4.
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A comprehensive system for well integrity management should also set out the regulator’s responsibilities for review and assessment of a gas company’s WIMS and an inspection regime to ensure compliance. The system should also specify the company’s reporting requirements for well integrity incidents, in addition to establishing penalties for non-compliance.

Further, assessment of well integrity management on a well-by-well basis is necessary to address well-specific risks. Well integrity hazard identification and risk assessment is an important component of well integrity management.

Commonwealth and WA regulations require the development of well management plans by operators that outline the risk assessment approach used, the risks identified, and the well integrity management practices that will be used. The well management plans must be submitted to the regulator for assessment and approval. The present project application process for drilling activities in the NT contains requirements for the gas operator to describe components of well integrity management, but it currently does not explicitly require an overall well integrity management plan for the full life cycle of a well. It is the Panel’s opinion that it should.

**Recommendation 5.4**

*That prior to the grant of any further exploration approvals, gas companies be required to develop and implement a well integrity management system (WIMS) for each well complying with ISO 16530-1:2017.*

*That prior to the grant of any further exploration approvals, each well must have an approved well management plan in place that contains, at a minimum, the following elements:*  

- consideration of well integrity management across the well life cycle;  
- a well integrity risk management process that documents how well integrity hazards are identified and risks assessed;  
- a well barrier plan containing well barrier performance standards, with specific reference to protection measures for beneficial use aquifers;  
- a process for periodically verifying well barrier integrity through the operational life of the well and immediately prior to abandonment, and a system for reporting to the regulator the findings from integrity assessments;  
- characterisation data for aquifers, saline water zones, and gas bearing zones in the formations intersected during drilling; and  
- monitoring methods to be used to detect migration of methane along the outside of the casing.

### 5.5.4 The Amungee NW-1H Well in the NT

The preceding discussion concerning well design, construction, integrity, and the long-term management of wells has been drawn mostly from overseas sources and experience. Accordingly, the schematics used to illustrate the relationships of wells and their components to different types of geological strata have intentionally been of a generic nature. Specific information is available, however, about the construction and operation of the Amungee NW-1H well, the only horizontal well in the NT that has been hydraulically fractured and production tested. Detail is provided in Origin’s Amungee NW-1H Discovery Evaluation Report. This report was initially submitted to DPIR as required by the Petroleum Act and was subsequently released to the Australian Stock Exchange.

The Amungee NW-1H well is a horizontal well that deviates at depth from the original Amungee NW-1 vertical well (Figure 13). The well system was constructed to Category 9 equivalent
standard, with cementing completed along the entire vertical and horizontal sections of the well. A schematic of construction details of the well, and key geological stratigraphic information are provided in Figure 5.13. The design process for the conductor and surface casings took into account the presence of two (Anthony Lagoon Beds and Gum Ridge) surficial aquifers at this location.

Figure 5.13: Casing configuration for wells drilled in the Beetaloo by Origin that ensures isolation of aquifers and hydrocarbon bearing zones. This figure is an updated version of the original figure shown in the draft Final Report due to labelling errors that had been made in the original version. At the Panel’s request, Origin produced a corrected version of the diagram. Source: Origin.
Figure 5.13 shows the importance of cementing the entire vertical section of the well because there are three hydrocarbon bearing zones at shallower depths than the current target Middle Velkerri Member (B shale). These are the overlying Velkerri C Shale, the major Kyalla Formation (another prospective target for gas and other hydrocarbons), and the Chambers River Formation, which is much closer to the surface and contains a relatively thin minor hydrocarbon bearing zone. As noted in Section 5.4, one of the key reasons for gas migration to the surface occurring along wellbores in the US has been the lack of proper cement casing needed to isolate intermediate hydrocarbon-bearing or coal zones from the surface (see Recommendation 5.3). Well completion activities at Amungee NW-1H began in July 2016, with the preparation of the wellbore for hydraulic stimulation operations. A Cement Bond Log (CBL) was conducted to confirm the cement integrity behind the 4.5” production casing, along with a 10,000 psi pressure test of the production casing to verify wellbore integrity.115 In August 2016, a total of 11 stimulation stages were undertaken, effectively placing 1.1 million kg of proppant and 10.7 ML of fluid (Figure 5.14). The spacing and intervals selected for the stimulation stages were based on modelled reservoir properties and the locations of interpreted small faults (average 6 m of throw with a maximum ~15 m of throw) and a 20 m standoff from the faults was incorporated into the stage design.116 Following the seventh stimulation treatment interval, a casing deformation (location marked on Figure 5.14) was discovered during the pump down operation. After running well diagnostics, the remaining five fracturing stages were shifted along the wellbore to provide a greater separation distance between the fracture initiation point and potential bedding planes.

As explained by Dr David Close from Origin to the Panel on 6 February 2018, the casing deformation midway along the horizontal section was a technical issue for Origin which has not affected the environmental performance of the well.118, 119 The horizontal section of the well is designed to be perforated to allow passage of hydraulic fracturing fluid to fracture the shale and has no bearing on well integrity. It is the integrity of the vertical section of a well that is essential for maintaining vertical (zonal) isolation between the target shale formation and near surface groundwater. The Panel has found no evidence that this section of the well is not performing as designed. As noted in Section 7.6.5, the occurrence of large faults that can allow vertical connection with the near surface is a risk factor that must be avoided as part of the well design phase. The gas

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114 Fulton and Knapton 2015; Munson 2014.  
116 Origin submission 1248, p 14; Origin submission 1269.  
117 Origin submission 233, Attachment 2; Origin submission 1269.  
118 Origin Energy Ltd and Lock the Gate Alliance Northern Territory submission 1075.  
119 Origin submission 1248, pp 15–16.
industry is currently required to report the locations of such faults to DPIR and indicate how they will be avoided through the location and design of a proposed well (Recommendation 7.14 specifically addresses this issue). In addition, the effect of Recommendation 5.7 is to further reduce the possibility of significant fault activation and the possibility of the excursion of hydraulic fracturing fluid to higher-than-planned levels.

Seismic surveys demonstrate that most of the Beetaloo Sub-basin contains relatively little internal faulting. However, small inactive faults with limited vertical extent will occur, and these are unlikely to show up on seismic surveys. These faults are typically located during drilling, as was the case with the Amungee horizontal well (location of fault marked on Figure 5.14), but they are not a matter of concern for either well integrity or the potential for excessive upwards migration of fluids during the hydraulic fracturing operation.

Origin has stated that a WIMS will apply to the ongoing management of its wells in the NT and is in line with the requirements for a WIMS documented in Section 5.5.3 and addressed by Recommendation 5.4.

5.6 Water use

Shale gas extraction requires the use of large quantities of water, which may be obtained from local surface or groundwater sources, or transported to the site from outside the region. This water is typically stored in large, above-ground double-lined ponds or tanks.

There has been a substantial amount of data published over the past decade regarding the volumes of water used for drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Considerable care needs to be taken in interpreting this information because of the rapid changes in technology that have occurred during this period, and the differences in water use and well density between vertical and horizontal wells. In particular, the increasing use of multi-well assemblies in association with much longer horizontal well sections is profoundly changing the water use profile of the industry.

In the US, the most recent long horizontal wells require 30–40 fracturing stages, with a current overall industry average of 16 stages per horizontal well. This requires a proportional increase in water use per well. For example, a 3 km horizontal well requires three times as much water as a 1 km horizontal well. Typical water volumes used are around 1–2 ML for well drilling, and approximately 1–2 ML for each hydraulic fracturing stage.

The water-related risks associated with any onshore shale gas industry in the NT are covered in detail in Chapter 7.

5.7 Wastewater production and composition

Three main sources of wastewater are produced during the shale gas extraction process:

- **drilling mud water**: used to drill the initial wellbore;
- **flowback water**: returned to the surface in the first few weeks to months after hydraulic fracturing has occurred; and
- **produced water**: from the shale layer produced over the lifetime of the well.

5.7.1 Wastewater production

The volume of wastewater produced from drilling a well represents the smallest volume (1–2 ML) of wastewater produced during well development. Drilling fluids (drilling mud) are an essential component of drilling operations, and are distinct from hydraulic fracturing fluids used during well stimulation. These fluids provide cooling and lubrication to the drill bit and drill string, lift drill cuttings from the well, and provide a component of well control. Used drilling fluids are typically contained in lined sedimentation pits. The typically saline supernatant water is removed for treatment elsewhere, while the settled ‘mud’ component is recycled for use in other drilling operations.

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120 Scrimgeour 2016, p 6; Origin submission 153, p 75.
121 BC Oil and Gas Commission 2012.
123 Hoffman et al. 2014.
125 ACOLA Report; US EPA 2016a; APPEA submission 215.
126 Hossain and Al-Majed 2015, pp 73-139.
As described above, when a well is hydraulically fractured, this is done in stages, with each stage plugged while the next is being perforated and fractured. This creates an increase in pressure and a backup of both fluids and gas while further stages are being drilled. When the final stage is drilled, the fluids and gas are allowed to flow up out of the well for a period of up to two months (Figure 5.15). This is the ‘flowback period’, where the water returning from the well is composed partially of drilling and injected hydraulic fracturing fluids, and partially of formation brines that are trapped in the target formations and are extracted together with the gas.\(^{127}\) Shown in Figure 5.15 is the short ‘flushing period’ where the residual fluids and solids in the well, produced as a result of the hydraulic fracturing process, are cleaned out in advance of preparing the well for production. This water has been grouped with ‘flowback’, although it can be of such poor quality that it may be segregated for separate treatment or disposal, rather than re-use.

**Figure 5.15:** The difference between flowback and produced water.

The water generated after the flowback period during the lifetime of gas production is called ‘produced water’, the composition of which resembles the original formation water present in the shale layer.\(^{128}\)

Depending on the nature of the hydrocarbon-containing shale formation, 20–50% of the volume of the initially injected water is returned to the surface as flowback water. Therefore, for a typical 20 ML total volume of water used to hydraulically fracture a horizontal well, approximately 4–10 ML could come back to the surface as flowback water.\(^{129}\) Based on US experience, the discharge of flowback water typically lasts for 4–6 weeks, during which time the discharge rate decreases from about 550 L/min to about 4 L/min.\(^{130}\) Once above ground, the flowback water is usually stored in either temporary storage tanks or ponds or conveyed by a pipeline to a wastewater treatment plant.\(^{131}\) The method used depends on the rate of flow of the water, whether it is going to be re-used for fracturing another well on the same well pad, and the distance between the well pad and the collection/treatment facility.

The initial period of flowback water collection (up to two months) is followed by a production period of 20 to 40 years, during which time typically a much smaller amount of produced water returns to the surface along with the gas produced.\(^{132}\) Although the rate of flow is very much less than during the initial flowback stage, in aggregate, the volume of produced water can be quite substantial. Again, based on US experience, the ratio of volume of flowback to produced water is very dependent upon the formation.\(^{133}\) The produced water also is usually collected and conveyed to a central storage or treatment facility for the life of the well.

\(^{130}\) Ziemkiewicz and He 2015.  
\(^{131}\) US EPA 2016a.  
\(^{132}\) Kondash and Vengosh 2015.  
5.7.2 Composition of hydraulic fracturing fluid

The composition by volume of a typical water-based hydraulic fracturing fluid is 90% to 97% water, 1% to 10% proppant, and 1% or less of chemical additives.134 The proportions of water, proppant, and additives in the fracturing fluid, and the specific additives used, can vary depending on a number of factors, including the rock type and the chemistry of the reservoir. Hydraulic fracturing fluids are generally either ‘slickwater’ or gel-based.135 ‘Slickwater’ formulations, which include polymers (for example, polyacrylamide) as friction reducers, are typically used in very low permeability reservoirs, such as shales. Because slickwater fluids are thinner (lower viscosity), they do not carry proppant into the fractures as easily, and therefore the larger volumes of water and greater pumping pressures are required to effectively transport the proppant into fractures. By contrast, gelled fluids are more viscous, and more proppant can be transported, with less water, compared to slickwater fractures. Gel-based fluids are used with more permeable formations.

The US EPA found that approximately 1,100 different chemicals had been used in hydraulic fracturing in the period between 2005 and 2013.136 Hydraulic fracturing technology has evolved rapidly over the past decade, and much greater attention is now being paid to the potential for contamination of below-ground and surface environments, with a much smaller fraction of these chemicals now being routinely used in modern hydraulic fracturing practice. For example, a detailed analysis (based on 34,675 disclosures and 676,376 ingredient reports contained in the US FracFocus database) of the chemical usage data in the US between January 2011 and February 2013 showed that only 5% (35) of the total identified number of chemicals previously used were used in most of the fracturing operations over that period.137 Additionally, there has been a strong move over the last decade by the gas industry to use less toxic and more readily degradable chemicals, or so-called ‘greener’ chemicals.138 However, technology providers did not disclose the actual identity of 381 chemicals, and claimed those chemicals, or chemical mixtures, as confidential business information (CBI).139 The use of CBI reduces the completeness of the data sets and the level of confidence in any assessment of the toxicity of chemical used in hydraulic fracturing. The issue of CBI is contentious and is anecdotally one of the reasons for the gas industry moving towards the use of non-proprietary chemicals that can be openly disclosed on databases like FracFocus.140

The Panel notes that public disclosure of “specific information regarding chemicals” used in hydraulic fracturing is required in the NT.141 For example, the chemicals used for the eight unconventional wells142 that have been hydraulically fractured in the NT are available on DPIR’s website.143 The 40 chemicals (Table 7.7) for Origin’s Amungee NW-1H production test well were disclosed by Origin to the Government and to the Panel.144 This list is a subset of the much larger list compiled by the US EPA of the chemicals used in the US.145

5.7.3 Composition of flowback and produced water

The initial composition of the flowback water generated immediately after hydraulic fracturing ceases, and the pressure is relieved, is likely to more closely resemble depleted fracturing fluid because some of the chemicals are retained by adsorption in the shale bed. However, with time, the decreasing daily volumes of fluid produced will contain increasing quantities of the mobile (soluble) geogenic components present in the fractured rock and will ultimately resemble the original formation fluid in the shale layer.146 Typically, the flowback water produced after the initial flush is quite saline (greater than 50,000 mg/L total dissolved solids (TDS)), especially if the target formation is of marine origin.
Flowback water contains residual chemicals used in the hydraulic fracturing process plus geogenic chemicals that originate from the shale formation itself. These geogenic chemicals include salts, metals and metalloids, organic hydrocarbons, and naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), depending on the geochemistry of the deposit. The actual concentrations of these various components depend both on the geochemical nature of the target formation and on the hydraulic fracturing process used.

Produced water is typically very saline (50,000–200,000 mg/L TDS) with higher concentrations of geogenic chemicals than in flowback water, but with very little of the chemical signature of the fracturing fluid that was used.

In the US, approximately 600 discrete chemicals have been detected in flowback and produced waters, and of this, only 77 were components of the hydraulic fracturing fluids used. This suggests that many of the hydraulic fracturing chemicals are either retained in place or are degraded or transformed into other chemical compounds (or not specifically measured). There is increasing evidence that such transformation reactions do occur between components of the hydraulic fracturing mixture and as a result of the reaction of hydraulic fracturing chemicals with geogenic compounds.

A variety of volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds, including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes (BTEX), have been detected in flowback and produced water from shale reservoirs. In particular, average total BTEX levels in shale flowback/produced water in the US have been found to be one to two orders of magnitude higher than in produced water from CSG extraction. This is an important finding because it indicates that caution needs to be exercised in extrapolating risk assessments made on CSG produced waters and applying them to flowback water from deep shales. There are, however, wide variations in the concentrations of organic compounds being measured across different shale plays, which could result from lateral variations in the geology across the formation, combined with differences in the compositions of the hydraulic fracturing fluids being used.

The Panel is cautious in using US data, which is quite variable across individual shale basins, to gain an understanding of the likely composition of flowback/produced waters that will be produced in the NT. Only over the past five years have more extensive (and intensive) measurements been taken in the US of the concentrations of organic compounds present in flowback and produced water. Knowledge of flowback and produced water compositions is therefore provided by a few studies on a relatively limited number of samples where the full range of inorganic and organic constituents have been determined. This has limited the capacity for meaningful risk assessments of flowback and produced waters to be undertaken compared with the known chemicals present in the hydraulic fracturing formulations. This situation is also complicated by the fact that the concentrations of these organic compounds are very site specific, depending both on the shale formation being targeted and on the formulation of the hydraulic fracturing fluid(s) being used.

There is very limited data on the composition of flowback and produced water from onshore shale gas extraction in Australia, and this makes the need for empirical data from test wells all the more important. The overseas studies suggest that flowback and produced water can contain a much greater number of potentially environmentally sensitive chemicals than are present in the original hydraulic fracturing fluid composition, and moreover, that the majority of these additional compounds originate from the minerals and organic compounds present in the shale formation. However, merely because a chemical is detected in flowback or produced water does not mean that it will be harmful to human health or to the environment.

The Panel notes that while the shale gas industry in the US is now largely required to publicly disclose the composition of hydraulic fracturing fluids in databases such as FracFocus, similar disclosure has not been required for the composition of flowback or produced waters.

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149 US EPA 2016a.
152 Maguire-Boyle and Barron 2014.
This causes difficulties with the assessment of the status of water management practices in the gas industry, a situation that has been noted in recent publications on water sourcing, and treatment and disposal practices in the onshore shale gas industry in the US and Canada.\textsuperscript{154} A similar situation exists in the NT, where public disclosure of the composition of flowback or produced water is currently not mandated. This contrasts with the UK where the \textit{UK Onshore Shale Gas Well Guidelines} require that a range of information (including volumes and composition) about flowback fluids and produced water must be available from the operator for disclosure.\textsuperscript{155} The Panel notes that DPIR supports the disclosure of analysis of flowback water and has developed guidelines stipulating baseline monitoring, testing and reporting requirements of hydraulic fracturing fluids and flowback water.\textsuperscript{156} In addition, DPIR suggests that the testing of flowback water may not be necessary on every (production) well if hydraulic fracturing fluids and stimulated formations are the same.

A detailed discussion about the composition of hydraulic fracturing fluids and produced water in the NT context is provided in Section 7.6, drawing on the data acquired from the Amungee NW-1H production well. The Panel’s recommendations for the public disclosure, management and handling of hydraulic fracturing fluids and flowback waters are contained in \textit{Recommendation 7.10}.

5.8 Wastewater management and reuse

5.8.1 Storage

Flowback water has typically been stored initially in open, lined surface ponds that may be constructed on the land surface or excavated below ground level.\textsuperscript{157} In the US, there has recently been a move towards storing flowback water in special-purpose, above-ground tanks (see \textit{Recommendation 7.12}).\textsuperscript{158} The same ponds or tanks that are used to store the water used to initially formulate the hydraulic fracturing fluid can also be used to store flowback water, depending on the volumes and quality of the water, and the extent of reuse.

The Panel notes that since 1–2 ML of water is required for each stage of hydraulic fracturing, and at least 20 stages of hydraulic fracturing are likely (based on developing industry practice), at least 40 ML of storage will be needed per well for a fully developed production scenario. This volume will not be cumulative for a multi-well pad configuration and will depend on the extent of reuse possible, noting that the fracturing stages for an individual well are completed sequentially. The wells located along a well pad will also be fractured sequentially rather than concurrently. The sequential nature of the operation will enable reuse opportunities to be maximised.

An example of the type of storage used and storage volumes required was provided by Origin in its environmental management plan for the Amungee NW-1H 11 fracturing stage test well.\textsuperscript{159} An aerial photograph of the site showing the layout of the ponds and other site infrastructure was provided in Origin’s submission to the Panel.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{154} For example, Alessi et al. 2017.\textsuperscript{155} UK Onshore Oil and Gas 2016, section 9.3.\textsuperscript{156} Department of Primary Industry and Resources, submission 424 (DPIR submission 424), p 5.\textsuperscript{157} US EPA 2016a.\textsuperscript{158} BHP 2016, p 5.\textsuperscript{159} Origin 2016, p 21.\textsuperscript{160} Origin submission 153, p 81.
5.8.2 Treatment and reuse

The Panel notes that there is currently no industrial wastewater receiving, treatment or disposal facility in the NT. The relatively small volumes of wastewater produced to date, including from the Amungee NW-1H production well, have been transported by road to Mt Isa in Queensland. In the event that the moratorium is lifted, storage and transportation issues will need to be addressed as a matter of priority given the increase in volumes of water requiring disposal. While programmed reuse (see below) of such water is likely to be an operational feature of a production environment with multi-well pads, this is unlikely to be the case for the exploration phase of the gas industry’s life cycle. The Panel has noted in Queensland the consequences of not having a plan for the ultimate fate or disposal of water treatment brines in place at the start of the upswing in development of the CSG industry. It is also noted that the long-distance transport of wastewater and treatment brines is a risk factor that needs to be addressed by the gas industry (see Chapters 7, 8 and 10).

‘Reuse’ refers to the practice of using treated or untreated flowback and produced water as a proportion of the water used to make new batches of hydraulic fracturing fluid. Reuse of wastewater can reduce, but not eliminate, the amount of fresh water needed for hydraulic fracturing since the volume of flowback water from a single well is generally small compared to the total volume needed to fracture the well. The extent of reuse of flowback or produced water depends on its quality, as certain contaminants can interfere with hydraulic fracturing performance. For example, the presence of calcium and sulfate ions can cause scaling in the well, and the presence of suspended solids can decrease the effectiveness of the biocide, which together with scaling, can cause plugging of fracture networks and wells. Slickwater fracturing systems, containing polyacrylamide polymer as a friction reducer, are generally considered best suited for reuse because most of this polymer remains in the shale. However, slickwater treatments usually require substantially more water than gel-based systems.

161 Vidic et al. 2013.
Generally, some form of treatment of the wastewater will be required before it can be reused. The treatment method will depend on the chemical composition of the hydraulic fracturing wastewater and the desired reuse water quality. The development of cost-effective treatment systems for the complex mixture of inorganic and organic compounds contained in flowback waters is a rapidly evolving field.  

Salinity is usually not an issue for the treatment of shale gas wastewaters because high concentrations of ions, such as sodium and chloride, can be tolerated in reuse water. For example, seawater has been successfully used to prepare hydraulic fracturing fluid for offshore operations. However, high salinity flowback water can also be supersaturated with salts like gypsum, barite or calcite, which could severely compromise the efficiency of subsequent fracturing operations by causing precipitates to form and block up the newly created fracture network. In particular, when calcium and barium levels are high, scale inhibitors must be used, or salt content reduced, before the water can be reused.

Flowback water also contains a diverse range of organic compounds, some of which may be difficult to treat. However, many of these organic compounds are biodegradable and could be treated in a purpose-built biological treatment plant. The effective removal of these organic compounds is necessary if flowback water is to be treated and disposed of off-site, rather than being reused for hydraulic fracturing.

Removal of suspended solids, using a process such as electrocoagulation, is much less costly than the removal of dissolved salts using energy-intensive processes such as reverse osmosis or thermal brine concentration. This may be the only treatment required if there are low concentrations of potentially problematic ions (for example, calcium and sulfate) in the flowback water. However, conventional oilfield water treatment technologies (such as reverse osmosis) may not always be effective in unconventional gas projects due to specific constituents in flowback and produced water, such as residual polymers, which have the potential to severely interfere with membrane-based treatment.

It is apparent from the published literature, from reports by regulators, and from some of the submissions received by the Panel, that the transport of wastewater across the landscape has resulted in contamination events, caused either by accident or by deliberate intent. A specific measure to reduce the occurrence of illegal dumping of wastewater is to mandate an auditable chain of custody system to ensure that the wastewater that is picked up from one location is delivered to its intended location. In the case of pipelines, the volumes of water entering the pipeline and being delivered to a destination, such as a central storage facility or water treatment plant, must be continuously monitored so that the occurrence of a leak can be detected as soon as possible, noting that the pipelines will be buried.

**Recommendation 5.5**

That prior to the grant of any further exploration approvals, in consultation with the gas industry and the community, the Government develops a wastewater management framework for any onshore shale gas industry. Consideration must be given to the likely volumes and nature of wastewaters that will be produced by the industry during the exploration and production phases.

That the framework for managing wastewater includes an auditable chain of custody system for the transport of wastewater (including by pipelines) that enables source-to-delivery tracking of wastewater.

That the absence of any treatment and disposal facilities in the NT for wastewater and brines produced by the gas industry be addressed as a matter of priority.
5.8.3 Reinjection

Historically in the US there has been a very low percentage reuse of flowback water, with more than 95% of all wastewater from oil and gas extraction having been disposed of through reinjection into disposal wells located in conventional petroleum reservoirs. However, reinjection is being increasingly restricted because of the potential for groundwater contamination and induced seismicity. There are no known potential onshore sites for reinjection of flowback or produced water into conventional hydrocarbon formations in the NT outside the Amadeus Basin. This issue is covered in greater detail in Chapter 7.

5.8.4 Wastewater management incidents

In 2016, the US EPA collated data from thousands of wells that have been drilled and hydraulically fractured over the past decade. It concluded that there was no evidence of any widespread impact on shallow aquifers, and no demonstrated cases of contamination of drinking water resources from hydraulic fracturing at depth. However, the US EPA identified cases of drinking water contamination from spills of fracturing fluids or flowback water, and the contamination of aquifers as a result of failures of well integrity during and after hydraulic fracturing.

There is significant potential for accidental releases, leaks and spills of hydraulic fracturing chemicals and fluids and flowback and produced water that could lead to contamination of nearby surface water and seepage through the soil profile into shallow aquifers (see Chapter 7). Most spills are related to the storing of water and materials in tanks and pits, and in moving wastewaters in pipelines and other forms of transport (for example, road tankers) between equipment. Not surprisingly, the incidence of spills has been found to be greatest within the first three years of well life, when 75–94% of spills occurred. This is the period when wells are drilled, hydraulically fractured, and have their largest water production volumes. However, while there have been more than one million hydraulic fracture stimulations in North America, and more than 1,300 in the Cooper Basin in SA, there has been no reported evidence of fracturing fluid moving from the fractures to near surface aquifers.

There have been instances of contamination of surface waterways by discharges of incompletely treated flowback waters. This occurred in Pennsylvania in the US during the early development of the Marcellus gasfield. This is a separate issue from surface spills. It occurred as a result of an inappropriate use of municipal wastewater treatment plants to treat flowback water – a function for which they were not designed – followed by discharge of the partially treated water into rivers. This practice has now been banned by US federal regulation.

Hydraulic fracturing has been taking place in the NT since 1967, but mainly as a process to enhance hydrocarbon production from conventional reservoirs in vertical wells. Only since 2011 has very limited hydraulic fracturing of unconventional formations been undertaken. DPIR reports that these operations have had little impact on water resources, but no specific details were provided in its submission. There has been no independent assessment and reporting of environmental performance by the onshore gas industry in the NT. In any event, the onshore gas industry in the Territory is relatively small and the performance data available is unlikely to be representative of full-scale development.

171 DPIR submission 226.
175 Patterson et al. 2017.
177 Mauter et al. 2014; Mauter and Palmer 2014.
179 DPIR submission 226, p 46.
180 DPIR submission 226, p 53.
5.9 Proppant use in hydraulic fracturing

Proppant is the second most used component (typically 2–10% by volume) in hydraulic fracturing. The function of proppant has been described above in Section 5.3.2.3. Depending on the geomechanical characteristics of the shale formation and its depth, the preferred proppant can be size-graded sand (primarily quartz) or synthetic ceramic-like material. Sand is the most commonly used proppant material in the US.

As noted in several submissions, the sourcing of proppant could be of substantial environmental concern in the NT if sand is the preferred material. This is because very large amounts would be needed. For example, in the single Amungee well that had 11 fracturing stages, approximately 1100 tonnes of graded sand was used. For a 10 well pad with 40 fracturing stages per well, this could require 40,000 tonnes of proppant sand. To put this into perspective, a B-double road train can carry approximately 50 tonnes of material.

The potential sources of supply for proppant will therefore need to be clearly identified by gas companies because its extraction could result in a significant footprint of disturbance that will ultimately require rehabilitation. In addition, large numbers of truck movements will be needed to transport the bulk material. It is understood that potential sand deposits are documented in the DPIR database of mineral resources in the NT.

5.10 Solid waste management

The solids produced by drilling represent a substantial waste stream associated with the production of onshore shale gas. When a well is drilled, drilling fluids (including drilling muds) are used to maintain circulation of the drill bit and to transport drill cuttings back to the surface. Drill cuttings produced by exploration activities are typically disposed of in drill mud pits, which are backfilled to ground level when drilling is completed. Before this is done, excess liquids are typically evaporated, and the drilling muds are reused in the drilling of new wells.

In the US, the disposal of the large amounts of drill cuttings produced by a full-scale industry is the cause of concern given the nature of this material and its potential to leach organic and inorganic components into the near surface environment.

The magnitude of the issue is exemplified by considering the example of an eight well pad, drilled to 3,000 m depth, with 3,000 m long horizontal sections for each well and with a 10 cm diameter wellbore. This well configuration would produce around 190 m$^3$ of shale material from each horizontal well and approximately the same amount of material from the vertical sections, depending on depth, excluding drilling cuttings from the larger diameter conductor and upper casings. Accordingly, approximately 870 tonnes (dry weight) of shale and other material could be extracted per multi-well pad. While this is a very small amount of material compared with that produced by a typical coal or metal mine, when aggregated over hundreds of well pads it can comprise a substantial amount of material requiring appropriate management.

A strategic management issue for any potential onshore shale gas industry in the NT will be whether this solid waste should be contained in a purpose-built, engineered, and centralised facility, or contained and managed on a per well pad basis as is currently the case for the exploration phase.

Submissions received from the gas industry in response to requests for further information from the Panel indicated that solid waste management was an issue that did need to be addressed.

Origin noted that, “purpose built, engineered facilities would be required to safely manage some solid and liquid waste generated by commercial shale development within the NT. Whether these facilities are located centrally or on each of the lease pads will be assessed as a part of the development concept. It can be stated however, that these facilities will be designed to prevent the seepage of contaminants to the environment.”
Protocols and procedures have been developed by regulators, the gas industry and commercial-waste handling facilities to screen drilling wastes for content of metals, NORM and hydrocarbons and to separate out cleaner fractions that can be used for other purposes, such as road base.\textsuperscript{189} In particular, several independently owned and operated waste management facilities have serviced the solid waste management needs of the Queensland CSG industry for many years, and there is precedent for the development of such facilities in response to the demand from a full-scale gas industry.\textsuperscript{190}

**Recommendation 5.6**

*That in consultation with the gas industry and the community, specific guidance be implemented by the Government, drawing on protocols and procedures developed in other jurisdictions, for the characterisation, segregation, potential reuse and management of solid wastes produced by any onshore shale gas industry.*\textsuperscript{191}

### 5.11 Seismicity and subsidence

#### 5.11.1 Seismicity induced by hydraulic fracturing

There is now considerable evidence from the US and UK\textsuperscript{192} that low magnitude earthquakes may occur during hydraulic fracturing and that larger-scale (Richter scale magnitude greater than 2.0) earthquakes have occurred during the reinjection of wastewater.\textsuperscript{193} With regard to the former, there is potential for induced seismicity to result from the uncontrolled propagation of fractures produced during hydraulic fracturing that can extend for up to several hundred metres in varying directions in the adjacent geological strata.

Induced seismicity associated with shale gas hydraulic fracturing has been reported in both the UK and the US.\textsuperscript{194} The US experience is that the seismicity levels vary for individual shale gas basins, and will depend on the depth of the producing layers (shallower layers experience lower induced seismicity levels before shutdown of the hydraulic fracturing process occurs) and local geology (the degree of faulting in the area of interest).\textsuperscript{195} The seismicity caused by hydraulic fracturing mostly has very low magnitudes (typically between $M_W = -2$ - $0$) and is unlikely to be felt or cause infrastructure damage,\textsuperscript{196} including damage to any wells drilled for hydraulic fracturing that have been specifically designed to withstand the stress of hydraulic fracturing. Overseas, findings to date also suggest that it is extremely rare for hydraulic fracturing stimulation to result in earthquakes of sufficient scale (Richter scale magnitude 2.0 or greater) to be felt locally or to cause even slight damage to buildings.\textsuperscript{197}

Considerably larger earthquakes ($M_W = 3$ - $5.7$) have, however, been associated with the injection of large volumes of fluid. For example, the disposal of produced water. These earthquakes often occur after high volumes of fluid have been injected into the rocks and at much lower fluid pressures than those required for hydraulic fracturing. These larger earthquakes generally have properties that suggest that they are often associated with the reactivation of existing faults rather than the creation of new hydraulic fractures. There is the possibility that any introduced water could lubricate existing geological faults, and therefore, the location of deep injection wells should be controlled by knowledge of the local geology. Hydraulic fracturing should not occur in highly faulted areas. The potential to induce earthquakes through the disposal of wastewater down wells can be mitigated by proper management of formation pressures.

Based upon experience in the US and UK, the extent of fracturing can be monitored using sophisticated micro-seismic technologies, with the fracturing distance controlled by varying the pressure that is used.\textsuperscript{198} The Panel considers that implementation of the trigger levels used

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\textsuperscript{189} DEHP 2013; DEHP 2015.
\textsuperscript{190} Origin submission 433, p 34.
\textsuperscript{191} For example, DEHP 2013; DEHP 2015.
\textsuperscript{192} For example, de Pater and Baisch, 2011; Royal Society Report.
\textsuperscript{193} ACOLA Report; US EPA 2016a, p 66; Clarke et al. 2014; Warpinski et al. 2012, respectively.
\textsuperscript{194} Clarke et al. 2014; Warpinski et al. 2012, respectively.
\textsuperscript{195} Warpinski et al. 2012.
\textsuperscript{196} Drummond 2016; the unit of MW (moment magnitude) is equivalent to the Richter scale magnitude for the small to medium earthquakes referred to here.
\textsuperscript{197} SHIP 2017.
\textsuperscript{198} Royal Society Report. 
in the UK *Traffic Light Monitoring System*,\(^{199}\) which informs the gas companies as to the induced seismicity occurring during hydraulic fracturing by monitoring seismic activity in real time, can reduce the likelihood of induced significant felt seismic events (earthquakes). The rules state that hydraulic fracturing must be stopped if minor earth tremors of magnitude 0.5 or greater on the Richter scale occur.

In its submission, DPIR states that there is no evidence to suggest that the hydraulic fracturing process can produce measurable earthquakes in areas that do not contain susceptible faults.\(^{200}\) The statement must, however, be qualified by the comment that Australia does not yet have any seismic risk data covering shale gas operations or a national record of seismic activity below magnitude 4 on the Richter scale.

Seismic activity caused by the reinjection of wastewater into the ground is discussed in Chapter 7.

**Recommendation 5.7**

*That to minimise the risk of occurrence of seismic events during hydraulic fracturing operations, a traffic light system for measured seismic intensity, similar to that in the UK, be implemented.*

### 5.11.2 Subsidence

The development of sinkholes as a result of the hydraulic fracturing process has been noted as a matter of concern by the community. Also of concern was the presence of cavities in karstic terrains (especially around Katherine and Mataranka and which are also known to occur in the Beetaloo Sub-basin) that could possibly result in problems with the placement and anchoring of the conductor casing and the upper sections of any wellbores.

The Panel has not located any scientific information to date about the potential for the development of sinkholes, or diminished well integrity, as the result of drilling in karstic terrain. However, the Panel notes that sinkholes normally occur at shallow depths (tens of metres) in either limestone or evaporite (salt) rock that has been subject to long-term solution by groundwater.

Further, the Panel considers that sinkholes are highly unlikely to occur as a result of hydraulic fracturing because of the large vertical distance between the hydraulic fracturing zone and the surface (several thousand metres), a distance over which the intervening rocks should compensate for any small cavities produced by hydraulic fracturing. In this context, the Panel notes that very little incompressible material is actually removed during the drilling and fracturing process, so there are very few cavities that would contribute to subsidence. This contrasts with CSG operations, where a substantial proportion of the original void volume in the coal seam is removed as produced water, and there is a much greater possibility of subsidence given the closer proximity of the CSG activities to the surface.

The Panel acknowledges, however, the potential for complications associated with drilling in karstic terrain, and the importance of having experienced and licensed drillers conducting drilling operations in such areas.

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199 UK Government 2017; Wong et al. 2015.
200 DPIR submission 226, p. 56.
5.12 Conclusion

In conducting its review, CSIRO noted that many studies of well integrity do not make the distinction between failures of individual barriers and well integrity failure. This distinction is critical because full integrity failure (that is, failure of all the barriers) is required to provide a pathway for contamination of the environment. CSIRO found overall that the rate of well integrity failures that have the potential to cause environmental contamination is approximately 0.1%, with several studies finding no well integrity failures. The rate for a single well barrier failure, however, was much higher: approximately 1–10%. However, there were very few single barrier failures observed for wells constructed to Category 9 or above, and no well integrity failures for wells built to those categories. The Amungee NW-1H well that was constructed by Origin in the Beetaloo Sub-basin was of Category 9 standard, with casing cemented to surface along the entire length of the well.

CSIRO also found that for shale gas wells decommissioned using current practices, if any of the potential leakage pathways were to develop, it was highly unlikely that they would allow large fluid flow rates along the wellbore. The small cross-sectional areas and long vertical lengths of the pathways are expected to limit any flow. The low permeability of shale gas formations is also a factor mitigating the potential for impacts of loss of well integrity post-well decommissioning. Pressures within the part of the reservoir accessed by the well will have been depleted by production, and the very low permeability of the shale will prevent gas from other parts of the reservoir migrating to the well.

Although CSIRO concluded that the potential for serious post-decommissioning and abandonment integrity issues is low, the Panel has found that there is very little information available worldwide on the performance of decommissioned and abandoned onshore shale gas wells. The assessment of post-decommissioning or abandonment performance is an aspect that requires greater attention by both the regulator and the gas industry and is the subject of specific recommendations by the Panel.

Overall, the Panel concludes that provided a well is constructed to the high standard required for the particular local geology, and provided that it has passed all of the relevant integrity tests prior to, during, and after hydraulic fracturing, there is a ‘low’ likelihood of integrity issues. There does, however, need to be a program of regular integrity testing during the decades-long operational life of the well to ensure that if problems do develop, they are detected early and remediated quickly (as specified in Recommendation 5.4). In particular, the well must pass a rigorous set of integrity tests prior to being decommissioned because once a well has been abandoned, it is difficult to re-enter it. The nature of chemicals used for hydraulic fracturing is also of concern to the community. However, while there have been more than one million hydraulic fractures in North America and more than 1,300 in the Cooper Basin in SA, there has been no reported evidence of fracturing fluid moving from the fractures at depth to near surface aquifers, provided that hydraulic fracturing is not conducted in proximity to a major vertically transmissive fault or an adjacent improperly decommissioned deep gas or petroleum well. The former risk is addressed by Recommendation 7.15, while the latter risk is unlikely to eventuate in the NT because so little prior exploration (and no prior production) for gas has occurred in the most prospective shale basins.

Unlike hydraulic fracturing fluids from depth, there is a significant potential for contamination from the surface. In particular, accidental releases, leaks and spills of hydraulic fracturing chemicals and fluids, and/or from flowback and produced water, can lead to contamination of nearby surface water and seep through the soil profile into shallow aquifers (see Chapter 7). It also appears from the published literature, from reports by regulators and from some of the submission received by the Panel, that the transport of wastewater across the landscape has resulted in contamination events, caused either by accident, or in some instances, deliberately. To address this, the Panel has recommended that a wastewater management framework be developed, including an auditable chain of custody that enables source-to-delivery tracking (Recommendation 5.5).

The solids produced by drilling represent a substantial waste stream associated with the production of shale gas. A strategic management issue for any potential onshore shale gas
industry in the NT is the question of whether this solid waste should be contained in a purpose-built and engineered centralised facility, or contained and managed on a per well pad basis as is currently the case for the exploration regime.

The possibility of hydraulic fracturing causing earthquakes of sufficient magnitude (2 or greater on the Richter scale) to cause structural damage has been considered. Based on an extensive review of the evidence, the Panel has concluded that this is unlikely to occur as a result of hydraulic fracturing. The only exception is if a fault is activated by the reinjection of fluid. By contrast, there have been many instances of higher magnitude earthquakes resulting from the reinjection of waste water into conventional petroleum reservoirs. These larger earthquakes are often associated with the reactivation of existing faults in the reservoir formation.

Finally, the development of sinkholes as a result of hydraulic fracturing has been raised by the community. The Panel considers that the likelihood of sinkholes developing is ‘very low’ as a result of hydraulic fracturing because of the large vertical distance (several thousand metres) between the hydraulic fracturing zone and the surface, a distance over which the intervening rocks will compensate for any small cavities produced by hydraulic fracturing.